The English version of this specification is the only normative version. Non-normative translations may also be available.
Copyright © 2013-2014 FIDO Alliance All Rights Reserved.
UAF authenticators may be connected to a user device via various physical interfaces (SPI, USB, Bluetooth, etc). The UAF Authenticator-Specific Module (ASM) is a software interface on top of UAF authenticators which gives a standardized way for FIDO UAF Clients to detect and access the functionality of UAF authenticators and hides internal communication complexity from FIDO UAF Client.
This document describes the internal functionality of ASMs, defines the UAF ASM API and explains how FIDO UAF Clients should use the API.
This document's intended audience is FIDO authenticator and FIDO FIDO UAF Client vendors.
This section describes the status of this document at the time of its publication. Other documents may supersede this document. A list of current FIDO Alliance publications and the latest revision of this technical report can be found in the FIDO Alliance specifications index at https://www.fidoalliance.org/specifications/.
This document was published by the FIDO Alliance as a Proposed Standard. If you wish to make comments regarding this document, please Contact Us. All comments are welcome.
Implementation of certain elements of this Specification may require licenses under third party intellectual property rights, including without limitation, patent rights. The FIDO Alliance, Inc. and its Members and any other contributors to the Specification are not, and shall not be held, responsible in any manner for identifying or failing to identify any or all such third party intellectual property rights.
THIS FIDO ALLIANCE SPECIFICATION IS PROVIDED “AS IS” AND WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY OF NON-INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
This document has been reviewed by FIDO Aliance Members and is endorsed as a Proposed Standard. It is a stable document and may be used as reference material or cited from another document. FIDO Alliance's role in making the Recommendation is to draw attention to the specification and to promote its widespread deployment.
Type names, attribute names and element names are written as code
.
String literals are enclosed in “”, e.g. “UAF-TLV”.
In formulas we use “|” to denote byte wise concatenation operations.
DOM APIs are described using the ECMAScript [ECMA-262] bindings for WebIDL [WebIDL-ED].
The notation base64url refers to "Base 64 Encoding with URL and Filename Safe Alphabet" [RFC4648] without padding.
Following [WebIDL-ED], dictionary members are optional unless they are
explicitly marked as required
.
WebIDL dictionary members MUST NOT have a value of null.
Unless otherwise specified, if a WebIDL dictionary member is DOMString, it MUST NOT be empty.
Unless otherwise specified, if a WebIDL dictionary member is a List, it MUST NOT be an empty list.
UAF specific terminology used in this document is defined in [FIDOGlossary].
All diagrams, examples, notes in this specification are non-normative.
Note: Certain dictionary members need to be present in order to
comply with FIDO requirements. Such members are marked in the
WebIDL definitions found in this document, as
required
. The keyword required
has been
introduced by [WebIDL-ED], which is a work-in-progress. If you
are using a WebIDL parser which implements [WebIDL], then you
may remove the keyword required
from your WebIDL and
use other means to ensure those fields are present.
The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
This section is non-normative.
UAF authenticators may be connected to a user device via various physical interfaces (SPI, USB, Bluetooth, etc). The UAF Authenticator-Specific module (ASM) is a software interface on top of UAF authenticators which gives a standardized way for FIDO UAF Clients to detect and access the functionality of UAF authenticators, and hides internal communication complexity from clients.
The ASM is a platform-specific software component offering an API to FIDO UAF Clients, enabling them to discover and communicate with one or more available authenticators.
A single ASM may report on behalf of multiple authenticators.
The intended audience for this document is FIDO UAF authenticator and FIDO UAF Client vendors.
Platform vendors might choose to not expose the ASM API defined in this document to applications. They might instead choose to expose ASM functionality through some other API (such as, for example, the Android KeyStore API, or iOS KeyChain API). In these cases it's important to make sure that the underlying ASM communicates with the FIDO UAF authenticator in a manner defined in this document.
The FIDO UAF protocol and its various operations is described in the FIDO UAF Protocol Specification [UAFProtocol]. The following simplified architecture diagram illustrates the interactions and actors this document is concerned with:
ASM requests and responses are presented in WebIDL format.
This section is normative.
