

FIDO Metadata Service

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Abstract

The FIDO Authenticator Metadata Specification defines so-called "Authenticator Metadata" statements. The metadata statements contains the "Trust Anchor" required to validate the attestation object, and they also describe several other important characteristics of the authenticator. The metadata service described in this document defines a baseline method for relying parties to access the latest metadata statements.

Status of This Document

This section describes the status of this document at the time of its publication. Other documents may supersede this document. A list of current FIDO Alliance publications and the latest revision of this technical report can be found in the [FIDO Alliance specifications index](#) at <https://www.fidoalliance.org/specifications/>.

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1. Notation§

Type names, attribute names and element names are written as code

String literals are enclosed in “”, e.g. “UAF-TLV”.

In formulas we use “|” to denote byte wise concatenation operations.

The notation `base64url(byte[8..64])` reads as 8-64 bytes of data encoded in base64url, "Base 64 Encoding with URL and Filename Safe Alphabet" [\[RFC4648\]](#) *without padding*.

Following [\[WebIDL-ED\]](#), dictionary members are optional unless they are explicitly marked as required.

WebIDL dictionary members MUST NOT have a value of null.

Unless otherwise specified, if a WebIDL dictionary member is DOMString, it MUST NOT be empty.

Unless otherwise specified, if a WebIDL dictionary member is a List, it MUST NOT be an empty list.

For definitions of terms, please refer to the FIDO Glossary[\[FIDOGlossary\]](#).

All diagrams, examples, notes in this specification are non-normative.

Note: Certain dictionary members need to be present in order to comply with FIDO requirements. Such members are marked in the WebIDL definitions found in this document, as required. The keyword required has been introduced by [\[WebIDL-ED\]](#), which is a work-in-progress. If you are using a WebIDL parser which implements [\[WebIDL\]](#), then you may remove the keyword required from your WebIDL and use other means to ensure those fields are present.

1.1. Key Words§

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [\[RFC2119\]](#).

2. Overview§

This section is not normative.

[\[FIDOMetadataStatement\]](#) defines authenticator metadata statements.

These metadata statements contain the trust anchor required to verify the attestation object (more specifically the KeyRegistrationData object), and they also describe several other important characteristics of the authenticator, including supported authentication and registration assertion schemes, and key protection flags.

These characteristics can be used when defining policies about which authenticators are acceptable for registration or authentication.

The metadata service described in this document defines a baseline method for relying parties to access the latest metadata statements.




Figure 1 FIDO Metadata Service Architecture Overview

2.1. Scope§

This document describes the FIDO Metadata Service architecture in detail and it defines the structure and interface to access this service. It also defines the flow of the metadata related messages and presents the rationale behind the design choices.

2.2. Detailed Architecture§

The metadata BLOB file contains a list of metadata statements related to the authenticators known to the FIDO Alliance (FIDO Authenticators).

The FIDO Server downloads the metadata BLOB file from a well-known FIDO URL and caches it locally.

The FIDO Server verifies the integrity and authenticity of this metadata BLOB file using the digital signature. It then iterates through the individual entries and parses the metadata statements related to authenticator models relevant to the relying party.

Individual metadata statements are included in the entry of the metadata BLOB file, and may be cached by the FIDO Server as required.




Figure 2 FIDO Metadata Service Architecture

The single arrow indicates the direction of the network connection, the double arrow indicates the direction of the data flow.

The metadata BLOB file is accessible at a well-known URL published by the FIDO Alliance.

The relying party decides how frequently the metadata service is accessed to check for metadata BLOB updates.

3. Metadata Service Details§

This section is normative.

The relying party can decide whether it wants to use the metadata service and whether or not it wants to accept certain authenticators for registration or authentication.

The relying party could also obtain metadata directly from authenticator vendors or other trusted sources.

3.1. Metadata BLOB Format§

The metadata service makes the metadata BLOB object (see [Metadata BLOB](#)) accessible to FIDO Servers.

This object contains all metadata for each authenticator including the metadata statements defined in [FIDOMetadataStatement](#). The BLOB object contains one signature.

3.1.1. Metadata BLOB Payload Entry dictionary

Represents the MetadataBLOBPayloadEntry

```
dictionary MetadataBLOBPayloadEntry {  
    AAID aaid;  
    AAGUID aaguid;  
    DOMString[] attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers;  
    required MetadataStatement metadataStatement;  
    BiometricStatusReport[] biometricStatusReports;  
    required StatusReport[] statusReports;  
    required DOMString timeOfLastStatusChange;  
    DOMString rogueListURL;  
    DOMString rogueListHash;  
};
```

aaid, of type AAID

The AAID of the authenticator this metadata BLOB payload entry relates to. See [UAFProtocol](#) for the definition of the AAID structure. This field MUST be set if the authenticator implements FIDO UAF.

