FIDO Metadata Statement

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Abstract

FIDO authenticators may have many different form factors, characteristics and capabilities. This document defines a standard means to describe the relevant pieces of information about an authenticator in order to interoperate with it, or to make risk-based policy decisions about transactions involving a particular authenticator.

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Type names, attribute names and element names are written as code.

String literals are enclosed in "", e.g., “UAF-TLV”.

In formulas we use “|” to denote byte wise concatenation operations.

DOM APIs are described using the ECMAScript [ECMA-262] bindings for WebIDL [WebIDL-ED].

Following [WebIDL-ED], dictionary members are optional unless they are explicitly marked as required.

WebIDL dictionary members MUST NOT have a value of null.

Unless otherwise specified, if a WebIDL dictionary member is DOMString, it MUST NOT be empty.

Unless otherwise specified, if a WebIDL dictionary member is a List, it MUST NOT be an empty list.

All diagrams, examples, notes in this specification are non-normative.
DOM APIs are described using the ECMAScript[ECMA-262] bindings for WebIDL [WebIDL-ED].

2. Overview

This section is not normative.

The FIDO family of protocols enable simpler and more secure online authentication utilizing a wide variety of different devices in a competitive marketplace. Much of the complexity behind this variety is hidden from Relying Party applications, but in order to accomplish the goals of FIDO, Relying Parties must have some means of discovering and verifying various characteristics of authenticators. Relying Parties can learn a subset of verifiable information for authenticators certified by the FIDO Alliance with an Authenticator Metadata statement. The Metadata statement can be acquired from the Metadata BLOB that is hosted on the Metadata Service [FIDOMetadataService].

For definitions of terms, please refer to the FIDO Glossary[FIDOGlossary].

2.1. Scope

This document describes the format of and information contained in Authenticator Metadata statements. For a definitive list of possible values for the various types of information, refer to the FIDO Registry of Predefined Values [FIDORegistry].

The description of the processes and methods by which authenticator metadata statements are distributed and the methods how these statements can be verified are described in the Metadata Service Specification [FIDOMetadataService].

2.2. Audience

The intended audience for this document includes:

- FIDO authenticator vendors who wish to produce metadata statements for their products.
- FIDO server implementers who need to consume metadata statements to verify characteristics of authenticators and attestation statements, make proper algorithm choices for protocol messages, create policy statements or tailor various other modes of operation to authenticator-specific characteristics.
- FIDO relying parties who wish to
  - create custom policy statements about which authenticators they will accept
  - risk score authenticators based on their characteristics
  - verify attested authenticator IDs for cross-referencing with third party metadata

2.3. Architecture
Authenticator metadata statements are used directly by the FIDO server at a relying party, but the information contained in the authoritative statement is used in several other places. How a server obtains these metadata statements is described in [FIDOMetadataService].

The workflow around an authenticator metadata statement is as follows:

1. The authenticator vendor produces a metadata statement, that is UTF-8 encoded, describing the characteristics of an authenticator.
2. The metadata statement is submitted to the FIDO Alliance as part of the FIDO certification process. The FIDO Alliance distributes the metadata as described in [FIDOMetadataService].
3. A FIDO relying party configures its registration policy to allow authenticators matching certain characteristics to be registered.
4. The FIDO server sends a registration challenge message. This message can contain such policy statement.
5. Depending on the FIDO protocol being used, either the relying party application or the FIDO UAF Client receives the policy statement as part of the challenge message and processes it. It queries available authenticators for their self-reported characteristics and (with the user’s input) selects an authenticator that matches the policy, to be registered.
6. The client processes and sends a registration response message to the server. This message contains a reference to the authenticator model and, optionally, a signature made with the private key corresponding to the public key in the authenticator’s attestation certificate.
7. The FIDO Server looks up the metadata statement for the particular authenticator model. If the metadata statement lists an attestation certificate(s), it verifies that an attestation signature is present, and made with the private key corresponding to either (a) one of the certificates listed in this metadata statement or (b)
This section is normative.

3. Types

3.1. Authenticator Attestation GUID (AAGUID) typedef

typedef DOMString AAGUID;

Some authenticators have an AAGUID, which is a 128-bit identifier that indicates the type (e.g. make and model) of the authenticator. The AAGUID MUST be chosen by the manufacturer to be identical across all substantially identical authenticators made by that manufacturer, and different (with probability \(1-2^{-128}\) or greater) from the AAGUIDs of all other types of authenticators.

The AAGUID is represented as a string (e.g. "7a98c250-6808-11cf-b73b-00aa00b677a7") consisting of 5 hex strings separated by a dash ("-"), see [RFC4122].

3.2. CodeAccuracyDescriptor dictionary

The CodeAccuracyDescriptor describes the relevant accuracy/complexity aspects of passcode user verification methods.

One example of such a method is the use of 4 digit PIN codes for mobile phone SIM card unlock.

We are using the numeral system base (radix) and \(\text{minLen}\), instead of the number of potential combinations since there is sufficient evidence [iPhonePasscodes] [MoreTopWorstPasswords] that users don’t select their code evenly distributed at random. So software might take into account the various probability distributions for different bases. This essentially means that in practice, passcodes are not as secure as they could be if randomly chosen.

```
dictionary CodeAccuracyDescriptor {
    required unsigned short base;
    required unsigned short minLength;
    unsigned short maxRetries;
    unsigned short blockSlowdown;
};
```

base, of type unsigned short

The numeric system base (radix) of the code, e.g. 10 in the case of decimal digits.
The minimum number of digits of the given base required for that code, e.g. 4 in the case of 4 digits.

**maxRetries, of type unsigned short**
Maximum number of false attempts before the authenticator will block this method (at least for some time). 0 means it will never block.

**blockSlowdown, of type unsigned short**
Enforced minimum number of seconds wait time after blocking (e.g. due to forced reboot or similar). 0 means this user verification method will be blocked, either permanently or until an alternative user verification method succeeded. All alternative user verification methods MUST be specified appropriately in the Metadata in `userVerificationDetails`.