The ASM API is defined in terms of JSON-formatted [ECMA-404] request and reply messages. In order to send a request to an ASM, a FIDO UAF Client creates an appropriate object (e.g., in ECMAscript), "stringifies" it (also known as serialization) into a JSON-formated string, and sends it to the ASM. The ASM de-serializes the JSON-formatted string, processes the request, constructs a response, stringifies it, returning it as a JSON-formatted string.
The ASM request processing rules in this document explicitly assume that the underlying authenticator implements the "UAFV1TLV" assertion scheme (e.g. references to TLVs and tags) as described in [UAFProtocol]. If an authenticator supports a different assertion scheme then the corresponding processing rules must be replaced with appropriate assertion scheme-specific rules.
Authenticator implementers MAY create custom authenticator command interfaces other than the one defined in [UAFAuthnrCommands]. Such implementations are not required to implement the exact message-specific processing steps described in this section. However,
TAG_UAFV1_REG_ASSERTION
and TAG_UAFV1_AUTH_ASSERTION
.enum Request {
"GetInfo",
"Register",
"Authenticate",
"Deregister",
"GetRegistrations",
"OpenSettings"
};
Enumeration description | |
---|---|
GetInfo | GetInfo |
Register | Register |
Authenticate | Authenticate |
Deregister | Deregister |
GetRegistrations | GetRegistrations |
OpenSettings | OpenSettings |
interface StatusCode {
const short UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK = 0x00;
const short UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR = 0x01;
const short UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED = 0x02;
const short UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_CANCELLED = 0x03;
};
UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK
of type shortUAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR
of type shortUAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
of type shortUAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_CANCELLED
of type shortAll ASM requests are represented as ASMRequest
objects.
dictionary ASMRequest {
required Request requestType;
Version asmVersion;
unsigned short authenticatorIndex;
object args;
Extension[] exts;
};
ASMRequest
MembersrequestType
of type required RequestasmVersion
of type VersionVersion
dictionary see [UAFProtocol].
The ASM version MUST be 1.0 (i.e. major version is 1 and minor version 0).authenticatorIndex
of type unsigned shortGetInfo
request for more details.
Field authenticatorIndex
MUST NOT be set
for GetInfo
request.args
of type objectRegisterIn
AuthenticateIn
DeregisterIn
exts
of type array of ExtensionExtension
dictionary see [UAFProtocol].
All ASM responses are represented as ASMResponse
objects.
dictionary ASMResponse {
required short statusCode;
object responseData;
Extension[] exts;
};
ASMResponse
MembersstatusCode
of type required shortStatusCode
interfaceresponseData
of type objectGetInfoOut
RegisterOut
AuthenticateOut
GetRegistrationOut
exts
of type array of ExtensionExtension
dictionary see [UAFProtocol].
Return information about available authenticators.
authenticatorIndex
)
Where possible, an authenticatorIndex
should be
a persistent identifier that uniquely identifies an
authenticator over time, even if it is repeatedly
disconnected and reconnected. This avoids possible
confusion if the set of available authenticators changes
between a GetInfo
request and subsequent ASM requests,
and allows a FIDO client to perform caching of information about removable
authenticators for a better user experience.
For a GetInfo request, the following ASMRequest
member(s) MUST
have the following value(s). The remaining ASMRequest
members
SHOULD be omitted:
ASMRequest.requestType
MUST be set to GetInfo
For a GetInfo response, the following ASMResponse
member(s) MUST
have the following value(s). The remaining ASMResponse
members
SHOULD be omitted:
ASMResponse.statusCode
MUST have one of the following valuesUAF_ASM_STATUS_OK
UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR
ASMResponse.responseData
MUST be an object of type GetInfoOut
dictionary GetInfoOut {
required AuthenticatorInfo[] Authenticators;
};
GetInfoOut
MembersAuthenticators
of type array of required AuthenticatorInfodictionary AuthenticatorInfo {
required unsigned short authenticatorIndex;
required Version[] asmVersions;
required boolean isUserEnrolled;
required boolean hasSettings;
required AAID aaid;
required DOMString assertionScheme;
required unsigned short authenticationAlgorithm;
required unsigned short[] attestationTypes;
required unsigned long userVerification;
required unsigned short keyProtection;
required unsigned short matcherProtection;
required unsigned long attachmentHint;
required boolean isSecondFactorOnly;
required boolean isRoamingAuthenticator;
required DOMString[] supportedExtensionIDs;
required unsigned short tcDisplay;
DOMString tcDisplayContentType;
DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor[] tcDisplayPNGCharacteristics;
DOMString title;
DOMString description;
DOMString icon;
};
AuthenticatorInfo
MembersauthenticatorIndex
of type required unsigned shortasmVersions
of type array of required VersionVersion
dictionary see [UAFProtocol].