NOTE: FIDO UAF authenticators support AAID, but they don't support AAGUID.

aaguid, of type AAGUID

The Authenticator Attestation GUID. See [FIDOKeyAttestation](#) for the definition of the AAGUID structure. This field MUST be set if the authenticator implements FIDO2.

NOTE: FIDO2 authenticators support AAGUID, but they don't support AAID.

attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers, of type DOMString[]

A list of the attestation certificate public key identifiers encoded as hex string. This value MUST be calculated according to method 1 for computing the keyIdentifier as defined in [RFC5280](#) section 4.2.1.2.

- The hex string MUST NOT contain any non-hex characters (e.g. spaces).
- All hex letters MUST be lower case.
- This field MUST be set if neither aaid nor aaguid are set. Setting this field implies that the attestation certificate(s) are dedicated to a single authenticator model.

FIDO U2F authenticators do not support AAID nor AAGUID, but they use attestation certificates dedicated to a single authenticator model.

metadataStatement, of type MetadataStatement

The metadataStatement JSON object as defined in [FIDOMetadataStatement](#).

biometricStatusReports, of type BiometricStatusReport[]

Status of the FIDO Biometric Certification of one or more biometric components of the Authenticator [FIDO Biometrics Requirements](#).

statusReports, of type StatusReport[]

An array of status reports applicable to this authenticator.

timeOfLastStatusChange, of type DOMString

ISO-8601 formatted date since when the status report array was set to the current value.

rogueListURL, of type [DOMString](#)

URL of a list of rogue (i.e. untrusted) individual authenticators.

rogueListHash, of type [DOMString](#)

`base64url(string[1..512])`

The hash value computed over the Base64url encoding of the UTF-8 representation of the JSON encoded `rogueList` available at `rogueListURL` (with type `rogueListEntry[]`). The hash algorithm related to the signature algorithm specified in the `JWTHeader` (see [Metadata BLOB](#) MUST be used.

This hash value MUST be present and non-empty whenever `rogueListURL` is present.

This method of base64url-encoding the UTF-8 representation is also used by JWT [\[JWT\]](#) to avoid encoding ambiguities.

EXAMPLE 1

```
{
  "no": 1234,
  "nextUpdate": "2014-03-31",
  "entries": [
    {
      "aaid": "1234#5678",
      "metadataStatement": "Metadata Statement object as defined in Metadata Statement spec."
    },
    {
      "statusReports": [
        {
          "status": "FIDO_CERTIFIED",
          "effectiveDate": "2014-01-04"
        }
      ],
      "timeOfLastStatusChange": "2014-01-04"
    },
    {
      "attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers": [
        "7c0903708b87115b0b422def3138c3c864e44573"
      ],
      "metadataStatement": "Metadata Statement object as defined in Metadata Statement spec."
    },
    {
      "statusReports": [
        {
          "status": "FIDO_CERTIFIED",
          "effectiveDate": "2014-01-07"
        },
        {
          "status": "UPDATE_AVAILABLE",
          "effectiveDate": "2014-02-19",
          "url": "https://example.com/update1234"
        }
      ],
      "timeOfLastStatusChange": "2014-02-19"
    }
  ]
}
```

3.1.2. BiometricStatusReport dictionary

Contains the current `BiometricStatusReport` of one of the authenticator's biometric component.

```
dictionary BiometricStatusReport {
    required unsigned short certLevel;
    required DOMString      modality;
    DOMString               effectiveDate;
    DOMString               certificationDescriptor;
    DOMString               certificateNumber;
    DOMString               certificationPolicyVersion;
    DOMString               certificationRequirementsVersion;
};
```

certLevel, of type [unsigned short](#)

Achieved level of the biometric certification of this biometric component of the authenticator [[FIDO Biometrics Requirements](#)].

modality, of type [DOMString](#)

A *single* a single USER_VERIFY short form case-sensitive string name constant, representing biometric modality. See section "User Verification Methods" in [FIDORegistry] (e.g. "fingerprint_internal"). This value MUST NOT be empty and this value MUST correspond to one or more entries in field userVerificationDetails in the related Metadata Statement [[FIDO Metadata Statement](#)]. This value MUST represent a biometric modality.