### 3.3. BiometricAccuracyDescriptor dictionary

The `BiometricAccuracyDescriptor` describes relevant accuracy/complexity aspects in the case of a biometric user verification method, see [FIDOBiometricsRequirements].

At least one of the values MUST be set. If the vendor doesn't want to specify such values, then `VerificationMethodDescriptor.baDesc` MUST be omitted.

```plaintext
dictionary BiometricAccuracyDescriptor {
  double selfAttestedFRR;
  double selfAttestedFAR;
  unsigned short maxTemplates;
  unsigned short maxRetries;
  unsigned short blockSlowdown;
}
```

**selfAttestedFRR, of type double**
The false rejection rate [ISOIEC-19795-1] for a single template, i.e. the percentage of verification transactions with truthful claims of identity that are incorrectly denied. For example a FRR of 10% would be encoded as 0.1.

This value is self attested and, if the authenticator passed biometric certification, the data is an independently verified FRR as measured when meeting the FRR target specified in the biometric certification requirements [FIDOBiometricsRequirements] for the indicated biometric certification level (see `certLevel in related biometricStatusReport as specified in [FIDOMetadataService])`.

Note: The false rejection rate is relevant for user convenience. Lower false rejection rates mean better convenience.

**selfAttestedFAR, of type double**
The false acceptance rate [ISOIEC-19795-1] for a single template, i.e. the percentage of verification transactions with wrongful claims of identity that are incorrectly confirmed. For example a FAR of 0.002% would be encoded as 0.00002.

This value is self attested and, if the authenticator passed biometric certification, the data is an independently verified FAR specified in the biometric certification requirements [FIDOBiometricsRequirements] for the indicated biometric certification level (see `certLevel in related biometricStatusReport as specified in [FIDOMetadataService])`.
Note: The resulting FAR when all templates are used is approx. \( \text{maxTemplates} \times \text{FAR} \).

The false acceptance rate is relevant for the security. Lower false acceptance rates mean better security.

Only the live captured subjects are covered by this value - not the presentation of artefacts.

**maxTemplates**, of type **unsigned short**
Maximum number of alternative templates from different fingers allowed (for other modalities, multiple parts of the body that can be used interchangeably), e.g. 3 if the user is allowed to enroll up to 3 different fingers to a fingerprint based authenticator.

If the authenticator passed biometric certification this value defaults to 1. For \( \text{maxTemplates} \) greater than one, it SHALL be independently verified to ensure FAR meets biometric performance requirements of certLevel (of the related biometricStatusReport as specified in [FIDOMetadataService]).

If the authenticator did not pass biometric certification, vendor can submit any number, but this number has not been validated for biometric performance requirements.

**maxRetries**, of type **unsigned short**
Maximum number of false attempts before the authenticator will block this method (at least for some time). 0 means it will never block.

**blockSlowdown**, of type **unsigned short**
Enforced minimum number of seconds wait time after blocking (e.g. due to forced reboot or similar). 0 means that this user verification method will be blocked either permanently or until an alternative user verification method succeeded. All alternative user verification methods MUST be specified appropriately in the metadata in `userVerificationDetails`.

### 3.4. PatternAccuracyDescriptor dictionary

The `PatternAccuracyDescriptor` describes relevant accuracy/complexity aspects in the case that a pattern is used as the user verification method.

Note: One example of such a pattern is the 3x3 dot matrix as used in Android [AndroidUnlockPattern] screen unlock. The `minComplexity` would be 1624 in that case, based on the user choosing a 4-digit PIN, the minimum allowed for this mechanism.

```json
dictionary PatternAccuracyDescriptor {
    required unsigned long minComplexity;
    unsigned short maxRetries;
    unsigned short blockSlowdown;
};
```

**minComplexity**, of type **unsigned long**
Number of possible patterns (having the minimum length) out of which exactly one would be the right one, i.e. 1/probability in the case of equal distribution.

**maxRetries**, of type **unsigned short**
Maximum number of false attempts before the authenticator will block authentication using this method (at least temporarily). 0 means it will never block.

**blockSlowdown**, of type **unsigned short**
Enforced minimum number of seconds wait time after blocking (due to forced reboot or similar mechanism). 0 means this user verification method will be blocked, either permanently or until an alternative user verification method method succeeded. All alternative user verification methods MUST be specified appropriately in the metadata under `userVerificationDetails`.

Note: The resulting FAR when all templates are used is approx. \( \text{maxTemplates} \times \text{FAR} \).

The false acceptance rate is relevant for the security. Lower false acceptance rates mean better security.

Only the live captured subjects are covered by this value - not the presentation of artefacts.
3.5. VerificationMethodDescriptor dictionary

A descriptor for a specific base user verification method as implemented by the authenticator.

A base user verification method must be chosen from the list of those described in [FIDORegistry].

Note: In reality, several of the methods described above might be combined. For example, a fingerprint based user verification can be combined with an alternative password.

The specification of the related AccuracyDescriptor is optional, but recommended.

```plaintext
dictionary VerificationMethodDescriptor {
  DOMString userVerificationMethod;
  CodeAccuracyDescriptor caDesc;
  BiometricAccuracyDescriptor baDesc;
  PatternAccuracyDescriptor paDesc;
};
```

userVerificationMethod, of type DOMString

a single USER_VERIFY constant case-sensitive string name. See section "User Verification Methods" in [FIDO Registry] (e.g. "presence_internal"). This value MUST NOT be empty.

