

# FIDO Metadata Service

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## Abstract

The FIDO Authenticator Metadata Specification defines so-called "Authenticator Metadata" statements. The metadata statements contains the "Trust Anchor" required to validate the attestation object, and they also describe several other important characteristics of the authenticator. The metadata service described in this document defines a baseline method for relying parties to access the latest metadata statements.

## Status of This Document

*This section describes the status of this document at the time of its publication. Other documents may supersede this document. A list of current FIDO Alliance publications and the latest revision of this technical report can be found in the [FIDO Alliance specifications index](https://www.fidoalliance.org/specifications/) at <https://www.fidoalliance.org/specifications/>.*

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## 1. Notation

Type names, attribute names and element names are written as code

String literals are enclosed in “”, e.g. “UAF-TLV”.

In formulas we use “|” to denote byte wise concatenation operations.

The notation `base64url(byte[8..64])` reads as 8-64 bytes of data encoded in base64url, "Base 64 Encoding with URL and Filename Safe Alphabet" [\[RFC4648\]](#) *without padding*.

Following [\[WebIDL-ED\]](#), dictionary members are optional unless they are explicitly marked as `required`.

WebIDL dictionary members **MUST NOT** have a value of null.

Unless otherwise specified, if a WebIDL dictionary member is `DOMString`, it **MUST NOT** be empty.

Unless otherwise specified, if a WebIDL dictionary member is a `List`, it **MUST NOT** be an empty list.

For definitions of terms, please refer to the FIDO Glossary [\[FIDOGlossary\]](#).

All diagrams, examples, notes in this specification are non-normative.

Note: Certain dictionary members need to be present in order to comply with FIDO requirements. Such members are marked in the WebIDL definitions found in this document, as required. The keyword required has been introduced by [\[WebIDL-ED\]](#), which is a work-in-progress. If you are using a WebIDL parser which implements [\[WebIDL\]](#), then you may remove the keyword required from your WebIDL and use other means to ensure those fields are present.

## 1.1. Key Words§

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [\[RFC2119\]](#).

## 2. Overview§


*This section is not normative.*

[\[FIDOMetadataStatement\]](#) defines authenticator metadata statements.

These metadata statements contain the trust anchor required to verify the attestation object (more specifically the KeyRegistrationData object), and they also describe several other important characteristics of the authenticator, including supported authentication and registration assertion schemes, and key protection flags.

These characteristics can be used when defining policies about which authenticators are acceptable for registration or authentication.

The metadata service described in this document defines a baseline method for relying parties to access the latest metadata statements.



**Figure 1** FIDO Metadata Service Architecture Overview

### 2.1. Scope§

This document describes the FIDO Metadata Service architecture in detail and it defines the structure and

interface to access this service. It also defines the flow of the metadata related messages and presents the rationale behind the design choices.


## 2.2. Detailed Architecture

The metadata BLOB file contains a list of metadata statements related to the authenticators known to the FIDO Alliance (FIDO Authenticators).

The FIDO Server downloads the metadata BLOB file from a well-known FIDO URL and caches it locally.

The FIDO Server verifies the integrity and authenticity of this metadata BLOB file using the digital signature. It then iterates through the individual entries and parses the metadata statements related to authenticator models relevant to the relying party.

Individual metadata statements are included in the entry of the metadata BLOB file, and may be cached by the FIDO Server as required.



**Figure 2** FIDO Metadata Service Architecture

The single arrow indicates the direction of the network connection, the double arrow indicates the direction of the data flow.

The metadata BLOB file is accessible at a well-known URL published by the FIDO Alliance.

The relying party decides how frequently the metadata service is accessed to check for metadata BLOB updates.

## 3. Metadata Service Details

*This section is normative.*

The relying party can decide whether it wants to use the metadata service and whether or not it wants to accept certain authenticators for registration or authentication.

The relying party could also obtain metadata directly from authenticator vendors or other trusted sources.

### 3.1. Metadata BLOB Format

The metadata service makes the metadata BLOB object (see [Metadata BLOB](#)) accessible to FIDO Servers.

This object contains all metadata for each authenticator including the metadata statements defined in [FIDO Metadata Statement](#). The BLOB object contains one signature.

#### 3.1.1. Metadata BLOB Payload Entry dictionary

Represents the MetadataBLOBPayloadEntry

```
dictionary MetadataBLOBPayloadEntry {  
    AAID aaid;  
    AAGUID aaguid;  
    DOMString[] attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers;  
    required MetadataStatement metadataStatement;  
    BiometricStatusReport[] biometricStatusReports;  
    required StatusReport[] statusReports;  
    required DOMString timeOfLastStatusChange;  
    DOMString rogueListURL;  
    DOMString rogueListHash;  
};
```

##### **aaid, of type AAID**

The AAID of the authenticator this metadata BLOB payload entry relates to. See [UAF Protocol](#) for the definition of the AAID structure. This field MUST be set if the authenticator implements FIDO UAF.

**NOTE:** FIDO UAF authenticators support AAID, but they don't support AAGUID.

##### **aaguid, of type AAGUID**

The Authenticator Attestation GUID. See [FIDO Key Attestation](#) for the definition of the AAGUID structure. This field MUST be set if the authenticator implements FIDO2.

**NOTE:** FIDO2 authenticators support AAGUID, but they don't support AAID.

##### **attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers, of type DOMString[]**

A list of the attestation certificate public key identifiers encoded as hex string. This value MUST be calculated according to method 1 for computing the keyIdentifier as defined in [RFC5280](#) section 4.2.1.2.

- The hex string MUST NOT contain any non-hex characters (e.g. spaces).
- All hex letters MUST be lower case.
- This field MUST be set if neither aaid nor aaguid are set. Setting this field implies that the attestation certificate(s) are dedicated to a single authenticator model.

FIDO U2F authenticators do not support AAID nor AAGUID, but they use attestation certificates dedicated to a single authenticator model.

**metadataStatement, of type [MetadataStatement](#)**

The metadataStatement JSON object as defined in [\[FIDOMetadataStatement\]](#).

**biometricStatusReports, of type [BiometricStatusReport\[\]](#)**

Status of the FIDO Biometric Certification of one or more biometric components of the Authenticator [\[FIDO BiometricsRequirements\]](#).

**statusReports, of type [StatusReport\[\]](#)**

An array of status reports applicable to this authenticator.

**timeOfLastStatusChange, of type [DOMString](#)**

ISO-8601 formatted date since when the status report array was set to the current value.

**rogueListURL, of type [DOMString](#)**

URL of a list of rogue (i.e. untrusted) individual authenticators.