isUserEnrolled
of type required booleanhasSettings
of type required booleanOpenSettings
request.aaid
of type required AAIDassertionScheme
of type required DOMStringAssertionScheme identifiers are defined in the UAF Protocol specification [UAFProtocol].
authenticationAlgorithm
of type required unsigned shortUAF_ALG
prefix.attestationTypes
of type array of required unsigned shortTAG_ATTESTATION
prefixuserVerification
of type required unsigned longUSER_VERIFY
constants in [UAFRegistry].keyProtection
of type required unsigned shortKEY_PROTECTION
constants in [UAFRegistry].matcherProtection
of type required unsigned shortMATCHER_PROTECTION
constants in [UAFRegistry].attachmentHint
of type required unsigned longATTACHMENT_HINT
constants defined in
[UAFRegistry].
Because the connection state and topology of an authenticator may be transient, these values are only hints that can be used by server-supplied policy to guide the user experience, e.g. to prefer a device that is connected and ready for authenticating or confirming a low-value transaction, rather than one that is more secure but requires more user effort. These values are not reflected in authenticator metadata and cannot be relied on by the relying party, although some models of authenticator may provide attested measurements with similar semantics as part of UAF protocol messages.
isSecondFactorOnly
of type required booleanisRoamingAuthenticator
of type required booleansupportedExtensionIDs
of type array of required DOMStringtcDisplay
of type required unsigned shortTRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY
constants in [UAFRegistry].
This value MUST be 0 if transaction confirmation is not supported by the authenticator.
tcDisplayContentType
of type DOMStringThis value MUST be present if transaction confirmation is supported,
i.e. tcDisplay
is non-zero.
tcDisplayPNGCharacteristics
of type array of DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptorDisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor
structure see [UAFAuthnrMetadata].
This list MUST be present if transaction confirmation is supported,
i.e. tcDisplay
is non-zero.
title
of type DOMStringIf the ASM doesn't return a title, the FIDO UAF Client must provide a title to the calling App. See section "Authenticator interface" in [UAFAppAPIAndTransport].
description
of type DOMStringThis text should be localized for current locale.
The text is intended to be displayed to the user. It might deviate from the description specified in the metadata statement for the authenticator [UAFAuthnrMetadata].
If the ASM doesn't return a description, the FIDO UAF Client will provide a description to the calling application. See section "Authenticator interface" in [UAFAppAPIAndTransport].
icon
of type DOMStringIf the ASM doesn't return an icon, the FIDO UAF Client will provide a default icon to the calling application. See section "Authenticator interface" in [UAFAppAPIAndTransport].
Verify the user and return an authenticator-generated UAF registration assertion.
For a Register request, the following ASMRequest
member(s) MUST
have the following value(s). The remaining ASMRequest
members
SHOULD be omitted:
ASMRequest.requestType
MUST be set to Register
ASMRequest.asmVersion
MUST be set to the desired versionASMRequest.authenticatorIndex
MUST be set to the target authenticator indexASMRequest.args
MUST be set to an object of type RegisterIn
For a Register response, the following ASMResponse
member(s) MUST
have the following value(s). The remaining ASMResponse
members
SHOULD be omitted:
ASMResponse.statusCode
MUST have one of the following values:
UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK
UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR
UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_CANCELLED
ASMResponse.responseData
MUST be an object of type RegisterOut
dictionary RegisterIn {
required DOMString appID;
required DOMString username;
required DOMString finalChallenge;
required unsigned short attestationType;
};
RegisterIn
MembersappID
of type required DOMStringusername
of type required DOMStringfinalChallenge
of type required DOMStringattestationType
of type required unsigned shortdictionary RegisterOut {
required DOMString assertion;
required DOMString assertionScheme;
};
RegisterOut
Membersassertion
of type required DOMStringassertionScheme
of type required DOMStringAssertionScheme identifiers are defined in the UAF Protocol specification [UAFProtocol].