The constant USER_VERIFY_ALL MUST NOT be used here.

caDesc, of type CodeAccuracyDescriptor

May optionally be used in the case of method USER_VERIFY_PASSCODE_INTERNAL or USER_VERIFY_PASSCODE_EXTERNAL.

baDesc, of type BiometricAccuracyDescriptor

May optionally be used in the case of method USER_VERIFY_FINGERPRINT_INTERNAL, USER_VERIFY_VOICEPRINT_INTERNAL, USER_VERIFY_FACEPRINT_INTERNAL, USER_VERIFY_EYEPRINT_INTERNAL, or USER_VERIFY_HANDPRINT_INTERNAL.

paDesc, of type PatternAccuracyDescriptor

May optionally be used in case of method USER_VERIFY_PATTERN_INTERNAL or USER_VERIFY_PATTERN_EXTERNAL

3.6. VerificationMethodANDCombinations typedef

```plaintext
typedef VerificationMethodDescriptor[] VerificationMethodANDCombinations;
```

VerificationMethodANDCombinations list describes a combination of the user verification methods that MUST be passed by the user, in order to achieve successful user verification.

The list MUST NOT be empty.

Each entry in the VerificationMethodANDCombinations describes an individual user verification method, that must be passed by the user, as well as some security properties of the user verification method such as pin requirements, biometric properties, etc

3.7. rgbPaletteEntry dictionary

The rgbPaletteEntry is an RGB three-sample tuple palette entry
dictionary rgbPaletteEntry {
  required unsigned short r;
  required unsigned short g;
  required unsigned short b;
};

\textbf{r}, of type \texttt{unsigned short}
Red channel sample value

\textbf{g}, of type \texttt{unsigned short}
Green channel sample value

\textbf{b}, of type \texttt{unsigned short}
Blue channel sample value

\subsection*{3.8. DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor dictionary}

The DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor describes a PNG image characteristics as defined in the PNG\cite{PNG} spec for IHDR (image header) and PLTE (palette table)

\begin{verbatim}
dictionary DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor {
  required unsigned long width;
  required unsigned long height;
  required octet bitDepth;
  required octet colorType;
  required octet compression;
  required octet filter;
  required octet interlace;
  rgbPaletteEntry[] plte;
};
\end{verbatim}

\textbf{width}, of type \texttt{unsigned long}
image width

\textbf{height}, of type \texttt{unsigned long}
image height

\textbf{bitDepth}, of type \texttt{octet}
Bit depth - bits per sample or per palette index.

\textbf{colorType}, of type \texttt{octet}
Color type defines the PNG image type.

\textbf{compression}, of type \texttt{octet}
Compression method used to compress the image data.

\textbf{filter}, of type \texttt{octet}
Filter method is the preprocessing method applied to the image data before compression.

\textbf{interlace}, of type \texttt{octet}
Interlace method is the transmission order of the image data.

\textbf{plte}, of type rgbPaletteEntry[]
1 to 256 palette entries

\subsection*{3.9. EcdaaTrustAnchor dictionary}

In the case of ECDAA attestation, the ECDAA-Issuer’s trust anchor MUST be specified in this field.


```
dictionary EcdaaTrustAnchor {
    required DOMString X;
    required DOMString Y;
    required DOMString c;
    required DOMString sx;
    required DOMString sy;
    required DOMString G1Curve;
}
```

\(X\), of type **DOMString**

base64url encoding of the result of ECPoint2ToB of the ECPoint2 \(X = P_2^x\). See [FIDOEcdaaAlgorithm] for the definition of ECPoint2ToB.

\(Y\), of type **DOMString**

base64url encoding of the result of ECPoint2ToB of the ECPoint2 \(Y = P_2^y\). See [FIDOEcdaaAlgorithm] for the definition of ECPoint2ToB.

\(c\), of type **DOMString**

base64url encoding of the result of BigNumberToB(\(c\)). See section "Issuer Specific ECDAA Parameters" in [FIDOEcdaaAlgorithm] for an explanation of \(c\). See [FIDOEcdaaAlgorithm] for the definition of BigNumberToB.

\(sx\), of type **DOMString**

base64url encoding of the result of BigNumberToB(\(sx\)). See section "Issuer Specific ECDAA Parameters" in [FIDOEcdaaAlgorithm] for an explanation of \(sx\). See [FIDOEcdaaAlgorithm] for the definition of BigNumberToB.

\(sy\), of type **DOMString**

base64url encoding of the result of BigNumberToB(\(sy\)). See section "Issuer Specific ECDAA Parameters" in [FIDOEcdaaAlgorithm] for an explanation of \(sy\). See [FIDOEcdaaAlgorithm] for the definition of BigNumberToB.

\(G1Curve\), of type **DOMString**


Note: Whenever a party uses this trust anchor for the first time, it must first verify that it was correctly generated by verifying \(s, sx, sy\). See [FIDOEcdaaAlgorithm] for details.

### 3.10. ExtensionDescriptor dictionary

This descriptor contains an extension supported by the authenticator.

```
dictionary ExtensionDescriptor {
    required DOMString id;
    unsigned short tag;
    DOMString data;
    required boolean fail_if_unknown;
}
```

\(id\), of type **DOMString**

Identifies the extension.

\(tag\), of type **unsigned short**

The TAG of the extension if this was assigned. TAGs are assigned to extensions if they could appear in an assertion.
Examples are TAG_USER_VERIFICATION_STATE and TAG_USER_VERIFICATION_INDEX as defined in [UAFRegistry].

data, of type DOMString
Contains arbitrary data further describing the extension and/or data needed to correctly process the extension.
This field MAY be missing or it MAY be empty.

fail_if_unknown, of type boolean
Indicates whether unknown extensions must be ignored (false) or must lead to an error (true) when the extension is to be processed by the FIDO Server, FIDO Client, ASM, or FIDO Authenticator.

- A value of false indicates that unknown extensions MUST be ignored.
- A value of true indicates that unknown extensions MUST result in an error.

3.11. AlternativeDescriptions dictionary

This descriptor contains description in alternative languages.

dictionary AlternativeDescriptions {
    DOMString *IETFLanguageCodes-members...;
};

*IETFLanguageCodes-members...
IETF language codes ([RFC5646]), defined by a primary language subtag, followed by a region subtag based on a two-letter country code from [ISO3166] alpha-2 (usually written in upper case), e.g: Austrian-German - "de-AT". In case of absence of the specific territorial language definition, vendor should fallback to the more general language option, e.g: If "de" is given, but "de-AT" is missing, the use "de" entry instead. Description values can contain any UTF-8 characters.