**rogueListHash, of type [DOMString](#)**

`base64url(string[1..512])`

The hash value computed over the Base64url encoding of the UTF-8 representation of the JSON encoded rogueList available at rogueListURL (with type rogueListEntry[]). The hash algorithm related to the signature algorithm specified in the JWTHeader (see [Metadata BLOB](#) MUST be used.

This hash value MUST be present and non-empty whenever rogueListURL is present.

This method of base64url-encoding the UTF-8 representation is also used by JWT [\[JWT\]](#) to avoid encoding ambiguities.

#### EXAMPLE 1

```
{
  "no": 1234,
  "nextUpdate": "2014-03-31",
  "entries": [
    {
      "aaid": "1234#5678",
      "metadataStatement": "Metadata Statement object as defined in Metadata Statement spec."
    },
    {
      "statusReports": [
        {
          "status": "FIDO_CERTIFIED",
          "effectiveDate": "2014-01-04"
        }
      ],
      "timeOfLastStatusChange": "2014-01-04"
    },
    {
      "attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers": [
        "7c0903708b87115b0b422def3138c3c864e44573"
      ],
      "metadataStatement": "Metadata Statement object as defined in Metadata Statement spec."
    },
    {
      "statusReports": [
        {
          "status": "FIDO_CERTIFIED",
          "effectiveDate": "2014-01-07"
        },
        {
          "status": "UPDATE_AVAILABLE",
          "effectiveDate": "2014-02-19",
          "url": "https://example.com/update1234"
        }
      ],
      "timeOfLastStatusChange": "2014-02-19"
    }
  ]
}
```

### 3.1.2. BiometricStatusReport dictionary

Contains the current BiometricStatusReport of one of the authenticator's biometric component.

```
dictionary BiometricStatusReport {
  required unsigned short certLevel;
  required DOMString      modality;
  DOMString                effectiveDate;
  DOMString                certificationDescriptor;
  DOMString                certificateNumber;
  DOMString                certificationPolicyVersion;
  DOMString                certificationRequirementsVersion;
};
```

#### certLevel, of type [unsigned short](#)

Achieved level of the biometric certification of this biometric component of the authenticator [[FIDO Biometrics Requirements](#)].

#### modality, of type [DOMString](#)

A *single* a single USER\_VERIFY short form case-sensitive string name constant, representing biometric

modality. See section "User Verification Methods" in [\[FIDORegistry\]](#) (e.g. "fingerprint\_internal"). This value MUST NOT be empty and this value MUST correspond to one or more entries in field `userVerificationDetails` in the related Metadata Statement [\[FIDOMetadataStatement\]](#). This value MUST represent a biometric modality.

For example use `USER_VERIFY_FINGERPRINT` for the fingerprint based biometric component. In this case the related Metadata Statement must also claim fingerprint as one of the user verification methods.

**effectiveDate, of type [DOMString](#)**

ISO-8601 formatted date since when the `certLevel` achieved, if applicable. If no date is given, the status is assumed to be effective while present.

**certificationDescriptor, of type [DOMString](#)**

Describes the externally visible aspects of the Biometric Certification evaluation.

For example it could state that the "biometric component is implemented OnChip - keeping biometric data inside the chip only."

**certificateNumber, of type [DOMString](#)**

The unique identifier for the issued Biometric Certification.

**certificationPolicyVersion, of type [DOMString](#)**

The version of the Biometric Certification Policy the implementation is Certified to, e.g. "1.0.0".

**certificationRequirementsVersion, of type [DOMString](#)**

The version of the Biometric Requirements [\[FIDOBiometricsRequirements\]](#) the implementation is certified to, e.g. "1.0.0".

### 3.1.3. StatusReport dictionary

Contains an `AuthenticatorStatus` and additional data associated with it, if any.

New `StatusReport` entries will be added to report known issues present in firmware updates.

The latest `StatusReport` entry MUST reflect the "current" status. For example, if the latest entry has status `USER_VERIFICATION_BYPASS`, then it is recommended assuming an increased risk associated with all authenticators of this AAID; if the latest entry has status `UPDATE_AVAILABLE`, then the update is intended to address at least all previous issues *reported* in this `StatusReport` dictionary.

The certification of FIDO Authenticators does NOT cover the security characteristics of multi-device keys.

```
dictionary StatusReport {
    required AuthenticatorStatus status;
    DOMString effectiveDate;
    unsigned long authenticatorVersion;
    DOMString batchCertificate;
    DOMString certificate;
    DOMString url;
    DOMString certificationDescriptor;
    DOMString certificateNumber;
    DOMString certificationPolicyVersion;
    DOMString certificationProfiles;
    DOMString certificationRequirementsVersion;
    DOMString sunsetDate;
    unsigned long fipsRevision;
    unsigned long fipsPhysicalSecurityLevel;
};
```

**status, of type [AuthenticatorStatus](#)**

Status of the authenticator. Additional fields MAY be set depending on this value.

**effectiveDate, of type [DOMString](#)**

ISO-8601 formatted date since when the status code was set, if applicable. If no date is given, the status is assumed to be effective while present.

**authenticatorVersion, of type [unsigned long](#)**

The authenticatorVersion (firmware version) that this status report relates to. In the case of FIDO\_CERTIFIED\* status values, the status applies to higher authenticatorVersions until there is a new statusReport.

For example, if the status would be USER\_VERIFICATION\_BYPASS, the authenticatorVersion indicates the vulnerable firmware version of the authenticator. Similarly, if the status would be UPDATE\_AVAILABLE, the authenticatorVersion indicates the updated firmware version that is available now. If the status would be SELF\_ASSERTION\_SUBMITTED, the authenticatorVersion indicates the firmware version that the self assertion was based on.

The firmware version of the authenticator providing the attestation can be found in the attestation certificate in extension id-fido-gen-ce-fw-version (OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.45724.1.1.5).

**batchCertificate, of type [DOMString](#)**

Base64-encoded [\[RFC4648\]](#) (not base64url!) DER [\[ITU-X690-2008\]](#) PKIX certificate value related to the current status, if applicable.

As an example, this could be an Batch Attestation Certificate (see[\[FIDOMetadataStatement\]](#)) related to a set of compromised authenticators (USER\_KEY\_REMOTE\_COMPROMISE).

**certificate, of type [DOMString](#)**

Base64-encoded [\[RFC4648\]](#) (not base64url!) DER [\[ITU-X690-2008\]](#) PKIX certificate value related to the current status, if applicable. This field will typically not be present if field batchCertificate is present.