For example use USER_VERIFY_FINGERPRINT for the fingerprint based biometric component. In this case the related Metadata Statement must also claim fingerprint as one of the user verification methods.

effectiveDate, of type [DOMString](#)

ISO-8601 formatted date since when the certLevel achieved, if applicable. If no date is given, the status is assumed to be effective while present.

certificationDescriptor, of type [DOMString](#)

Describes the externally visible aspects of the Biometric Certification evaluation.

For example it could state that the "biometric component is implemented OnChip - keeping biometric data inside the chip only".

certificateNumber, of type [DOMString](#)

The unique identifier for the issued Biometric Certification.

certificationPolicyVersion, of type [DOMString](#)

The version of the Biometric Certification Policy the implementation is Certified to, e.g. "1.0.0".

certificationRequirementsVersion, of type [DOMString](#)

The version of the Biometric Requirements [[FIDO Biometrics Requirements](#)] the implementation is certified to, e.g. "1.0.0".

3.1.3. StatusReport dictionary

Contains an AuthenticatorStatus and additional data associated with it, if any.

New StatusReport entries will be added to report known issues present in firmware updates.

The latest StatusReport entry MUST reflect the "current" status. For example, if the latest entry has status USER_VERIFICATION_BYPASS, then it is recommended assuming an increased risk associated with all authenticators of this AAID; if the latest entry has status UPDATE_AVAILABLE, then the update is intended to address at least all previous issues *reported* in this StatusReport dictionary.

The certification of FIDO Authenticators does NOT cover the security characteristics of multi-device keys.

```

dictionary StatusReport {
    required AuthenticatorStatus status;
    DOMString effectiveDate;
    unsigned long authenticatorVersion;
    DOMString batchCertificate;
    DOMString certificate;
    DOMString url;
    DOMString certificationDescriptor;
    DOMString certificateNumber;
    DOMString certificationPolicyVersion;
    DOMString[] certificationProfiles;
    DOMString certificationRequirementsVersion;
    DOMString sunsetDate;
    unsigned long fipsRevision;
    unsigned long fipsPhysicalSecurityLevel;
};

```

status, of type [AuthenticatorStatus](#)

Status of the authenticator. Additional fields MAY be set depending on this value.

effectiveDate, of type [DOMString](#)

ISO-8601 formatted date since when the status code was set, if applicable. If no date is given, the status is assumed to be effective while present.

authenticatorVersion, of type [unsigned long](#)

The authenticatorVersion (firmware version) that this status report relates to. In the case of FIDO_CERTIFIED* status values, the status applies to higher authenticatorVersions until there is a new statusReport.

For example, if the status would be USER_VERIFICATION_BYPASS, the authenticatorVersion indicates the vulnerable firmware version of the authenticator. Similarly, if the status would be UPDATE_AVAILABLE, the authenticatorVersion indicates the updated firmware version that is available now. If the status would be SELF_ASSERTION_SUBMITTED, the authenticatorVersion indicates the firmware version that the self assertion was based on.

An authenticator's current firmware version can be found in the attestation certificate in extension id-fido-gen-ce-fw-version (OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.45724.1.1.5).

batchCertificate, of type [DOMString](#)

Base64-encoded [\[RFC4648\]](#) (not base64url!) DER [\[ITU-X690-2008\]](#) PKIX certificate value related to the current status, if applicable.

As an example, this could be an Batch Attestation Certificate (see [\[FIDOMetadataStatement\]](#)) related to a set of compromised authenticators (USER_KEY_REMOTE_COMPROMISE).

certificate, of type [DOMString](#)

Base64-encoded [\[RFC4648\]](#) (not base64url!) DER [\[ITU-X690-2008\]](#) PKIX certificate value related to the current status, if applicable. This field will typically not be present if field batchCertificate is present.

As an example, this could be an Attestation Root Certificate (see [\[FIDOMetadataStatement\]](#)) related to a set of compromised authenticators (ATTESTATION_KEY_COMPROMISE).

url, of type [DOMString](#)

HTTPS URL where additional information may be found related to the current status, if applicable.

For example a link to a web page describing an available firmware update in the case of status UPDATE_AVAILABLE, or a link to a description of an identified issue in the case of status USER_VERIFICATION_BYPASS.

certificationDescriptor, of type [DOMString](#)

Describes the externally visible aspects of the Authenticator Certification evaluation.