For example:

    {  
        "ru-RU": "Пример U2F аутентификатора от FIDO Alliance",
        "fr-FR": "Exemple U2F authenticator de FIDO Alliance"
    }

Each description SHALL NOT exceed a maximum length of 200 characters.

3.12. AuthenticatorGetInfo dictionary

This dictionary describes supported versions, extensions, AAGUID of the device and its capabilities.

dictionary AuthenticatorGetInfo {
    DOMString members...;
};

members...
The members are the fields of the structure reported by an authenticator when invoking the 'authenticatorGetInfo' method, see [FIDOCTAP]. All binary values are base64 encoded.

4. Metadata Keys

This section is normative.
**dictionary MetadataStatement**

```javascript
dictionary MetadataStatement {
  DOMString legalHeader;
  AAID aaid;
  AAGUID aaguid;
  DOMString[] attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers;
  required DOMString description;
  AlternativeDescriptions alternativeDescriptions;
  required unsigned long authenticatorVersion;
  required DOMString protocolFamily;
  required unsigned short schema;
  required Version[] upv;
  required DOMString[] authenticationAlgorithms;
  required DOMString[] publicKeyAlgAndEncodings;
  required DOMString[] attestationTypes;
  required VerificationMethodANDCombinations[] userVerificationDetails;
  required DOMString[] keyProtection;
  boolean isKeyRestricted;
  boolean isFreshUserVerificationRequired;
  required DOMString[] matcherProtection;
  unsigned short cryptoStrength;
  required DOMString[] attachmentHint;
  DOMString tcDisplay;
  DOMString tcDisplayContentType;
  DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor[] tcDisplayPNGCharacteristics;
  required DOMString[] attestationRootCertificates;
  EcdaaTrustAnchor[] ecdaaTrustAnchors;
  DOMString icon;
  ExtensionDescriptor[] supportedExtensions;
  AuthenticatorGetInfo[] authenticatorGetInfo;
};
```

**legalHeader, of type DOMString**

The legalHeader, which must be in each Metadata Statement, is an indication of the acceptance of the relevant legal agreement for using the MDS.

The example of a Metadata Statement legal header is:

"legalHeader": "https://fidoalliance.org/metadata/metadata-statement-legal-header/".

**aaid, of type AAID**

The Authenticator Attestation ID. See [UAFProtocol] for the definition of the AAID structure. This field MUST be set if the authenticator implements FIDO UAF.

Note: FIDO UAF Authenticators support AAID, but they don’t support AAGUID.
It is always expected that the UAF Authenticator (or at least the UAF ASM) knows and provides the correct AAID.

**aaguid, of type AAGUID**

The Authenticator Attestation GUID. See [FIDOKeyAttestation] for the definition of the AAGUID structure. This field MUST be set if the authenticator implements FIDO2.

Note: FIDO 2 Authenticators support AAGUID, but they don’t support AAID.

**attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers, of type DOMString[]**

A list of the attestation certificate public key identifiers encoded as hex string.

This value MUST be calculated according to method 1 for computing the keyIdentifier as defined in [RFC5280] section 4.2.1.2. The hex string MUST NOT contain any non-hex characters (e.g. spaces). All hex letters MUST be lower case. This field MUST be set if neither aaid nor aaguid are set. Setting this field implies that the attestation certificate(s) are dedicated to a single authenticator model.
All attestationCertificateKeyId values should be unique within the scope of the Metadata Service.

Note: FIDO U2F Authenticators typically do not support AAID nor AAGUID, but they use attestation certificates dedicated to a single authenticator model.

description, of type DOMString
A human-readable, short description of the authenticator, in English.

Note: This description should help an administrator configuring authenticator policies. This description might deviate from the description returned by the ASM for that authenticator.
This description should contain the public authenticator trade name and the publicly known vendor name.

This description MUST be in English, and only contain ASCII [ECMA-262] characters.
This description SHALL NOT exceed a maximum length of 200 characters.

alternativeDescriptions, of type AlternativeDescriptions
A list of human-readable short descriptions of the authenticator in different languages.

authenticatorVersion, of type unsigned long
Earliest (i.e. lowest) trustworthy authenticatorVersion meeting the requirements specified in this metadata statement.

Adding new StatusReport entries with status UPDATE_AVAILABLE to the metadata BLOB object [FIDOMetadataService] MUST also change this authenticatorVersion if the update fixes severe security issues, e.g. the ones reported by preceding StatusReport entries with status code USER_VERIFICATION_BYPASS, ATTESTATION_KEY_COMPROMISE, USER_KEY_REMOTE_COMPROMISE, USER_KEY_PHYSICAL_COMPROMISE, REVOKED.

It is RECOMMENDED to assume increased risk if this version is higher (newer) than the firmware version present in an authenticator. For example, if a StatusReport entry with status USER_VERIFICATION_BYPASS or USER_KEY_REMOTE_COMPROMISE precedes the UPDATE_AVAILABLE entry, than any firmware version lower (older) than the one specified in the metadata statement is assumed to be vulnerable.

The specified version should equal the value of the ‘firmwareVersion’ member of the authenticatorGetInfo response. If present, see [FIDOCTAP].

protocolFamily, of type DOMString
The FIDO protocol family. The values "uaf", "u2f", and "fido2" are supported.

Metadata Statements for U2F authenticators MUST set the value of protocolFamily to "u2f". Metadata statement for UAF authenticator MUST set the value of protocolFamily to "uaf", and FIDO2/WebAuthentication Authenticator implementations MUST set the value of protocolFamily to "fido2".

schema, of type unsigned short
The Metadata Schema version

Metadata schema version defines what schema of the metadata statement is currently present. The schema version of this version of the specification is 3.

upv, of type Version[]
The FIDO unified protocol version(s) (related to the specific protocol family) supported by this authenticator. See [UAFProtocol] for the formal definition of the Version structure (containing major and minor version numbers).