As an example, this could be an Attestation Root Certificate (see[\[FIDOMetadataStatement\]](#)) related to a set of compromised authenticators (ATTESTATION\_KEY\_COMPROMISE).

**url, of type [DOMString](#)**

HTTPS URL where additional information may be found related to the current status, if applicable.

For example a link to a web page describing an available firmware update in the case of status UPDATE\_AVAILABLE, or a link to a description of an identified issue in the case of status USER\_VERIFICATION\_BYPASS.

**certificationDescriptor, of type [DOMString](#)**

Describes the externally visible aspects of the Authenticator Certification evaluation.

For example it could state that the authenticator is a "SecurityKey based on a CC EAL 5 certified chip hardware".

**certificateNumber, of type [DOMString](#)**

The unique identifier for the issued Certification.

**certificationPolicyVersion, of type [DOMString](#)**

The version of the Authenticator Certification Policy the implementation is Certified to, e.g. "1.0.0".

**certificationProfiles, of type [DOMString\[\]](#)**

array of strings. Each entry represents a supported certification profile. The supported profiles are defined in the active version of the [Authenticator Certification Policy](#) document. At the time of writing this specification, the supported profiles are: "consumer" and "enterprise".

### **certificationRequirementsVersion, of type [DOMString](#)**

The Document Version of the Authenticator Security Requirements (DV)[\[FIDOAuthenticatorSecurityRequirements\]](#) the implementation is certified to, e.g. "1.2.0".

### **sunsetDate, of type [DOMString](#)**

ISO-8601 formatted date since when the status will expire, if applicable. If no date is given, the status is assumed to not have a scheduled expiry.

### **fipsRevision, of type [unsigned long](#)**

The revision number of the FIPS 140 specification, e.g. "3" in the case of FIPS 140-3. This entry MUST be present if and only if the [status](#) entry is one of FIPS140\_CERTIFIED\_L\*.

### **fipsPhysicalSecurityLevel, of type [unsigned long](#)**

In the case the status represents a FIPS certification, this field contains the "physical security level" of the FIPS certification. This entry MUST be present if and only if the [status](#) entry is one of FIPS140\_CERTIFIED\_L\*. It MUST reflect the physical security level which might deviate from the overall level.

## **3.1.4. AuthenticatorStatus enum**

This enumeration describes the status of an authenticator model as identified by its AAID/AAGUID or attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers and potentially some additional information (such as a specific attestation key).

```
enum AuthenticatorStatus {
    "NOT_FIDO_CERTIFIED",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED",
    "USER_VERIFICATION_BYPASS",
    "ATTESTATION_KEY_COMPROMISE",
    "USER_KEY_REMOTE_COMPROMISE",
    "USER_KEY_PHYSICAL_COMPROMISE",
    "UPDATE_AVAILABLE",
    "RETIRED",
    "REVOKED",
    "SELF_ASSERTION_SUBMITTED",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L1",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L1plus",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L2",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L2plus",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L3",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L3plus",
    "FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L1",
    "FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L2",
    "FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L3",
    "FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L4"
};
```

### **3.1.4.1. Certification Related Statuses**

The certification of FIDO Authenticators does NOT cover the security characteristics of multi-device keys.

#### **NOT\_FIDO\_CERTIFIED**

This authenticator is not FIDO certified.

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- effectiveDate - When status was achieved
- authenticatorVersion - The minimum applicable authenticator version.
- url - To the authenticator page or additional information about the authenticator

#### **SELF\_ASSERTION\_SUBMITTED**

The authenticator vendor has completed and submitted the self-certification checklist to the FIDO Alliance. If this completed checklist is publicly available, the URL will be specified in url.

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- effectiveDate - Date of incident being reported
- authenticatorVersion - New authenticator version that is

#### **FIDO\_CERTIFIED**

This authenticator has passed FIDO functional certification. This certification scheme is phased out and will be replaced by FIDO\_CERTIFIED\_L1.

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- effectiveDate - When certification was issued
- authenticatorVersion - The minimum version of the certified solution
- certificationDescriptor - Authenticator Description. I.e. "Munkey 7c Black Edition"
- certificateNumber - FIDO Alliance Certificate Number
- certificationPolicyVersion - Authenticator Certification Policy
- certificationProfiles - list of supported certification profiles
- certificationRequirementsVersion - Security Requirements Version
- url - URL to the certificate, or the news article about achievement of the certification.

These fields are applicable to any of the FIDO\_CERTIFIED\_\*.

#### **FIDO\_CERTIFIED\_L1**

The authenticator has passed FIDO Authenticator certification at level 1. This level is the more strict successor of FIDO\_CERTIFIED.

#### **FIDO\_CERTIFIED\_L1plus**

The authenticator has passed FIDO Authenticator certification at level 1+. This level is the more than level 1.

#### **FIDO\_CERTIFIED\_L2**

The authenticator has passed FIDO Authenticator certification at level 2. This level is more strict than level 1+.

#### **FIDO\_CERTIFIED\_L2plus**

The authenticator has passed FIDO Authenticator certification at level 2+. This level is more strict than level 2.

#### **FIDO\_CERTIFIED\_L3**

The authenticator has passed FIDO Authenticator certification at level 3. This level is more strict than level 2+.

#### **FIDO\_CERTIFIED\_L3plus**

The authenticator has passed FIDO Authenticator certification at level 3+. This level is more strict than level 3.

#### **FIPS140\_CERTIFIED\_L1**

The authenticator has passed FIPS 140 certification at overall level 1.

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- certificateNumber - certificate number as given in the FIPS certificate
- url - URL to the FIPS certificate (e.g. [https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/\[nn\]](https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/[nn]))
- sunsetDate - the sunset data as given in the FIPS certificate
- fipsPhysicalSecurityLevel - the level of the physical security according to the FIPS certificate

These fields are applicable to any of the FIPS140\_CERTIFIED\_\*.

#### **FIPS140\_CERTIFIED\_L2**

The authenticator has passed FIPS 140 certification at overall level 2.

#### **FIPS140\_CERTIFIED\_L3**

The authenticator has passed FIPS 140 certification at overall level 3.

#### **FIPS140\_CERTIFIED\_L4**

The authenticator has passed FIPS 140 certification at overall level 4.

#### **RETIRED**

The authenticator vendor has decided to retire the product, that this authenticator should not be accepted any longer. For example if a prototype version of the authenticator was added to FIDO MDS and has now been superseded by the final product, the entry for the prototype might be set to "retired".