For example it could state that the authenticator is a "SecurityKey based on a CC EAL 5 certified chip hardware".

certificateNumber, of type [DOMString](#)

The unique identifier for the issued Certification.

certificationPolicyVersion, of type [DOMString](#)

The version of the Authenticator Certification Policy the implementation is Certified to, e.g. "1.0.0".

certificationProfiles, of type [DOMString\[\]](#)

array of strings. Each entry represents a supported certification profile. The supported profiles are defined in the active version of the [Authenticator Certification Policy](#) document. At the time of writing this specification, the supported profiles are: "consumer" and "enterprise".

certificationRequirementsVersion, of type [DOMString](#)

The Document Version of the Authenticator Security Requirements (DV) [\[FIDOAuthenticatorSecurityRequirements\]](#) the implementation is certified to, e.g. "1.2.0".

sunsetDate, of type [DOMString](#)

ISO-8601 formatted date since when the status will expire, if applicable. If no date is given, the status is assumed to not have a scheduled expiry.

fipsRevision, of type [unsigned long](#)

The revision number of the FIPS 140 specification, e.g. "3" in the case of FIPS 140-3. This entry MUST be present if and only if the [status](#) entry is one of FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L*.

fipsPhysicalSecurityLevel, of type [unsigned long](#)

In the case the status represents a FIPS certification, this field contains the "physical security level" of the FIPS certification. This entry MUST be present if and only if the [status](#) entry is one of FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L*. It MUST reflect the physical security level which might deviate from the overall level.

3.1.4. AuthenticatorStatus enum

This enumeration describes the status of an authenticator model as identified by its AAID/AAGUID or attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers and potentially some additional information (such as a specific attestation key).

```
enum AuthenticatorStatus {
    "NOT_FIDO_CERTIFIED",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED",
    "USER_VERIFICATION_BYPASS",
    "ATTESTATION_KEY_COMPROMISE",
    "USER_KEY_REMOTE_COMPROMISE",
    "USER_KEY_PHYSICAL_COMPROMISE",
    "UPDATE_AVAILABLE",
    "REVOKED",
    "SELF_ASSERTION_SUBMITTED",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L1",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L1plus",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L2",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L2plus",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L3",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L3plus",
    "FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L1",
    "FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L2",
    "FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L3",
    "FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L4"
};
```

3.1.4.1. Certification Related Statuses

The certification of FIDO Authenticators does NOT cover the security characteristics of multi-device keys.

NOT_FIDO_CERTIFIED

This authenticator is not FIDO certified.

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- effectiveDate - When status was achieved
- authenticatorVersion - The minimum applicable authenticator version.
- url - To the authenticator page or additional information about the authenticator

SELF_ASSERTION_SUBMITTED

The authenticator vendor has completed and submitted the self-certification checklist to the FIDO Alliance. If this completed checklist is publicly available, the URL will be specified in url.

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- effectiveDate - Date of incident being reported
- authenticatorVersion - New authenticator version that is

FIDO_CERTIFIED

This authenticator has passed FIDO functional certification. This certification scheme is phased out and will be replaced by FIDO_CERTIFIED_L1.

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- effectiveDate - When certification was issued
- authenticatorVersion - The minimum version of the certified solution
- certificationDescriptor - Authenticator Description. I.e. "Munikey 7c Black Edition"
- certificateNumber - FIDO Alliance Certificate Number
- certificationPolicyVersion - Authenticator Certification Policy
- certificationProfiles - list of supported certification profiles
- certificationRequirementsVersion - Security Requirements Version
- url - URL to the certificate, or the news article about achievement of the certification.

These fields are applicable to any of the FIDO_CERTIFIED_.*.

FIDO_CERTIFIED_L1

The authenticator has passed FIDO Authenticator certification at level 1. This level is the more strict successor of FIDO_CERTIFIED.

FIDO_CERTIFIED_L1plus

The authenticator has passed FIDO Authenticator certification at level 1+. This level is the more than level 1.

FIDO_CERTIFIED_L2

The authenticator has passed FIDO Authenticator certification at level 2. This level is more strict than level 1+.

FIDO_CERTIFIED_L2plus

The authenticator has passed FIDO Authenticator certification at level 2+. This level is more strict than level 2.

FIDO_CERTIFIED_L3

The authenticator has passed FIDO Authenticator certification at level 3. This level is more strict than level 2+.

FIDO_CERTIFIED_L3plus

The authenticator has passed FIDO Authenticator certification at level 3+. This level is more strict than level 3.

FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L1

The authenticator has passed FIPS 140 certification at overall level 1.