The unified protocol version is determined as follows:

- in the case of FIDO UAF, use the upv value as specified in the respective "OperationHeader" field, see [UAFProtocol].
- in the case of U2F, use
- major version 1, minor version 0 for U2F v1.0
- major version 1, minor version 1 for U2F v1.1
- major version 1, minor version 2 for U2F v1.2 also known as CTAP1
- in the case of FIDO2/CTAP2, use
  - major version 1, minor version 0 for CTAP 2.0
  - major version 1, minor version 1 for CTAP 2.1

**authenticationAlgorithms**, of type `DOMString[]`

The list of authentication algorithms supported by the authenticator.

Must be set to the complete list of the supported ALG_ constant case-sensitive string names defined in the FIDO Registry of Predefined Values [FIDORegistry] (section "Authentication Algorithms") if the authenticator supports multiple algorithms. E.g. "secp256r1_ecdsa_sha256_raw", "secp256r1_ecdsa_sha256_der".

The list MUST NOT be empty.

**publicKeyAlgAndEncodings**, of type `DOMString[]`

The list of public key formats supported by the authenticator during registration operations.

Must be set to the complete list of the supported ALG_KEY constant case-sensitive string names defined in the FIDO Registry of Predefined Values [FIDORegistry] if the authenticator model supports multiple encodings. See section "Public Key Representation Formats", e.g. "ecc_x962_raw", "ecc_x962_der".

Because this information is not present in APIs related to authenticator discovery or policy, a FIDO server MUST be prepared to accept and process any and all key representations defined for any public key algorithm it supports. The list MUST NOT be empty. If there are multiple values they MUST be ordered by preference.

**attestationTypes**, of type `DOMString[]`

Must be set to the complete list of the supported ATTESTATION constant case-sensitive string names. See section "Authenticator Attestation Types" of FIDO Registry [FIDORegistry] for all available attestation formats, e.g. "basic_full".

**userVerificationDetails**, of type `VerificationMethodANDCombinations[]`

A list of alternative VerificationMethodANDCombinations.

userVerificationDetails is a two dimensional array, that informs RP what VerificationMethodANDCombinations user may be required to perform in order to pass user verification, e.g User need to pass fingerprint, or faceprint, or password and palm print, etc.
Consider this userVerificationDetails example:

```json
[
    
    { "userVerificationMethod": "fingerprint_internal" }
   ],
   // OR
   
    { "userVerificationMethod": "passcode_internal" }
   ],
   // OR
   
    { "userVerificationMethod": "faceprint_internal"},
    // AND
    { "userVerificationMethod": "voiceprint_internal"}
]
```

In this example we have user verification details that describe these potential scenarios: User has an authenticator model that requires

1. Fingerprint, or
2. Passcode, or
3. Faceprint and Voiceprint - where Voiceprint and Faceprint must be provided in order to pass user verification.

The RP verifying attestation or assertion, by checking UV flag in the response knows that one of the user verification combinations been passed.

Note: FIDO2 "Security Keys" will typically support "none", or "presence_internal", or "passcode_external" [FIDOCTAP], i.e.

```json
[
    
    { "userVerificationMethod": "none" }
   ],
   
    { "userVerificationMethod": "presence_internal" }
   ],
   
    { "userVerificationMethod": "passcode_external" }
   ],
   
    { "userVerificationMethod": "passcode_external" },
    { "userVerificationMethod": "presence_internal" }
]
```

The FIDO Client will typically prevent "none" (silent authentication) and "passcode_external" (without "presence_internal") from being used in practice, see [WebAuthn].

**keyProtection, of type DOMString[]**

The list of key protection types supported by the authenticator. Must be set to the complete list of the supported KEY_PROTECTION constant case-sensitive string names defined in the FIDO Registry of Predefined Values [FIDORegistry] in section "Key Protection Types" e.g. "secure_element". Each value MUST NOT be empty.
isKeyRestricted, of type boolean
This entry is set to true, if the Uauth private key is restricted by the authenticator to only sign valid FIDO signature assertions. This entry is set to false, if the authenticator doesn't restrict the Uauth key to only sign valid FIDO signature assertions. In this case, the calling application could potentially get any hash value signed by the authenticator. If this field is missing, the assumed value is isKeyRestricted=true.

Note: Only in the case of isKeyRestricted=true, the FIDO server can trust a signature counter, transaction text, or any other extension in the signature assertion to have been correctly processed/controlled by the authenticator.

isFreshUserVerificationRequired, of type boolean
This entry is set to true, if Uauth key usage always requires a fresh user verification. If this field is missing, the assumed value is isFreshUserVerificationRequired=true. This entry is set to false, if the Uauth key can be used without requiring a fresh user verification, e.g. without any additional user interaction, if the user was verified a (potentially configurable) caching time ago.

In the case of isFreshUserVerificationRequired=false, the FIDO server MUST verify the registration response and/or authentication response and verify that the (maximum) caching time (sometimes also called "authTimeout") is acceptable.

This entry solely refers to the user verification. In the case of transaction confirmation, the authenticator MUST always ask the user to authorize the specific transaction.

Note that in the case of isFreshUserVerificationRequired=false, the calling App could trigger use of the key without user involvement. In this case it is the responsibility of the App to ask for user consent.

matcherProtection, of type DOMString[]
The list of matcher protections supported by the authenticator. Must be set to the complete list of the supported MATCHER_PROTECTION constant case-sensitive string names defined in the FIDO Registry of Predefined Values [FIDORegistry]. See section "Matcher Protection Types", e.g. "on_chip". This value MUST NOT be empty.

If multiple user verification methods ("matchers") are implemented, then this value must reflect the weakest implementation of all user verification methods.

If a user verification method implementation is split across multiple components, then this value must reflect the weakest implementation of all those components.