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- effectiveDate - Date of retirement
- url - URL to the news/corporate article explaining the reason for retirement

#### **REVOKED**

The FIDO Alliance has determined that this authenticator should not be trusted for any reason. For example if it is known to be a fraudulent product or contain a deliberate backdoor. Relying parties SHOULD reject any future registration of this authenticator model.

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- effectiveDate - Date of incident being reported
- authenticatorVersion - New authenticator version that is
- url - URL to the news/corporate article explaining the reason for revocation

#### *3.1.4.2. Security Notification Statuses*

#### **USER\_VERIFICATION\_BYPASS**

Indicates that malware is able to bypass the user verification. This means that the authenticator could be used without the user's consent and potentially even without the user's knowledge.

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- effectiveDate - Date of incident being reported
- authenticatorVersion - Minimum affected authenticator version
- batchCertificate - Base64 DER-encoded PKIX certificate identifying the compromised batch attestation certificate related to the affected authenticators.
- certificate - Base64 DER-encoded PKIX certificate. Might not be present if batchCertificate is present. identifying the attestation root certificate related to the affected authenticators.
- url - URL to the news/corporate article explaining the incident

### **ATTESTATION\_KEY\_COMPROMISE**

Indicates that an attestation key for this authenticator is known to be compromised. The relying party SHOULD check the `certificate` field and use it to identify the compromised authenticator batch. If neither the `batchCertificate` nor the `certificate` field are set, the relying party should reject all new registrations of the compromised authenticator. The Authenticator manufacturer should set the date to the date when compromise has occurred.

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- `effectiveDate` - Date of incident being reported
- `authenticatorVersion` - Minimum affected authenticator version
- `batchCertificate` - Base64 DER-encoded PKIX certificate identifying the compromised batch attestation certificate related to the affected authenticators.
- `certificate` - Base64 DER-encoded PKIX certificate. Might not be present if `batchCertificate` is present. Identifying the attestation root certificate related to the affected authenticators.
- `url` - URL to the news/corporate article explaining the incident

### **USER\_KEY\_REMOTE\_COMPROMISE**

This authenticator has identified weaknesses that allow registered keys to be compromised and should not be trusted. This would include both, e.g. weak entropy that causes predictable keys to be generated or side channels that allow keys or signatures to be forged, guessed or extracted.

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- `effectiveDate` - Date of incident being reported
- `authenticatorVersion` - Minimum affected authenticator version
- `batchCertificate` - Base64 DER-encoded PKIX certificate identifying the compromised batch attestation certificate related to the affected authenticators.
- `certificate` - Base64 DER-encoded PKIX certificate. Might not be present if `batchCertificate` is present. Identifying the attestation root certificate related to the affected authenticators.
- `url` - URL to the news/corporate article explaining the incident

### **USER\_KEY\_PHYSICAL\_COMPROMISE**

This authenticator has known weaknesses in its key protection mechanism(s) that allow user keys to be extracted by an adversary in physical possession of the device.

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- `effectiveDate` - Date of incident being reported
- `authenticatorVersion` - Minimum affected authenticator version
- `batchCertificate` - Base64 DER-encoded PKIX certificate identifying the compromised batch attestation certificate related to the affected authenticators.
- `certificate` - Base64 DER-encoded PKIX certificate. Might not be present if `batchCertificate` is present. Identifying the attestation root certificate related to the affected authenticators.
- `url` - URL to the news/corporate article explaining the incident

#### *3.1.4.3. Info Statuses*

### **UPDATE\_AVAILABLE**

A software or firmware update is available for the device. The Authenticator manufacturer should set the `url` to the URL where users can obtain an update and the date the update was published. When this status code

is used, then the field authenticatorVersion in the authenticator Metadata Statement [\[FIDO Metadata Statement\]](#) MUST be updated, if the update fixes severe security issues, e.g. the ones reported by preceding StatusReport entries with status code USER\_VERIFICATION\_BYPASS, ATTESTATION\_KEY\_COMPROMISE, USER\_KEY\_REMOTE\_COMPROMISE, USER\_KEY\_PHYSICAL\_COMPROMISE, REVOKED. The Relying party MUST reject the Metadata Statement if the authenticatorVersion has not increased

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- effectiveDate - Date of incident being reported
- authenticatorVersion - New authenticator version that is available. MUST match authenticatorVersion in the metadata statement.
- url - URL to the page with the update info

Relying parties might want to inform users about available firmware updates.

More values might be added in the future. FIDO Servers MUST silently ignore all unknown AuthenticatorStatus values.

### 3.1.5. RogueListEntry dictionary

Contains a list of individual authenticators known to be rogue.

New RogueListEntry entries will be added to report new individual authenticators known to be rogue.

Old RogueListEntry entries will be removed if the individual authenticator is known to not be rogue any longer.

```
dictionary RogueListEntry {
    required DOMString sk;
    required DOMString date;
};
```

#### sk, of type **DOMString**

Base64url encoding of the rogue authenticator's secret key (sk value, see [\[FIDO EcdaaAlgorithm\]](#), section ECDA A Attestation).

In order to revoke an individual authenticator, its secret key (sk) must be known.

#### date, of type **DOMString**

ISO-8601 formatted date since when this entry is effective.

```
EXAMPLE: ROGUELISTENTRY[] EXAMPLE
[
  { "sk": "M0-oaqbeJSSayzXaDUhh9LMKeT4Zio1bqn6W8kDaUfM",
    "date": "2016-06-07"},
  { "sk": "k96Npt4jJIq7NNNoNSGH0swp5PhU6jVuyf5jyYNtxrNQ",
    "date": "2016-06-09"},
]
```

### 3.1.6. Metadata BLOB Payload dictionary

Represents the MetadataBLOBPayload

```
dictionary MetadataBLOBPayload {
  DOMString legalHeader;
  required Number no;
  required DOMString nextUpdate;
  required MetadataBLOBPayloadEntry[] entries;
};
```

### legalHeader, of type [DOMString](#)

The legalHeader, which MUST be in each BLOB, is an indication of the acceptance of the relevant legal agreement for using the MDS. The FIDO Alliance's Blob will contain this legal header: "legalHeader": "Retrieval and use of this BLOB indicates acceptance of the appropriate agreement located at <https://fidoalliance.org/metadata/metadata-legal-terms/>"

### no, of type [Number](#)

The serial number of this Metadata BLOB Payload. This serial number MUST be incremented whenever the contents of the BLOB changes. Serial numbers MUST be consecutive and strictly monotonic, i.e. the successor BLOB will have a no value exactly incremented by one.

### nextUpdate, of type [DOMString](#)

ISO-8601 formatted date when the next update will be provided at latest.