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- certificateNumber - certificate number as given in the FIPS certificate
- url - URL to the FIPS certificate (e.g. [https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/\[nn\]](https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/[nn]))
- sunsetDate - the sunset data as given in the FIPS certificate
- fipsPhysicalSecurityLevel - the level of the physical security according to the FIPS certificate

These fields are applicable to any of the FIPS140_CERTIFIED_.*.

FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L2

The authenticator has passed FIPS 140 certification at overall level 2.

FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L3

The authenticator has passed FIPS 140 certification at overall level 3.

FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L4

The authenticator has passed FIPS 140 certification at overall level 4.

REVOKED

The FIDO Alliance has determined that this authenticator should not be trusted for any reason. For example if it is known to be a fraudulent product or contain a deliberate backdoor. Relying parties SHOULD reject any

future registration of this authenticator model.

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- effectiveDate - Date of incident being reported
- authenticatorVersion - New authenticator version that is
- url - URL to the news/corporate article explaining the reason for revocation

3.1.4.2. Security Notification Statuses

USER_VERIFICATION_BYPASS

Indicates that malware is able to bypass the user verification. This means that the authenticator could be used without the user's consent and potentially even without the user's knowledge.

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- effectiveDate - Date of incident being reported
- authenticatorVersion - Minimum affected authenticator version
- batchCertificate - Base64 DER-encoded PKIX certificate identifying the compromised batch attestation certificate related to the affected authenticators.
- certificate - Base64 DER-encoded PKIX certificate. Might not be present if batchCertificate is present. identifying the attestation root certificate related to the affected authenticators.
- url - URL to the news/corporate article explaining the incident

ATTESTATION_KEY_COMPROMISE

Indicates that an attestation key for this authenticator is known to be compromised. The relying party SHOULD check the certificate field and use it to identify the compromised authenticator batch. If neither the batchCertificate nor the certificate field are set, the relying party should reject all new registrations of the compromised authenticator. The Authenticator manufacturer should set the date to the date when compromise has occurred.

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- effectiveDate - Date of incident being reported
- authenticatorVersion - Minimum affected authenticator version
- batchCertificate - Base64 DER-encoded PKIX certificate identifying the compromised batch attestation certificate related to the affected authenticators.
- certificate - Base64 DER-encoded PKIX certificate. Might not be present if batchCertificate is present. identifying the attestation root certificate related to the affected authenticators.
- url - URL to the news/corporate article explaining the incident

USER_KEY_REMOTE_COMPROMISE

This authenticator has identified weaknesses that allow registered keys to be compromised and should not be trusted. This would include both, e.g. weak entropy that causes predictable keys to be generated or side channels that allow keys or signatures to be forged, guessed or extracted.

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- effectiveDate - Date of incident being reported
- authenticatorVersion - Minimum affected authenticator version
- batchCertificate - Base64 DER-encoded PKIX certificate identifying the compromised batch attestation

certificate related to the affected authenticators.

- certificate - Base64 DER-encoded PKIX certificate. Might not be present if batchCertificate is present. identifying the attestation root certificate related to the affected authenticators.
- url - URL to the news/corporate article explaining the incident

USER_KEY_PHYSICAL_COMPROMISE

This authenticator has known weaknesses in its key protection mechanism(s) that allow user keys to be extracted by an adversary in physical possession of the device.

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- effectiveDate - Date of incident being reported
- authenticatorVersion - Minimum affected authenticator version
- batchCertificate - Base64 DER-encoded PKIX certificate identifying the compromised batch attestation certificate related to the affected authenticators.
- certificate - Base64 DER-encoded PKIX certificate. Might not be present if batchCertificate is present. identifying the attestation root certificate related to the affected authenticators.
- url - URL to the news/corporate article explaining the incident

3.1.4.3. Info Statuses

UPDATE_AVAILABLE

A software or firmware update is available for the device. The Authenticator manufacturer should set the url to the URL where users can obtain an update and the date the update was published. When this status code is used, then the field authenticatorVersion in the authenticator Metadata Statement [\[FIDO Metadata Statement\]](#) MUST be updated, if the update fixes severe security issues, e.g. the ones reported by preceding StatusReport entries with status code USER_VERIFICATION_BYPASS, ATTESTATION_KEY_COMPROMISE, USER_KEY_REMOTE_COMPROMISE, USER_KEY_PHYSICAL_COMPROMISE, REVOKED. The Relying party MUST reject the Metadata Statement if the authenticatorVersion has not increased

Applicable StatusReport fields are:

- effectiveDate - Date of incident being reported
- authenticatorVersion - New authenticator version that is available. MUST match authenticatorVersion in the metadata statement.
- url - URL to the page with the update info

Relying parties might want to inform users about available firmware updates.