Refer to [UAFAuthnrCommands] document for more information about the TAGs and structure mentioned in this paragraph.
authenticatorIndex
.
If the authenticator cannot be located, then fail with UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR
.
If the authenticator supports UserVerificationToken
(see [UAFAuthnrCommands]), then the ASM
must obtain this token in order to later include it with
the Register
command.
UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
KHAccessToken
(see section
KHAccessToken for more
details)RegisterIn.finalChallenge
using the
authenticator-specific hash function (FinalChallengeHash
)
An authenticator's preferred hash function information MUST meet the
algorithm defined in the AuthenticatorInfo.authenticationAlgorithm
field.
TAG_UAFV1_REGISTER_CMD
structure and pass it to the authenticator
FinalChallengeHash
, KHAccessToken
,
RegisterIn.Username
,
UserVerificationToken
, RegisterIn.AppID
,
RegisterIn.AttestationType
AuthenticatorType
some arguments may be optional.
Refer to [UAFAuthnrCommands]
for more information on authenticator types and their required arguments.TAG_UAFV1_REGISTER_CMD_RESP
TAG_AUTHENTICATOR_ASSERTION
(e.g. TAG_UAFV1_REG_ASSERTION
) and
extract TAG_KEYID
CallerID
, AppID
, TAG_KEYHANDLE
,
TAG_KEYID
and CurrentTimestamp
in the ASM's database.
What data an ASM will store at this stage depends on underlying authenticator's architecture. For example some authenticators might store AppID, KeyHandle, KeyID inside their own secure storage. In this case ASM doesn't have to store these data in its database.
RegisterOut
object
RegisterOut.assertionScheme
according to AuthenticatorInfo.assertionScheme
TAG_AUTHENTICATOR_ASSERTION
(e.g. TAG_UAFV1_REG_ASSERTION
) in base64url format and set as
RegisterOut.assertion
.
RegisterOut
objectVerify the user and return authenticator-generated UAF authentication assertion.
For an Authenticate request, the following ASMRequest
member(s) MUST
have the following value(s). The remaining ASMRequest
members
SHOULD be omitted:
ASMRequest.requestType
MUST be set to Authenticate
.ASMRequest.asmVersion
MUST be set to the desired version.ASMRequest.authenticatorIndex
MUST be set to the target authenticator index.ASMRequest.args
MUST be set to an object of type AuthenticateIn
For an Authenticate response, the following ASMResponse
member(s) MUST
have the following value(s). The remaining ASMResponse
members
SHOULD be omitted:
ASMResponse.statusCode
MUST have one of the following values:
UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK
UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR
UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_CANCELLED
ASMResponse.responseData
MUST be an object of type
AuthenticateOut
dictionary AuthenticateIn {
required DOMString appID;
DOMString[] keyIDs;
required DOMString finalChallenge;
Transaction
[] transaction;
};
AuthenticateIn
MembersappID
of type required DOMStringkeyIDs
of type array of DOMStringfinalChallenge
of type required DOMStringtransaction
of type array of Transaction
This may, for example, depend on whether user's device is positioned horizontally or vertically at the moment of transaction.
dictionary Transaction {
required DOMString contentType;
required DOMString content;
DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor tcDisplayPNGCharacteristics;
};
Transaction
MemberscontentType
of type required DOMStringcontent
of type required DOMStringcontentType
to be shown to the user.tcDisplayPNGCharacteristics
of type DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptorDisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor
structure See [UAFAuthnrMetadata].dictionary AuthenticateOut {
required DOMString assertion;
required DOMString assertionScheme;
};
AuthenticateOut
Membersassertion
of type required DOMStringassertionScheme
of type required DOMStringRefer to the [UAFAuthnrCommands] document for more information about the TAGs and structure mentioned in this paragraph.
authenticatorIndex
UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
If the authenticator supports UserVerificationToken
(see [UAFAuthnrCommands]), the ASM
must obtain this token in order to later pass to Sign
command.