**NOTE:** The FIDO operational approach to publishing the FIDO Metadata has changed. Guidance on the download frequency and download approach is given in section Metadata BLOB Processing Rules. The use of the "nextUpdate" field is discouraged and the field will be removed in the future. FIDO servers should ensure this field is not required by their code.

### entries, of type [MetadataBLOBPayloadEntry\[\]](#)

List of zero or more MetadataBLOBPayloadEntry objects.

**NOTE:** The "issued at" claim (iat) is included in the JWT header according to [\[RFC7519\]](#).

## 3.1.7. Metadata BLOB§

The metadata BLOB is a JSON Web Token (see [\[JWT\]](#) and [\[JWS\]](#)). It consists of three elements:

- The base64url encoding, without padding, of the UTF-8 encoded JWT Header (see example below),
- the base64url encoding, without padding, of the UTF-8 encoded Metadata BLOB Payload (see example at the beginning of section [Metadata BLOB Format](#)),
- and the base64url-encoded, also without padding, JWS Signature [\[JWS\]](#) computed over the to-be-signed payload using the Metadata BLOB signing key, i.e.  $tbsPayload = EncodedJWTHeader | "." | EncodedMetadataBLOBPayload$

All three elements of the BLOB are concatenated by a period (".")  $MetadataBLOB = EncodedJWTHeader | "." | EncodedMetadataBLOBPayload | "." | EncodedJWSSignature$

The hash algorithm related to the signing algorithm specified in the JWT Header (e.g. SHA256 in the case of "ES256") MUST also be used to compute the hash of the metadata statements (see section [Metadata BLOB Payload Entry Dictionary](#)).

The JWT Header SHALL include the "iat" ("issued at") claim as specified in [\[RFC7519\]](#).

### 3.1.7.1. Examples§

*This section is not normative.*



QzLLTVdYZWZKZE9a0TRiYjlvCwQxUk9uUzdXSVRUekhpBU1xaXZiTzNnMERkVnlrM1dRQmhCenRLMzVZ  
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MDgtYTQwMy1hYjRmNWYxMmVmZTUuLAoJCQkJimFsdGvYbmf0aXZLRGVzY3JpcHRpb25zIjogewoJCQk  
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EXAMPLE: JWT HEADER

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In order to produce the tbsPayload, we first need the base64url-encoded (without padding) JWT Header:

EXAMPLE: ENCODED JWT HEADER

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 MVVFQ2d3TFJYaGhiWEJzWlNCUFVrY3hfREFPQmd0VkJBc01CMFY0WVcxZDJHVXGNCiAgICBDekFKQmd0VkJBwVRBbFZUTVfzd0NRWURWUvFJREFKtlDURVNNQkFHQTfVRUJ3d0pWmkZyWldacFpXeGtNQjRYDQogICAgRFRJeE1EUxHPVEV4TXpVd04xb1hEVFE0TURd05ERXhNeLV3TjFvd2dhTXhKekFsQmd0VkJBTU1Ia1ZZUvUxUQ0KICAgIFRfVWdUVVJUTXlCVVJWt1VJRwXpVkvWU1RVVkvTVUzVU1RFaU1DQUdDU3FHU0liM0RRRUUpBUllUwLhoaGJYQnMNCiAgICBaUJJsZUdGdGNHeGxMbU52YlRFVU1CSUdBmVVFQ2d3TFJYaGhiWEJzWlNCUFVrY3hfREFPQmd0VkJBc01CMFY0DQogICAgWVcxZDJHVXhDekFKQmd0VkJBwVRBbFZUTVfzd0NRWURWUvFJREFKtlDURVNNQkFHQTfVRUJ3d0pWmkZyWldacA0KICAgIFpXeGtNRmt3RXDZSEtvWk16ajBDQVFZSutvWk16ajBEQVFjRFFnQUVOR3VtQmJZbkZrBlRqUDFSU2ZjNzBoc2gNCiAgICBnYmlJMvP0cHRnW42eFJMqS9XcTBQU0NmTGw1cVErcjdbkGNLMWQzcjN2TGErdm02RzZ2S0hHQ1BFZVv6cU12DQogICAgTUMwd0RBWURWUjBUQkFVd0F3RUIvekFkQmd0VkhRNEVGZ1FVTms2RjRSSm5HR1ZGZSswL2NiWndmclpkN1pVdW0KICAgIERRWUpLb1pJaHJzTkFRUxUUFZE2dJQkFDbnAxZm0wRktsV21VdFRwbEx1WwC3bXBzNhhQL0NPdThkbmIz0HUNCiAgICAxbk1EVnVPVDQrQ1phaU05QUd6MzEzR0QyMmhqTEdybVB1Ww44NndHT0tJM0hPckVvc0dkTW1meTd0VG1LWC9lDQogICAgTS9lUzNGRURYWm5F0DJQbjVvRk15QlQvZjhZ R3VYeU9zRlpxV0J2VmRCSUlEbGRDcEQ0bXhNUVpaT1p0VHJsdg0KICAgIDNXdkJRTUMvZHNpY094ZTNR S1h2V0hpNlFl1LJodWfpcDNyUG13TWYrNEpwbkPK0pNUHFbYVUXY0FIOEhwc2YNCiAgICByTEFNb0tz MTQ4ajIrY3ZicGFxbXNUNXJJb0gvZxpWclBhRy9NT2lJZ3E30XcvZWZ1d1NpNUFY0EoRa0RvTFNFDQog ICAGZjNkNXdpZ2ZtKWUfVXFfjUnhYVEVfDEtJekRNNmh6YUJRRmlBV3ZUbjlJbFZXZ250UWFtU1h2SCt0 eGFURjlpRQ0KICAgIGxIeFVmNUl0WUZwY2lDcHp0U3J5ZGVIdi9PQ05SjcvTFZyaWNUU2xvOFJoK08z eVA5Visydu5mM1g4c1FKTnQNCiAgICB1ZnJRTmFxcTE4d2lYbGlUTHVmuU24wMi9nK21raElVaU5LZLRP SnB2Q2pLZUNuQ0ZjefFVMi9YVDNLadNHOGdEDQogICAgSndzTzZfVlJqTVVkdDRBWUt6ZS9oRVVdD0Y1 NUlGMm0zakhJb0N10GpWZmoyNENlRVg1ZG5mdlNyK1Nwdk41UQ0KICAgIEIwdVowNU00cm15Wlh5cUJt MHPmL2ZSK2lFMC9acEludXdmQzdYk1c4MnpYbG5Na3BsSTNRK0p4ZDdqZlExNMNCiAgICBZTKUySzZy dLJJVDAxdzBQ0VpxeURGN2tuR0twUmXwN09xeGQzN2JEL1ZVYldwUTdnSUFmc0p0SDVLQkxvd0hKDQog ICAGrkZqVyInciAgXQ0KfQ

then we have to append a period (".") and the base64url encoding of theEncodedMetadataBLOBPayload (taken from the example in section [Metadata BLOB Format](#)):