More values might be added in the future. FIDO Servers MUST silently ignore all unknown AuthenticatorStatus values.

3.1.5. RogueListEntry dictionary

Contains a list of individual authenticators known to be rogue.

New RogueListEntry entries will be added to report new individual authenticators known to be rogue.

Old RogueListEntry entries will be removed if the individual authenticator is known to not be rogue any longer.

Contains a list of individual authenticators known to be rogue.

New RogueListEntry entries will be added to report new individual authenticators known to be rogue.

Old RogueListEntry entries will be removed if the individual authenticator is known to not be rogue any longer.

```
dictionary RogueListEntry {  
    required DOMString sk;  
    required DOMString date;  
};
```

sk, of type [DOMString](#)

Base64url encoding of the rogue authenticator's secret key (sk value, see [FIDOEcdaaAlgorithm](#), section ECDAAtestation).

In order to revoke an individual authenticator, its secret key (sk) must be known.

date, of type [DOMString](#)

ISO-8601 formatted date since when this entry is effective.

EXAMPLE: ROGUELISTENTRY[] EXAMPLE

```
[  
  { "sk": "M0-oaqbeJSSayzXaDUhh9LMKeT4Zio1bqn6W8kDaUfM",  
    "date": "2016-06-07"},  
  { "sk": "k96Npt4jJIq7NNNoNSGH0swp5PhU6jVuyf5jyYNtxrNQ",  
    "date": "2016-06-09"},  
]
```

3.1.6. Metadata BLOB Payload dictionary

Represents the MetadataBLOBPayload

```
dictionary MetadataBLOBPayload {  
    DOMString legalHeader;  
    required Number no;  
    required DOMString nextUpdate;  
    required MetadataBLOBPayloadEntry[] entries;  
};
```

legalHeader, of type [DOMString](#)

The legalHeader, which MUST be in each BLOB, is an indication of the acceptance of the relevant legal agreement for using the MDS. The FIDO Alliance's Blob will contain this legal header: "legalHeader": "Retrieval and use of this BLOB indicates acceptance of the appropriate agreement located at <https://fidoalliance.org/metadata/metadata-legal-terms/>"

no, of type [Number](#)

The serial number of this Metadata BLOB Payload. This serial number MUST be incremented whenever the contents of the BLOB changes. Serial numbers MUST be consecutive and strictly monotonic, i.e. the successor BLOB will have a no value exactly incremented by one.

nextUpdate, of type [DOMString](#)

ISO-8601 formatted date when the next update will be provided at latest.

entries, of type [MetadataBLOBPayloadEntry](#)[]

List of zero or more MetadataBLOBPayloadEntry objects.

3.1.7. Metadata BLOB

The metadata BLOB is a JSON Web Token (see [JWT](#) and [JWS](#)). It consists of three elements:

- The base64url encoding, without padding, of the UTF-8 encoded JWT Header (see example below),
- the base64url encoding, without padding, of the UTF-8 encoded Metadata BLOB Payload (see example at the beginning of section [Metadata BLOB Format](#)),
- and the base64url-encoded, also without padding, JWS Signature [\[JWS\]](#) computed over the to-be-signed payload using the Metadata BLOB signing key, i.e. `tbsPayload = EncodedJWTHeader | "." | EncodedMetadataBLOBPayload`

All three elements of the BLOB are concatenated by a period (".")

```
MetadataBLOB = EncodedJWTHeader | "." | EncodedMetadataBLOBPayload | "." | EncodedJWSSignature
```

The hash algorithm related to the signing algorithm specified in the JWT Header (e.g. SHA256 in the case of "ES256") MUST also be used to compute the hash of the metadata statements (see section [Metadata BLOB Payload Entry Dictionary](#)).

3.1.7.1. Examples

This section is not normative.