KHAccessToken
(see section KHAccessToken for more
details)
AuthenticateIn.finalChallenge
using an authenticator-specific
hash function (FinalChallengeHash
).
The authenticator's preferred hash function information MUST meet the
algorithm defined in the AuthenticatorInfo.authenticationAlgorithm
field.
AuthenticateIn.keyIDs
is empty, then return UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
AuthenticateIn.appID
and AuthenticateIn.keyIDs
and obtain
the KeyHandles associated with it.
UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
if no entry has been found AuthenticateIn.keyIDs
as KeyHandles
TAG_UAFV1_SIGN_CMD
structure and pass it to the authenticator.
AuthenticateIn.AppID
, AuthenticateIn.Transaction.content
(if not empty), FinalChallengeHash
, KHAccessToken
,
UserVerificationToken
, KeyHandles
This may, for example, depend on whether user's device is positioned horizontally or vertically at the moment of transaction.
AuthenticateIn.Transaction.content
before passing it to the authenticatorTAG_UAFV1_SIGN_CMD_RESP
TAG_USERNAME_AND_KEYHANDLE
, then
TAG_USERNAME_AND_KEYHANDLE
fieldsTAG_UAFV1_SIGN_CMD.KeyHandles
to the single KeyHandle associated with the selected
username.
TAG_UAFV1_SIGN_CMD command
AuthenticateOut
object
AuthenticateOut.assertionScheme
as AuthenticatorInfo.assertionScheme
TAG_AUTHENTICATOR_ASSERTION
(e.g. TAG_UAFV1_AUTH_ASSERTION
) in base64url format and
set as AuthenticateOut.assertion
AuthenticateOut
object
Some authenticators might support "Transaction Confirmation Display" functionality
not inside the authenticator but within the boundaries of the
ASM. Typically these are software based Transaction Confirmation Displays. When
processing the Sign
command with a given transaction such ASM
should show transaction content in its own UI and after user
confirms it -- pass the content to authenticator so that
the authenticator includes it in the final assertion.
See [UAFRegistry] for flags describing Transaction Confirmation Display type.
The authenticator metadata statement MUST truly indicate the
type of transaction confirmation display implementation.
Typically the "Transaction Confirmation Display" flag
will be set to TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY_ANY
or
TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY_PRIVILEGED_SOFTWARE
.
Delete registered UAF record from the authenticator.
For a Deregister request, the following ASMRequest
member(s) MUST
have the following value(s). The remaining ASMRequest
members
SHOULD be omitted:
ASMRequest.requestType
MUST be set to Deregister
ASMRequest.asmVersion
MUST be set to the desired versionASMRequest.authenticatorIndex
MUST be set to the target authenticator indexASMRequest.args
MUST be set to an object of type DeregisterIn
For a Deregister response, the following ASMResponse
member(s) MUST
have the following value(s). The remaining ASMResponse
members
SHOULD be omitted:
ASMResponse.statusCode
MUST have one of the following values:
UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK
UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR
UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
dictionary DeregisterIn {
required DOMString appID;
required DOMString keyID;
};
DeregisterIn
MembersappID
of type required DOMStringkeyID
of type required DOMStringRefer to [UAFAuthnrCommands] for more information about the TAGs and structures mentioned in this paragraph.
authenticatorIndex
KHAccessToken
(see section KHAccessToken for more
details).
DeregisterIn.appID
and DeregisterIn.keyID
TAG_UAFV1_DEREGISTER_CMD
structure, copy KHAccessToken
,
DeregisterIn.keyID
and pass it to the authenticator.
Return all registrations made for the calling FIDO UAF Client.
For a GetRegistrations request, the following ASMRequest
member(s) MUST
have the following value(s). The remaining ASMRequest
members
SHOULD be omitted:
ASMRequest.requestType
MUST be set to GetRegistrations
ASMRequest.asmVersion
MUST be set to the desired version ASMRequest.authenticatorIndex
MUST be set to corresponding ID For a GetRegistrations response, the following ASMResponse
member(s) MUST
have the following value(s). The remaining ASMResponse
members
SHOULD be omitted:
ASMResponse.statusCode
MUST have one of the following values:
UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK
UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR
ASMResponse.responseData
MUST be an object of type
GetRegistrationsOut
dictionary GetRegistrationsOut {
required AppRegistration[] appRegs;
};
GetRegistrationsOut
MembersappRegs
of type array of required AppRegistrationappID
(see AppRegistration
below).