The matcherProtection specified here denotes the effective security of the FIDO authenticator’s user verification. This means that a false positive user verification implies breach of the stated method. For example, if matcherProtection=TEE is stated, it shall be impossible to trigger use of the Uauth private key when bypassing the user verification without breaking the TEE.

cryptoStrength, of type unsigned short
The authenticator’s overall claimed cryptographic strength in bits (sometimes also called security strength or security level). If this value is absent, the cryptographic strength is unknown. If the cryptographic strength of one of the involved cryptographic methods is unknown the overall claimed cryptographic strength is also unknown.
attachmentHint, of type DOMString[]

The list of supported attachment hints describing the method(s) by which the authenticator communicates with the FIDO user device. Must be set to the complete list of the supported ATTACHMENT_HINT constant case-sensitive string names defined in the FIDO Registry of Predefined Values [FIDORegistry]. See section "Authenticator Attachment Hints", e.g. "nfc".

This value MUST NOT be empty.

Note: The connection state and topology of an authenticator may be transient and cannot be relied on as authoritative by a relying party, but the metadata field should have all the bit flags set for the topologies possible for the authenticator. For example, an authenticator instantiated as a single-purpose hardware token that can communicate over bluetooth should set ATTACHMENT_HINT_EXTERNAL but not ATTACHMENT_HINT_INTERNAL.

For FIDO2 the values of attachmentHint MUST correspond to the authenticatorGetInfo.transports if present.

See the field authenticatorGetInfo for FIDO2 authenticators; which expose similar information in the 'transports' member when invoking the 'authenticatorGetInfo' method. See [FIDOCTAP]

tcDisplay, of type DOMString[]

The list of supported transaction confirmation display capabilities. Must be set to include a valid combination, as specified in FIDO Registry of Predefined Values [FIDORegistry] section "Transaction Confirmation Display Types", of the supported TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY constant case-sensitive string names e.g. "any", "hardware".

This value MUST be empty, if transaction confirmation is not supported by the authenticator.

The tcDisplay specified here denotes the effective security of the authenticator’s transaction confirmation display. This means that only a breach of the stated method allows an attacker to inject transaction text to be included in the signature assertion which hasn’t been displayed and confirmed by the user.

tcDisplayContentType, of type DOMString

Supported MIME content type [RFC2049] for the transaction confirmation display, such as text/plain or image/png.

This value MUST be present if transaction confirmation is supported, i.e. tcDisplay is non-zero.

tcDisplayPNGCharacteristics, of type DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor[]

A list of alternative DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor.

Each of these entries is one alternative of supported image characteristics for displaying a PNG image.

This list MUST be present if PNG-image based transaction confirmation is supported, i.e. tcDisplay is non-zero and tcDisplayContentType is image/png.

attestationRootCertificates, of type DOMString[]

List of attestation trust anchors for the batch chain in the authenticator attestation. Each element of this array represents a PKIX [RFC5280] X.509 certificate that is a valid trust anchor for this authenticator model. Multiple certificates might be used for different batches of the same model. The array does not represent a certificate chain, but only the trust anchor of that chain. A trust anchor can be a root certificate, an intermediate CA certificate or even the attestation certificate itself.

Each array element is a base64-encoded (section 4 of [RFC4648]), DER-encoded [ITU-X690-2008] PKIX certificate value. Each element MUST be dedicated for authenticator attestation.
Either

1. the manufacturer attestation trust anchor

   or

2. the trust anchor dedicated to a specific authenticator model

MUST be specified.

In the case (1), the trust anchor certificate might cover multiple authenticator models. In this case, it must be possible to uniquely derive the authenticator model from the Attestation Certificate. When using AAID or AAGUID, this can be achieved by either specifying the AAID or AAGUID in the attestation certificate using the extension id-fido-gen-ce-aaid { 1 3 6 1 4 1 45724 1 1 1 } or id-fido-gen-ce-aaguid { 1 3 6 1 4 1 45724 1 1 4 } or - when neither AAID nor AAGUID are defined - by using the attestationCertificateKeyIdentifier method.

In the case (2) this is not required as the trust anchor only covers a single authenticator model.

When supporting surrogate basic attestation only (see [UAFProtocol], section "Surrogate Basic Attestation"), no attestation trust anchor is required/used. So this array MUST be empty in that case.

A list of trust anchors used for ECDAA attestation. This entry MUST be present if and only if attestationType includes ATTESTATION_ECDAA. The entries in attestationRootCertificates have no relevance for ECDAA attestation. Each ecdaaTrustAnchor MUST be dedicated to a single authenticator model (e.g as identified by its AAID/AAGUID).

Note: This field only applies to UAF authenticators.


List of extensions supported by the authenticator.

Note: This field only applies to UAF authenticators.

For FIDO2 authenticators see authenticatorGetInfo

Describes supported versions, extensions, AAGUID of the device and its capabilities.

The information is the same reported by an authenticator when invoking the 'authenticatorGetInfo' method, see [FIDOCTAP].

Note: This field MUST be present for FIDO 2 authenticators.

FIDO UAF and FIDO U2F authenticators do not support authenticatorGetInfo.

5. Metadata Statement Format
This section is not normative.
A FIDO Authenticator Metadata Statement is a document containing a JSON encoded dictionary MetadataStatement.

5.1. UAF Example

Example of the metadata statement for an UAF authenticator with:

- authenticatorVersion 2.
- Fingerprint based user verification allowing up to 5 registered fingers, with false acceptance rate of 0.002% and rate limiting attempts for 30 seconds after 5 false trials.
- Authenticator is embedded with the FIDO User device.
- The authentication keys are protected by TEE and are restricted to sign valid FIDO sign assertions only.
- The (fingerprint) matcher is implemented in TEE.
- The Transaction Confirmation Display is implemented in a TEE.
- The Transaction Confirmation Display supports display of "image/png" objects only.
- Display has a width of 320 and a height of 480 pixel. A bit depth of 16 bits per pixel offering True Color (=Color Type 2). The zlib compression method (0). It doesn't support filtering (i.e. filter type of=0) and no interlacing support (interlace method=0).
- It uses the ALG_SIGN_SECP256R1_ECDSA_SHA256_RAW authentication algorithm.
- It uses the ALG_KEY_ECC_X962_RAW public key format (0x100=256 decimal).
- It only implements the ATTESTATION_BASIC_FULL method (0x3E07=15879 decimal).
- It implements UAF protocol version (upv) 1.0 and 1.1.

```json
"legalHeader": "https://fidoalliance.org/metadata/metadata-statement-legal-header/",
"description": "FIDO Alliance Sample UAF Authenticator",
"aaid": "1234#5678",
"alternativeDescriptions": {
    "ru-RU": "Пример UAF аутентификатора от FIDO Alliance",
    "fr-FR": "Exemple UAF authenticator de FIDO Alliance"
},
"authenticatorVersion": 2,
"protocolFamily": "uaf",
"schema": 3,
"upv": [ { "major": 1, "minor": 0 }, { "major": 1, "minor": 1 } ],
"authenticationAlgorithms": ["secp256r1_ecdsa_sha256_raw"],
"publicKeyAlgAndEncodings": ["ecc_x962_raw"],
"attestationTypes": ["basic_full"],
"userVerificationDetails": [ { "userVerificationMethod": "fingerprint_internal", "baDesc": { "selfAttestedFAR": 0.00002, "maxRetries": 5, "blockSlowdown": 30, "maxTemplates": 5 } } ],
"keyProtection": ["hardware", "tee"]
```
Example of an **User Verification Methods** entry for an authenticator with:

- Fingerprint based user verification method, with:
  - the ability for the user to enroll up to 5 fingers (reference data sets) with
    - a false acceptance rate of 1 in 50000 (0.002%) per finger. This results in a FAR of 0.01% (0.0001).
    - The fingerprint verification will be blocked after 5 unsuccessful attempts.
- A PIN code with a minimum length of 4 decimal digits has to be set up as alternative verification method.
  Entering the PIN into the authenticator will be required to re-activate fingerprint based user verification after it has been blocked.

```json
EXAMPLE 2
[
  [
    {
      "userVerificationMethod": "fingerprint_internal",
      "baDesc": {
        "selfAttestedFAR": 0.000002,
        "maxTemplates": 5,
        "maxRetries": 5,
        "blockSlowdown": 0
      }
    }
  ],
  [
    {
      "userVerificationMethod": "passcode_internal",
      "caDesc": {
        "base": 10,
        "minLength": 4
      }
    }
  ]
]
```

5.2. **U2F Example**

Example of the metadata statement for an U2F authenticator with:

- authenticatorVersion 2.
- Touch based user presence check.
- Authenticator is a USB pluggable hardware token.
- The authentication keys are protected by a secure element.
- The user presence check is implemented in the chip. From the perspective of the authenticator, the presence check is optional for U2F_AUTHENTICATE.
- The Authenticator is a pure second factor authenticator.
- It uses the **ALG_SIGN_SECP256R1_ECDSA_SHA256_RAW** authentication algorithm.
- It uses the **ALG_KEY_ECC_X962_RAW** public key format.
- It only implements the **ATTESTATION_BASIC_FULL** method.
It implements U2F protocol versions 1.2, 1.1 and 1.0.
5.3. FIDO2 Example

Example of the metadata statement for an FIDO2 authenticator with:

- AAGUID is set to 0132d110-bf4e-4208-a403-ab4f5f12efe5.
- authenticatorVersion is set to 2.
- Touch based user presence check, and external pin (ClientPin Protocol) support.
- Authenticator is a USB pluggable hardware token with support for NFC.
- The authentication keys are protected by a secure element.
- The user presence check is implemented in the chip. From the perspective of the authenticator, the presence check is optional for getAssertion.
- It uses the ALG_SIGN_SECP256R1_ECDSA_SHA256_RAW and ALG_SIGN_RSASSA_PKCSV15_SHA256_RAW authentication algorithms.
- It uses the ALG_KEY_COSE public key format.
- It only implements the ATTESTATION_BASIC_METHOD method.
- It implements FIDO2 protocol version 1.0.

```json
EXAMPLE 4
{
    "legalHeader": "https://fidoalliance.org/metadata/metadata-statement-legal-header/",
    "description": "FIDO Alliance Sample FIDO2 Authenticator",
    "aaguid": "0132d110-bf4e-4208-a403-ab4f5f12efe5",
    "alternativeDescriptions": {
        "ru-RU": "Пример FIDO2 аутентификатора от FIDO Alliance",
        "fr-FR": "Exemple FIDO2 authenticateur de FIDO Alliance",
        "zh-CN": "FIDO AllianceFIDO2"
    },
    "protocolFamily": "fido2",
    "schema": 3,
    "authenticatorVersion": 5,
    "upv": {
        "major": 1, "minor": 0
    }
}
```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"MMD5r1Jj3F0gHNjDSNarYugMyLMyZsk7P1xpoHfp8
h3Wp1LzNFnk54Xcc1wDGUmYzXYeffh6/c/kTtvM4EBxa9VQGdxr3LrUMRJHEKk72azFYKQA2hGQ1
z+85NFNpXDr4k3xv1Q8xQ6BzeNboBskn8k4enbRw+k1hWfXTFD01EYyWUs5n+vDqgKaxzucDEo1
sh102Q0a0h0mXr12La3m0f9w1k9+wLNTMY/86MPO8y3i10f4xm6P0WqG9+DZukYna56mS5z5WwS
5qV1rVuyJqXAlnzkial/gHSD7RkTyihogAAAAABJRUSErKJggg==", "supportedExtensions": [
"id": "hmac-secret", "fail_if_unknown": false },
"id": "credProtect", "fail_if_unknown": false ]
],
"authenticatorGetInfo": { "versions": [ "U2F_V2", "FIDO_2.0" ],
"extensions": [ "credProtect", "hmac-secret" ],
"aaguid": "0132d110b4e4208a403ab4f5f12efe5", "options": [ "plat": false, "rk": true, "clientPin": true, "up": true, "uv": true, "uvToken": false, "config": false ],
"maxMsgSize": 1200, "pinUvAuthProtocols": [1],
"maxCredentialCountInList": 16, "maxCredentialIdLength": 128, "transports": ["usb", "nfc"],
"algorithms": [{ "type": "public-key", "alg": -7 },
{ "type": "public-key", "alg": -257 }]
],
"maxAuthenticatorConfigLength": 1024, "defaultCredProtect": 2, "firmwareVersion": 5
}
6. Additional Considerations

6.1. Field updates and metadata

Metadata statements are intended to be stable once they have been published. When authenticators are updated in the field, such updates are expected to improve the authenticator security (for example, improve FRR or FAR). The authenticatorVersion must be updated if firmware updates fixing severe security issues (e.g. as reported previously) are available.