EXAMPLE: ENCODED METADATA BLOB

EwoJImxLZ2FsSGVhZGVYIjogIlJldHJpZXZhcbChbmGqdXNlIG9mIHROaXMgQkxPQiBpbmRyY2F0ZXMG
YWNjZXB0YW5jZSBvZiB0aGUgYXBwcm9wcmldhGUGyWdYzZWtZW50IGxvY2F0ZWQgYXQgaHR0cHM6Ly9m
awRvYWxsawFuY2Uub3JnL2l1dGFkYXRhL2l1dGFkYXRhLWxlZ2FsLXRlcmlzLyIsCgkibm8iOiAxNSwK
CSJuZXh0VXBkYXRlIjogIjIwMjAtMDMtMzAiLAoJImVudHJpZXMiOiBbewoJCQkiYWFpZCI6ICIXMjM0
IzU2NzgiLAoJCQkibWV0YWRhdGFdTGF0ZW1bnQiOiB7CgkJCQkibGVnYXwIZWFKZXIIoiAiaHR0cHM6
Ly9maWRvYWxsawFuY2Uub3JnL2l1dGFkYXRhL2l1dGFkYXRhLXN0YXRlbWVudC1sZWdhbCl0ZWFKZXIv
IiwKCQkJCSJkZXNjcmlwdGlvbviI6ICJGSURPIEFsbGlhbmlIFNhxbBsZSBVQUYgQXV0aGVudGljYXR
ciIsCgkJCQkiYWFpZCI6ICIXMjM0IzU2NzgiLAoJCQkJImFsdGVybmf0aXZLRGVzY3JpcHRpb25zIjog
ewoJCQkJCSJydS1SVSI6ICLQn9GA0LjQvNC10YAgVUFGINCW0YPRgtC10L3RgtC40YTQuNC60LDRgtC-
0YDQsCDQvtGCIEZJRE8gQWxsawFuY2UiLAoJCQkJCSJmci1GUI6ICJFeGVtcGxlIFVBRIbhdXR0ZW50
aNhdG9yIGRLIEZJRE8gQWxsawFuY2UiCgkJCQL9LAoJCQkJImF1dGhlbnRpY2F0b3JWZXJzaW9uIjog
MiwKCQkJCSJwcm90b2NvbEZhbWlseSI6ICJlYWIiLAoJCQkJInNjaGVtYSI6IDMsCgkJCQkidXB2Ijog
W3sKCQkJCQkJIm1ham9yIjogMSwKCQkJCQkJIm1pbm9yIjogMAoJCQkJCX0sCgkJCQkJewoJCQkJCQki
bWFqb3IiOiAxLAoJCQkJCQkibWlub3IiOiAxCGkJCQkJfQoJCQkJXSwwKCQkJCSJhdXR0ZW50aWNhdGlv
bkFsZ29yaXRobXMiOiBBIiLnNyAyNTZyMV9lY2RzYV9zaGEyNTZfcml0sCgkJCQkicHVibGljS2V5
QWxnQW5kRW5jb2RpbmdzIjogWyJlY2NfeDk2ML9yYXciSXswKCQkJCSJhdHRlc3Rh dGlvb1R5cGVzIjog
WyJiYXNpY19mdWxsIl0sCgkJCQkidXNlclZlcmhmaWNhdGlvbklRdGFpbHMI6ICBBcgkJCQkJW3sKCQkJ
CQkJInVzZXJWZXJpZmljYXRpb25NZXRob2QiOiAiZmluZ2VycHJpbnRfaW50ZXJyYWIiLAoJCQkJCQki
YmFEZXNjIjogewoJCQkJCQkJInNlbGZBdHRlc3RlZEZBUiI6IDAuMDAwMDIsCgkJCQkJCQkibWF4UmV0
cmllcyI6IDUsCgkJCQkJCQkiYmxvY2tTbG93ZG93biI6IDMWLAoJCQkJCQkJIm1heFRlbnBseYXRlcyl6
IDUKCQkJCQkJfQoJCQkJCX1dCgkJCQLdLAoJCQkJImtleVByb3RlY3Rpb24iOiBBIimhhcmR3YXJlIiwg
InRlZSJdLAoJCQkJImlzS2V5UmVzdHJpY3RlZCI6IHRYdWUsCgkJCQkibWF0Y2hlc1Byb3RlY3Rpb24i
OiBBIinRlZSJdLAoJCQkJImNyeXB0b1N0cmVuZ3RoIjogMTI4LAoJCQkJImF0dGFjaG1lnRlaW50Ijog
WyJpbmRlcml5bCJdLAoJCQkJInRjRGltzcGxheSI6IFsiYw55IiwgInRlZSJdLAoJCQkJInRjRGltzcGx
eUNvbmlbnRUeXBFIjogImtleYwddLL3BuZyIsCgkJCQkidGNEaXNbWGFSUE5HQ2hhcmFjdGVyaXN0aWNz
IjogW3sKCQkJCQkid2lkdGgiOiAzMjAsCgkJCQkJImhlaWdodCI6IDQ4MCwKCQkJCQkiYml0RGVvdGgi
OiAxNiwcKCQkJCQkiY29sb3JUeXBFIjogMiwKCQkJCQkiY29tcHJlc3Npb24iOiAwLAoJCQkJCSJmaWx0
ZXIiOiAwLAoJCQkJCSJpbmRlcmlhY2UiOiAwCgkJCQL9XSwwKCQkJCSJhdHRlc3Rh dGlvb1Jvb3RDZXJ0
awZpY2F0ZXMiOiBBIbBgCgkJCQkJIk1JSUNQVENDQWVPZ0F3SUJBZ0lKQU9lZXh2VTNPETJ3TUfVR0NDcUDt
TTQ5QkFNQ01Ic3hJREFlQmdOVkhBTU1GMU5oYlhCc1ptQkJKsfJsYzNsAGRhbHhiaUJTtyI5ME1SWXdG
QVLEVLFRS0RBMudTVVJQSUVGc2JHbGhibU5sTVJFd0R3WURWUVMREfoVlFVWwdWRmRITERFU0lCQUDb
MVVFQnd3SLVHRnNieUJCykhsdk1Rc3dDUVLEVLFRSURBSKRREVMtUFRr0EXvUVCaE1DVLZNdoHoY05N
VFF3TmpFNE1UTXPnek15V2hjTkSERXhnVEF6TVRNek16TXlXakI3TVNBd0hnWURWUVEREjkvFLMXdi
R1VnUVhSMFPyTjBZWfJwyjI0Z1vtOXZkREVXTUJRROExVUVDZ3d0UmtsRVR5QkjiR3hwwVc1alpURVJN
QTHHTQTFVRUN3d0lWVUZHSUSZFJ5d3hfakFRQmdOVkjbY01DVkJoYkc4Z1FXeDBiekVMTUFRr0EXvUVD
QXDdUTBFen6QUPCZ05WQkfZVEFsVLRNRmt3RXdxSEtvwk16ajBDQVFZSuTvkw16ajBEQVFjrFFnQUVI
OGh2MkQwSFfhNTkvQmlwUTdSwmVoTC9GTUd6RmQxUUJnOXXBVXBPwjNham51UTk0UFI3YU16SDMZblVT
QnI4ZkhZRHXt0JiNThweEdxSEpSeVqVnk5RTUU0d0hRWURWUjBPQkJZRUZQb0hBM0NMahaHGykmwSXQ0