MAY be an empty list.
dictionary AppRegistration {
required DOMString appID;
required DOMString[] keyIDs;
};
AppRegistration
MembersappID
of type required DOMStringkeyIDs
of type array of required DOMStringappID
authenticatorIndex
AppRegistration
objectsSome ASMs might not store this information inside their own database. Instead it might have been stored inside the authenticator's secure storage area. In this case the ASM must send a proprietary command to obtain the necessary data.
GetRegistrationsOut
object and returnDisplay the authenticator-specific settings interface. If the authenticator has its own built-in user interface,
then the ASM MUST invoke TAG_UAFV1_OPEN_SETTINGS_CMD
to display it.
For an OpenSettings request, the following ASMRequest
member(s) MUST
have the following value(s). The remaining ASMRequest
members
SHOULD be omitted:
ASMRequest.requestType
MUST be set to OpenSettings
ASMRequest.asmVersion
MUST be set to the desired versionASMRequest.authenticatorIndex
MUST be set to the target authenticator indexFor an OpenSettings response, the following ASMResponse
member(s) MUST
have the following value(s). The remaining ASMResponse
members
SHOULD be omitted:
ASMResponse.statusCode
MUST have one of the following values:
UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK
This section is non-normative.
In a typical implementation, the FIDO UAF Client will call
GetInfo
during initialization and obtain information about
the authenticators. Once the information is obtained it will
typically be used during FIDO UAF message processing to find a match
for given FIDO UAF policy. Once a match is found the FIDO UAF Client will
send the appropriate request (Register/Authenticate/Deregister...)
to this ASM.
The FIDO UAF Client may use the information obtained from
a GetInfo
response to display relevant information about an
authenticator to the user.
This section is normative.
On Android systems FIDO UAF ASMs MAY be implemented as a separate APK-packaged application.
The FIDO UAF Client invokes ASM operations via Android Intents. All interactions between the FIDO UAF Client and an ASM on Android takes place through the following intent identifier:
org.fidoalliance.intent.FIDO_OPERATION
To carry messages described in this document, an intent MUST also have
its type
attribute set
to application/fido.uaf_asm+json
.
ASMs MUST register that intent in their manifest file and implement a handler for it.
FIDO UAF Clients MUST append an extra, message
, containing a String
representation of a ASMRequest
, before invoking the intent.
FIDO UAF Clients MUST invoke ASMs by calling startActivityForResult()
FIDO UAF Clients SHOULD assume that ASMs will display an interface to the user in order to handle
this intent, e.g. prompting the user to complete the verification ceremony.
However, the ASM SHOULD NOT display any user interface when processing a GetInfo
request.
After processing is complete the ASM will return the response intent
as an argument to onActivityResult()
.
The response intent will have an extra, message
, containing a String
representation of a ASMResponse
.
FIDO UAF Clients can discover the ASMs available on the system by using
PackageManager.queryIntentActivities(Intent intent, int flags)
with the FIDO Intent described above to see if any activities are available.
A typical FIDO UAF Client will enumerate all
ASM applications using this function and will invoke the GetInfo
operation for each one discovered.