EXAMPLE: TBSPAYLOAD

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 R3VYeU9zRlpxV0J2VmRCSUlEbGRDcEQ0bXhNUVpaT1p0VHJsdg0KICAgIDNXdkJRTUMvZHNpY094ZTNR S1h2V0hpNlFl1LJodWfpcDNyUG13TWYrNEpwbkPK0pNUHFbYVUXY0FIOEhwc2YNCiAgICByTEFNb0tz MTQ4ajIrY3ZicGFxbXNUNXJJb0gvZxpWclBhRy9NT2lJZ3E30XcvZWZ1d1NpNUFY0EoRa0RvTFNFDQog ICAGZjNkNXdpZ2ZtKWUfVXFfjUnhYVEVfDEtJekRNNmh6YUJRRmlBV3ZUbjlJbFZXZ250UWFtU1h2SCt0 eGFURjlpRQ0KICAgIGxIeFVmNUl0WUZwY2lDcHp0U3J5ZGVIdi9PQ05SjcvTFZyaWNUU2xvOFJoK08z eVA5Visydu5mM1g4c1FKTnQNCiAgICB1ZnJRTmFxcTE4d2lYbGlUTHVmuU24wMi9nK21raElVaU5LZLRP SnB2Q2pLZUNuQ0ZjefFVMi9YVDNLadNHOGdEDQogICAgSndzTzZfVlJqTVVkdDRBWUt6ZS9oRVVdD0Y1 NUlGMm0zakhJb0N10GpWZmoyNENlRVg1ZG5mdlNyK1Nwdk41UQ0KICAgIEIwdVowNU00cm15Wlh5cUJt MHPmL2ZSK2lFMC9acEludXdmQzdYk1c4MnpYbG5Na3BsSTNRK0p4ZDdqZlExNMNCiAgICBZTKUySzZy dLJJVDAxdzBQ0VpxeURGN2tuR0twUmXwN09xeGQzN2JEL1ZVYldwUTdnSUFmc0p0SDVLQkxvd0hKDQog ICAGrkZqVyInciAgXQ0KfQ













SZ3c0cGtzwbWJkaTNidTJEZTdZmFCQnhjcwZ2cVByVwPpGUU5UUTiYbGZkVVZWDY4cLRKS0Y1RG5TbVV  
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0WUQ2YwJXQkJNcmgrYXBOYk9Lck5GMS1Z0NHNHjPwEdmd01QUHRWaf2afUzWU1PQUFudVv1L1IwN0w  
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Qcm90b2NvbHM0I0lsxXSwibWF4Q3JlZGVudGllbENvdW50SW5MaXN0IjoXNiwiZW50b2NvbHM0I0l0sImFzZ29yaXRobXMi0lt7InR5cGU  
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hdHVzQ2hhbmdlIjoIjAx0S0wMS0wNCJ9XX0. -kc1wr0rJA16bxLXXzeDkFE0CsbKAY2WDEzoCY-Aej\_  
N0bWIOAmphGxSa3CXgmwFwgAuy230Eq\_BHT0\_RshsA

The line breaks are for display purposes only.

The signature in the example above was computed with the following ECDSA key

EXAMPLE: ECDSA KEY USED FOR SIGNATURE COMPUTATION

```

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIICZTCCAagAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkJOPQQDAjCBozEnMCUGA1UEAwweRVhBTVBM
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Hx4bJ+zCsgIg/tvBut0JUUVvvoHio/otAUACH5bNHP3uIziDS+PTUC=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIFNpFhJvod3jKvbrLLzKTWKFxzaZ4l7kMchx3NyytQYUoAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAE1AmzrB0qLFz5L5UMBqMWU81q3XQoRYkTmNxY6+bqqk71IMAAxm9v
gceu+z4/lhGketKVQ928r64RBt1aDfU/2w==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----

```

The root certificate to validate certificate path in the X5C is:

EXAMPLE: CERTIFICATE PATH ROOT CERTIFICATE

```

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIGGTCCBAGAwIBAgIUdT9qLX0sVMRe8l0sLmHd3mZovQ0wDQYJKoZiHvcNAQEL
BQAwZsXhZAdBgNVBAMMFkVYU1QTEUgTURTMYBURVNUIFJPT1QxIjAgBgkqhkiG
9w0BCQEW E2V4YW1wbGV4ZXhhbXBsZS5jb20xZDASBgNVBAoMC0V4YW1wbGUuY29tMRQwEg
YDVQKDAFeGFtcGxLMAQswCQYDVQGEwJVUzELMAkGA1UECAwCTVkeEjAQBGNVBAcM
CVdha2VmaWVsZDAeFw0yMTA0MTkxMTM1MDdaFw00DA5MDQxMTM1MDda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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

```

## 3.2. Metadata BLOB object processing rules

The FIDO Server MUST follow these processing rules:

1. Download (see [here](#) for considerations) and cache the root signing trust anchor from the respective MDS root location "mds.fidoalliance.org". More information can be found at <https://fidoalliance.org/metadata/>

The FIDO server should pass the serial number of the latest cached Metadata Service BLOB to the service (GET `/?localCopySerial=77`). In that case, the MDS will return HTTP code 304 (Not Modified) if no newer MDS blob is available. Alternatively, the serial number of the local copy could be provided through the "If-None-Match" header field. The server will always return the serial number in the ETag header field. If both, the "localCopySerial" parameter and the "If-None-Match" header are provided, the server will only process the "localCopySerial" parameter.

2. To validate the digital certificates used in the digital signature, the certificate revocation information MUST be available in the form of CRLs at the respective MDS CRL location e.g. More information can be found at <https://fidoalliance.org/metadata/>
3. The FIDO Server MUST be able to download the latest metadata BLOB object from the well-known URL when appropriate, e.g. <https://mds.fidoalliance.org/>. The serial number of the latest local copy SHOULD be provided in order to avoid unnecessary data transfers.
4. If the x5u attribute is present in the JWT Header, then:
  1. The FIDO Server MUST verify that the URL specified by the x5u attribute has the same web-origin as the URL used to download the metadata BLOB from. The FIDO Server SHOULD ignore the file if the web-origin differs (in order to prevent loading objects from arbitrary sites).
  2. The FIDO Server MUST download the certificate (chain) from the URL specified by the x5u attribute [\[JWS\]](#). The certificate chain MUST be verified to properly chain to the metadata BLOB signing trust anchor according to [\[RFC5280\]](#). All certificates in the chain MUST be checked for revocation according to [\[RFC5280\]](#).
  3. The FIDO Server SHOULD ignore the file if the chain cannot be verified or if one of the chain certificates is revoked.