Note: The metadata statement is assumed to relate to all authenticators having the same authenticator model identifier (AAID/AAGUID/attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers).

Note: The FIDO Server is recommended to assume increased risk if the authenticatorVersion specified in the metadata statement is newer (higher) than the one present in the authenticator.

Significant changes in authenticator functionality are not anticipated in firmware updates. For example, if an authenticator vendor wants to modify a PIN-based authenticator to use "Speaker Recognition" as a user verification method, the vendor MUST assign a new authenticator model identifier (AAID/AAGUID/attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers) to this authenticator.

A single authenticator implementation could report itself as two "virtual" authenticators using different authenticator model identifiers (AAIDs/AAGUIDs/attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers). Such implementations MUST properly (i.e. according to the security characteristics claimed in the metadata) protect UAuth keys and other sensitive data from the other "virtual" authenticator - just as a normal authenticator would do.

Note: Authentication keys (UAuth.pub) registered for one authenticator model (e.g. as identified by AAID/AAGUID/attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers) cannot be used by authenticators reporting a different authenticator model identifier (AAID/AAGUID/attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers) - even when running on the same hardware (see section "Authentication Response Processing Rules for FIDO Server" in [UAFProtocol]).

Index

Terms defined by this specification

AAGUID
aaguid
AAID
aaid
alternativeDescriptions
attachmentHint
attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers
attestationRootCertificates
attestationTypes
authenticationAlgorithms
authenticatorGetInfo
authenticatorVersion
b
baDesc
base
BiometricAccuracyDescriptor
protocolFamily
publicKeyAlgAndEncodings
r
rgbPaletteEntry
schema
selfAttestedFAR
selfAttestedFRR
supportedExtensions
sx
sy
tag
tcDisplay
tcDisplayContentType
tcDisplayPNGCharacteristics
upv
userVerificationDetails
userVerificationMethod
VerificationMethodANDCombinations
VerificationMethodDescriptor
width
X
Y

Terms defined by reference

[WebIDL] defines the following terms:
  DOMString
  boolean
  double
  octet
  unsigned long
  unsigned short

References

Normative References

[ECMA-262]

[FIDOAuthenticatorSecurityRequirements]

[FIDOBiometricsRequirements]
Informative References§


[AndroidUnlockPattern] Android Unlock Pattern Security Analysis. Published. URL: http://www.sinustrom.info/2012/05/21/android-unlock-pattern-security-analysis/


[FIDOKeyAttestation] FIDO 2.0: Key attestation format. URL: https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20150904/fido-key-attestation-v2.0-ps-20150904.html

typedef DOMString AAGUID;

dictionary CodeAccuracyDescriptor {
    required unsigned short base;
    required unsigned short minLength;
    unsigned short maxRetries;
    unsigned short blockSlowdown;
};

dictionary BiometricAccuracyDescriptor {
    double selfAttestedFRR;
    double selfAttestedFAR;
    unsigned short maxTemplates;
    unsigned short maxRetries;
    unsigned short blockSlowdown;
};

dictionary PatternAccuracyDescriptor {
    required unsigned long minComplexity;
    unsigned short maxRetries;
    unsigned short blockSlowdown;
};

dictionary VerificationMethodDescriptor {
    DOMString userVerificationMethod;
    CodeAccuracyDescriptor caDesc;
}
typedef VerificationMethodDescriptor[] VerificationMethodANDCombinations;

dictionary rgbPaletteEntry {
    required unsigned short r;
    required unsigned short g;
    required unsigned short b;
};

dictionary DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor {
    required unsigned long width;
    required unsigned long height;
    required octet bitDepth;
    required octet colorType;
    required octet compression;
    required octet filter;
    required octet interlace;
    rgbPaletteEntry[] plte;
};

dictionary EcdaaTrustAnchor {
    required DOMString X;
    required DOMString Y;
    required DOMString c;
    required DOMString sx;
    required DOMString sy;
    required DOMString G1Curve;
};

dictionary ExtensionDescriptor {
    required DOMString id;
    unsigned short tag;
    DOMString data;
    required boolean fail_if_unknown;
};

dictionary MetadataStatement {
    DOMString legalHeader;
    AAID aaid;
    AAAGUID aaguid;
    DOMString[] attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers;
    required DOMString description;
    AlternativeDescriptions alternativeDescriptions;
    required unsigned long authenticatorVersion;
    required DOMString protocolFamily;
    required unsigned short schema;
    required Version[] upv;
    required DOMString[] authenticationAlgorithms;
    required DOMString[] publicKeyAlgAndEncodings;
    required DOMString[] attestationTypes;
    required VerificationMethodANDCombinations[] userVerificationDetails;
    required DOMString[] keyProtection;
    boolean isKeyRestricted;
    boolean isFreshUserVerificationRequired;
    required DOMString[] matcherProtection;
    unsigned short cryptoStrength;
    DOMString[] attachmentHint;
    required DOMString tcDisplay;
    DOMString tcDisplayContentType;
DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor[]
required DOMString[]
EcdaaTrustAnchor[]
DOMString
ExtensionDescriptor[]
AuthenticatorGetInfo
};
tcDisplayPNGCharacteristics;
attestationRootCertificates;
eCdaaTrustAnchors;
icon;
supportedExtensions;
authenticatorGetInfo;