On Windows, an ASM is implemented in the form of a Dynamic Link
Library (DLL). The following is an example asmplugin.h
header
file defining a Windows ASM API:
/*! @file asm.h */ #ifndef __ASMH_ #define __ASMH_ #ifdef _WIN32 #define ASM_API __declspec(dllexport) #endif #ifdef _WIN32 #pragma warning ( disable : 4251 ) #endif #define ASM_FUNC extern "C" ASM_API #define ASM_NULL 0 /*! \brief Error codes returned by ASM Plugin API. * Authenticator specific error codes are returned in JSON form. * See JSON schemas for more details. */ enum asmResult_t { Success = 0, /**< Success */ Failure /**< Generic failure */ }; /*! \brief Generic structure containing JSON string in UTF-8 * format. * This structure is used throughout functions to pass and receives * JSON data. */ struct asmJSONData_t { int length; /**< JSON data length */ char pData; /*< JSON data */ }; /*! \brief Enumeration event types for authenticators. These events will be fired when an authenticator becomes available (plugged) or unavailable (unplugged). */ enum asmEnumerationType_t { Plugged = 0, /**< Indicates that authenticator Plugged to system */ Unplugged /**< Indicates that authenticator Unplugged from system */ }; namespace ASM { /*! \brief Callback listener. FIDO UAF Client must pass an object implementating this interface to Authenticator::Process function. This interface is used to provide ASM JSON based response data.*/ class ICallback { public virtual ~ICallback() {} /** This function is called when ASM's response is ready. * @param response JSON based event data @param exchangeData must be provided by ASM if it needs some data back right after calling the callback function. The lifecycle of this parameter must be managed by ASM. ASM must allocate enough memory for getting the data back. */ virtual void Callback(const asmJSONData_t &response, asmJSONData_t &exchangeData) = 0; }; /*! \brief Authenticator Enumerator. FIDO UAF Client must provide an object implementing this interface. It will be invoked when a new authenticator is plugged or when an authenticator has been unplugged. */ class IEnumerator { public virtual ~IEnumerator() {} /** This function is called when an authenticator is plugged or unplugged. * @param eventType event type (plugged/unplugged) @param AuthenticatorInfo JSON based GetInfoResponse object */ virtual void Notify(const asmEnumerationType_t eventType, const asmJSONData_t &AuthenticatorInfo) = 0; }; } /** Initializes ASM plugin. This is the first function to be called. * @param pEnumerationListener caller provided Enumerator */ ASM_FUNC asmResult_t asmInit(ASM::IEnumerator *pEnumerationListener); /** Process given JSON request and returns JSON response. * If the caller wants to execute a function defined in ASM JSON schema then this is the function that must be called. * @param pInData input JSON data @param pListener event listener for receiving events from ASM */ ASM_FUNC asmResult_t asmProcess(const asmJSONData_t *pInData, ASM::ICallback *pListener); /** Unitializes ASM plugin. * */ ASM_FUNC asmResult_t asmUninit(); #endif // __ASMPLUGINH_
A Windows-based FIDO UAF Client MUST look for ASM DLLs in the following registry paths:
HKCU\Software\FIDO\UAF\ASM
HKLM\Software\FIDO\UAF\ASM
The FIDO UAF Client iterates over all keys under this path and looks for "path" field:
[HK**\Software\FIDO\UAF\ASM\<exampleASMName>]
"path"="<ABSOLUTE_PATH_TO_ASM>.dll"
path
MUST point to the absolute location of the ASM DLL.
This section is normative.
ASM developers must carefully protect the FIDO UAF data they are working with. ASMs must follow these security guidelines:
ASMs MUST implement a mechanism for isolating UAF credentials registered by two different FIDO UAF Clients from one another. One FIDO UAF Client MUST NOT have access to FIDO UAF credentials that have been registered via a different FIDO UAF Client. This prevents malware from exercising credentials associated with a legitimate FIDO Client.
ASMs must properly protect their sensitive data against malware using platform-provided isolation capabilities in order to follow the assumptions made in [FIDOSecRef]. Malware with root access to the system or direct physical attack on the device are out of scope for this requirement.
The following are examples for achieving this:
An ASM designed specifically for bound authenticators MUST ensure that FIDO UAF credentials registered with one ASM cannot be accessed by another ASM. This is to prevent an application pretending to be an ASM from exercising legitimate UAF credentials.
An ASMs must implement platform-provided security best practices for protecting UAF related stored data.
ASMs MUST NOT store any sensitive FIDO UAF data in its local storage, except the following:
CallerID
, ASMToken
, PersonaID
,
KeyID
, KeyHandle
, AppID
An ASM, for example, must never store a username provided by a FIDO Server in its local storage in a form other than being decryptable exclusively by the authenticator.