The requirements for verifying certificate revocation, are only applicable to the MDS BLOB payload certificates. It is up to the server vendors whether to enforce CRL check for the certificates in the individual metadata statements.

5. If the x5u attribute is missing, the chain should be retrieved from the x5c attribute. If that attribute is missing as well, Metadata BLOB signing trust anchor is considered the BLOB signing certificate chain.
6. Verify the signature of the Metadata BLOB object using the BLOB signing certificate chain (as determined by the steps above). The FIDO Server SHOULD ignore the file if the signature is invalid. It SHOULD also ignore the file if its number (no) is less or equal to the number of the last Metadata BLOB object cached locally.
7. Write the verified object to a local cache as required. Remember the "iat" ("issued at") time as needed.
8. Iterate through the individual entries (of type `MetadataBLOBPayloadEntry`). For each entry:
  1. Ignore the entry if the AAID, AAGUID or attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers is not relevant to the relying party (e.g. not acceptable by any policy)

Note: To remain compatible with future versions the FIDO Server SHOULD ignore unrecognized fields when processing any element of an entry. The addition, subtraction or change in interpretation of any fields in an entry of this specification which substantively changes the processing logic of a consumer will only occur alongside an update to the major version number of the specification.

2. Check whether the status report of the authenticator model has changed compared to the cached entry by looking at the fields `timeOfLastStatusChange` and `statusReport`.

Update the status of the cached entry. It is up to the relying party to specify behavior for authenticators

with status reports that indicate a lack of certification, or known security issues. However, the status REVOKED indicates significant security issues related to such authenticators.

Authenticators with an unacceptable status should be marked accordingly. This information is required for building registration and authentication policies included in the registration request and the authentication request [\[UAFProtocol\]](#).

3. Update the cached metadata statement.

It is possible that an MDS entry representing an authenticator disappears in a future update of the BLOB. This should not affect the processing of any other MDS entries.

## 4. Considerations§

*This section is not normative.*

This section describes the key considerations for designing this metadata service.

### **Need for Authenticator Metadata**

When defining policies for acceptable authenticators, it is often better to describe the required authenticator characteristics in a generic way than to list individual authenticator AIDs. The metadata statements provide such information. Authenticator metadata also provides the trust anchor required to verify attestation objects.

The metadata service provides a standardized method to access such metadata statements.

### **Integrity and Authenticity**

Metadata statements include information relevant for the security. Some business verticals might even have the need to document authenticator policies and trust anchors used for verifying attestation objects for auditing purposes.

It is important to have a strong method to verify and proof integrity and authenticity and the freshness of metadata statements. We are using a single digital signature to protect the integrity and authenticity of the Metadata BLOB object and all metadata statements.

### **Organizational Impact**

The FIDO Alliance has control over the FIDO certification process and authentication vendors provide the metadata as part of that process. With this metadata service, the list of known authenticators and their metadata statements need to be updated, signed and published regularly. A single signature needs to be generated in order to protect the integrity and authenticity of the metadata BLOB object and all embedded metadata statements.

### **Performance Impact**

Metadata BLOB objects and metadata statements can be cached by the FIDO Server.

The update policy can be specified by the relying party.

The metadata BLOB object includes a date for the next scheduled update. As a result there is *no additional impact* to the FIDO Server during FIDO Authentication or FIDO Registration operations.

### **High Security Environments**

Some high security environments might only trust internal policy authorities. FIDO Servers in such environments could be restricted to use metadata BLOB objects from a proprietary trusted source only. The metadata service is the baseline for most relying parties.

## Extended Authenticator Information

Some relying parties might want additional information about authenticators before accepting them. The policy configuration is under control of the relying party, so it is possible to only accept authenticators for which additional data is available and meets the requirements.

## Implementer Guidance

For typical applications, we recommend checking for updated Metadata Statements once a day. This ensures up-to-date information about available security keys and passkey providers and their respective characteristics and certification status.

In order to minimize bandwidths needs and system load, we also recommend providing the serial number of the most recent local copy that is available, see section [Metadata BLOB object processing rules](#) for more details. This avoids downloading the data again if there is no change.

Note that the `nextUpdate` field will be removed in the future.

## Index§

### Terms defined by this specification§

[aaguid](#)

[aaid](#)

[attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers](#)

["ATTESTATION\\_KEY\\_COMPROMISE"](#)

[AuthenticatorStatus](#)

[authenticatorVersion](#)

[batchCertificate](#)

[BiometricStatusReport](#)

[biometricStatusReports](#)

[certificate](#)

`certificateNumber`

[dict-member for BiometricStatusReport](#)

[dict-member for StatusReport](#)

`certificationDescriptor`

[dict-member for BiometricStatusReport](#)

[dict-member for StatusReport](#)

`certificationPolicyVersion`

[dict-member for BiometricStatusReport](#)

[dict-member for StatusReport](#)

[certificationProfiles](#)

`certificationRequirementsVersion`

[dict-member for BiometricStatusReport](#)

[dict-member for StatusReport](#)

[certLevel](#)

[date](#)

`effectiveDate`

[dict-member for BiometricStatusReport](#)

[dict-member for StatusReport](#)

[entries](#)  
["FIDO\\_CERTIFIED"](#)  
["FIDO\\_CERTIFIED\\_L1"](#)  
["FIDO\\_CERTIFIED\\_L1plus"](#)  
["FIDO\\_CERTIFIED\\_L2"](#)  
["FIDO\\_CERTIFIED\\_L2plus"](#)  
["FIDO\\_CERTIFIED\\_L3"](#)  
["FIDO\\_CERTIFIED\\_L3plus"](#)  
["FIPS140\\_CERTIFIED\\_L1"](#)  
["FIPS140\\_CERTIFIED\\_L2"](#)  
["FIPS140\\_CERTIFIED\\_L3"](#)  
["FIPS140\\_CERTIFIED\\_L4"](#)  
[fipsPhysicalSecurityLevel](#)  
[fipsRevision](#)  
[legalHeader](#)  
[MetadataBLOBPayload](#)  
[MetadataBLOBPayloadEntry](#)  
[metadataStatement](#)  
[modality](#)  
[nextUpdate](#)  
[no](#)  
["NOT\\_FIDO\\_CERTIFIED"](#)  
["RETIRED"](#)  
["REVOKED"](#)  
[RogueListEntry](#)  
[rogueListHash](#)  
[rogueListURL](#)  
["SELF\\_ASSERTION\\_SUBMITTED"](#)  
[sk](#)  
[status](#)  
[StatusReport](#)  
[statusReports](#)  
[sunsetDate](#)  
[timeOfLastStatusChange](#)  
["UPDATE\\_AVAILABLE"](#)  
[url](#)  
["USER\\_KEY\\_PHYSICAL\\_COMPROMISE"](#)  
["USER\\_KEY\\_REMOTE\\_COMPROMISE"](#)  
["USER\\_VERIFICATION\\_BYPASS"](#)

## Terms defined by reference§

[ECMAScript] defines the following terms:

Number

[WebIDL] defines the following terms:

DOMString

unsigned long

unsigned short

## References§

### Normative References§

#### [ECMAScript]

*ECMAScript Language Specification*. URL: <https://tc39.es/ecma262/multipage/>

#### [FIDOAuthenticatorSecurityRequirements]

Rolf Lindemann; Dr. Joshua E. Hill; Douglas Biggs. *FIDO Authenticator Security Requirements*. November 2020. Final Draft. URL: <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-security-requirements/fido-authenticator-security-requirements-v1.4-fd-20201102.html>

#### [FIDOBiometricsRequirements]

Stephanie Schuckers; et al. *FIDO Biometrics Requirements*. October 2020. URL: <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/biometric/requirements/Biometrics-Requirements-v2.0-fd-20201006.html>

#### [FIDOMetadataStatement]

B. Jack; R. Lindemann; Y. Ackermann. *FIDO Metadata Statements*. 05 January 2026. Proposed Standard. URL: <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/mds/fido-metadata-statement-v3.1.1-ps-20260105.html>

#### [JWS]

M. Jones; J. Bradley; N. Sakimura. *JSON Web Signature (JWS)*. May 2015. RFC. URL: <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515>

#### [JWT]

M. Jones; J. Bradley; N. Sakimura. *JSON Web Token (JWT)*. May 2015. RFC. URL: <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519>

#### [RFC4648]

S. Josefsson. *The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings (RFC 4648)*. October 2006. URL: <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4648.txt>

#### [RFC5280]

D. Cooper; et al. *Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile*. May 2008. URL: <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280>

#### [RFC7519]

M. Jones; J. Bradley; N. Sakimura. *JSON Web Token (JWT)*. May 2015. Proposed Standard. URL: <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>

#### [WebIDL]

Edgar Chen; Timothy Gu. *Web IDL Standard*. Living Standard. URL: <https://webidl.spec.whatwg.org/>

#### [WebIDL-ED]

Cameron McCormack. *Web IDL*. 13 November 2014. Editor's Draft. URL: <http://heycam.github.io/webidl/>

### Informative References§

#### [FIDOEcdaaAlgorithm]

R. Lindemann; et al. *FIDO ECDA Algorithm*. 23 May 2022. Proposed Standard. URL: <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-id-20180227/fido-ecdaa-algorithm-v2.0-id-20180227.html>

#### [FIDOGlossary]

R. Lindemann; et al. *FIDO Technical Glossary*. 23 May 2022. Proposed Standard. URL:

<https://fidoalliance.org/specs/common-specs/fido-glossary-v2.1-ps-20220523.html>

#### [FIDOKeyAttestation]

*FIDO 2.0: Key attestation format*. URL: <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20150904/fido-key-attestation-v2.0-ps-20150904.html>

#### [FIDORegistry]

R. Lindemann; et al. *FIDO Registry of Predefined Values*. 05 January 2026. Proposed Standard. URL: <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/common-specs/fido-registry-v2.3-ps-20260105.html>

#### [ITU-X690-2008]

*X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER), (T-REC-X.690-200811)*. November 2008. URL: <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690-200811-S>

#### [RFC2119]

S. Bradner. *Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels*. March 1997. Best Current Practice. URL: <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119>

#### [UAFProtocol]

R. Lindemann; et al. *FIDO UAF Protocol Specification v1.2*. Proposed Standard. URL: <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-uaf-v1.2-ps-20201020/fido-uaf-protocol-v1.2-ps-20201020.html>

## IDL Index

```
dictionary MetadataBLOBPayloadEntry {
    AAID aaid;
    AAGUID aaguid;
    DOMString[] attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers;
    required MetadataStatement metadataStatement;
    BiometricStatusReport[] biometricStatusReports;
    required StatusReport[] statusReports;
    required DOMString timeOfLastStatusChange;
    DOMString rogueListURL;
    DOMString rogueListHash;
};

dictionary BiometricStatusReport {
    required unsigned short certLevel;
    required DOMString modality;
    DOMString effectiveDate;
    DOMString certificationDescriptor;
    DOMString certificateNumber;
    DOMString certificationPolicyVersion;
    DOMString certificationRequirementsVersion;
};

dictionary StatusReport {
    required AuthenticatorStatus status;
    DOMString effectiveDate;
    unsigned long authenticatorVersion;
    DOMString batchCertificate;
    DOMString certificate;
    DOMString url;
    DOMString certificationDescriptor;
    DOMString certificateNumber;
    DOMString certificationPolicyVersion;
    DOMString[] certificationProfiles;
    DOMString certificationRequirementsVersion;
    DOMString sunsetDate;
    unsigned long fipsRevision;
    unsigned long fipsPhysicalSecurityLevel;
```

```

};

enum AuthenticatorStatus {
    "NOT_FIDO_CERTIFIED",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED",
    "USER_VERIFICATION_BYPASS",
    "ATTESTATION_KEY_COMPROMISE",
    "USER_KEY_REMOTE_COMPROMISE",
    "USER_KEY_PHYSICAL_COMPROMISE",
    "UPDATE_AVAILABLE",
    "RETIRED",
    "REVOKED",
    "SELF_ASSERTION_SUBMITTED",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L1",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L1plus",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L2",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L2plus",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L3",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L3plus",
    "FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L1",
    "FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L2",
    "FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L3",
    "FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L4"
};

dictionary RogueListEntry {
    required DOMString sk;
    required DOMString date;
};

dictionary MetadataBLOBPayload {
    DOMString                legalHeader;
    required Number          no;
    required DOMString       nextUpdate;
    required MetadataBLOBPayloadEntry[] entries;
};

```

## Issues Index

ISSUE 1 Update this example