ASMs SHOULD ensure that applications cannot use silent authenticators for tracking purposes. ASMs implementing support for a silent authenticator MUST show, during every registration, a user interface which explains what a silent authenticator is, asking for the users consent for the registration. Also, it is RECOMMENDED that ASMs designed to support roaming silent authenticators either
KHAccessToken
is an access control mechanism for protecting an
authenticator's FIDO UAF credentials from unauthorized use. It is
created by the ASM by mixing various sources of information
together. Typically, a KHAccessToken
contains the following four
data items in it: AppID
, PersonaID
,
ASMToken
and CallerID
.
AppID
is provided by the FIDO Server and is contained in every
FIDO UAF message.
PersonaID
is obtained by the ASM from the operational environment.
Typically a different PersonaID
is assigned to every operating system user
account.
ASMToken
is a randomly generated secret which is maintained
and protected by the ASM.
In a typical implementation an ASM will randomly generate an ASMToken when it is launched the first time and will maintain this secret until the ASM is uninstalled.
CallerID
is the ID the platform has assigned to the calling FIDO UAF Client
(e.g. "bundle ID" for iOS). On different platforms the caller ID
can be obtained differently.
For example on Android platform
ASM can use the hash of the caller's apk-signing-cert
.
The ASM uses the KHAccessToken
to establish a link between the ASM and
the key handle that is created by authenticator on behalf of
this ASM.
The ASM provides the KHAccessToken
to the authenticator with every
command which works with key handles.
The following example describes how the ASM constructs and uses
KHAccessToken
.
Register
request
AppID
KHAccessToken = AppID
ASMToken
,
PersonaID
and CallerID
KHAccessToken |= ASMToken | PersonaID | CallerID
KHAccessToken
KHAccessToken
using the authenticator's hashing algorithm.
The reason of using authenticator specific hash function is to
make sure of interoperability between ASMs. If interoperability
is not required, an ASM can use any other secure hash function it
wants.
KHAccessToken=hash(KHAccessToken)
KHAccessToken
to the authenticatorKHAccessToken
into
RawKeyHandle
(see
[UAFAuthnrCommands] for more details)
KHAccessToken
as input
argument
KHAccessToken
the same way as
during the Register
request and provides it to the authenticator along with other
arguments.
RawKeyHandle.KHAccessToken
is equal to
the provided KHAccessToken
.
Bound authenticators MUST support a mechanism for binding
generated key handles to ASMs. The binding mechanism MUST have at
least the same security characteristics as mechanism for protcting KHAccessToken
described above. As a consequence it is RECOMMENDED to securely derive
KHAccessToken
from AppID
, ASMToken
,
PersonaID
and the CallerID
.
It is recommended for roaming authenticators that the
KHAccessToken
contains only the AppID
since otherwise users won't
be able to use them on different machines (PersonaID
, ASMToken
and CallerID
are platform specific). If the authenticator
vendor decides to do that in order to address a specific use case, however, it is allowed.
Including PersonaID
in the KHAccessToken
is optional for all types
of authenticators. However an authenticator designed for
multi-user systems will likely have to support it.
The following table summarizes the access control requirements for each API call.
ASMs MUST implement the access control requirements defined below. ASM vendors MAY implement additional security mechanisms.
Terms used in the table:
NoAuth
-- no access controlCallerID
-- FIDO UAF Client's platform-assigned ID is verifiedUserVerify
-- user must be explicitly verificationKeyIDList
-- must be known to the callerCommands | First-factor bound authenticator | Second-factor bound authenticator | First-factor roaming authenticator | Second-factor roaming authenticator |
---|---|---|---|---|
GetInfo | NoAuth | NoAuth | NoAuth | NoAuth |
OpenSettings | NoAuth | NoAuth | NoAuth | NoAuth |
Register | UserVerify | UserVerify | UserVerify | UserVerify |
Authenticate | UserVerify
AppID CallerID PersonaID |
UserVerify
AppID KeyIDList CallerID PersonaID |
UserVerify
AppID |
UserVerify
AppiD KeyIDList |
GetRegistrations* | CallerID
PersonaID |
CallerID
PersonaID |
X | X |
Deregister | AppID
KeyID PersonaID CallerID |
AppID
KeyID PersonaID CallerID |
AppID
KeyID |
AppID
KeyID |