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b25LIgoJCQkJCX1dLAoJCQkJCVt7CgkJCQkJCSJ1c2VyVmVyaWZpY2F0aW9uTWV0aG9kIjogInByZXNl
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CgkJCQkJCQkibWluTGvuZ3RoIjogNAoJCQkJCQl9CgkJCQkJfV0sCgkJCQkJW3sKCQkJCQkJCSJ1c2Vy
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LAoJCQkJCQl7CgkJCQkJCQkixNlclZlcmMawNhdGlvbk1ldGhvZCI6ICJwcmVzZW5jZV9pbmRlcm5h
bCIKCQkJCQkJfQoJCQkJCVC0KCQkJCVC0sCgkJCQkia2V5UHJvdGVjdGlvbiI6IFsiaGFyZDhcmUiLCAi
c2VjdXJlX2VsZW1lbnQiXSwKCQkJCSJtYXRjaGVyUHJvdGVjdGlvbiI6IFsiaGFyZDhcmUiLCAi
ImNyeXB0b1N0cmVuZ3RoIjogMTI4LAoJCQkJImF0dGFjaG1lbnRIaw50IjogWyJleHRlc2MiOiB7CgkJCQk
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dGlvbiJvb3RDZXJ0awZpY2F0ZXMiOiBbCgkJCQkJK1k1JSUNQVENDQWVPZ0F3SUJBZ0lKQU9lZXh2VTNP
eTJ3TUFR0NDcUdTTTQ5QkFNQ0I1c3hJREFlQmd0VkJBTU1GMU5oYlhCc1pTQkJKSFJsYzNSaGRHbHZi
aUJTYjI5ME1SWXGdGVLEVLFRS0RBMUdTVVJQSUVGc2JHbGhibU5sTVJFd0R3WURWUVMREFoVLFVWwdW
RmRITERFU0lCQUdBMVVFQnd3SlVHRnNieUJCykHsDk1Rc3dDUVLEVLFRSURBSkRRVEVMTUFR0EXVUVC
aE1DVLZNd0hoY05NVFF3TmPFNE1UTXpNek15V2hjTk5ERXhNVEF6TVRNek16TXlXakI3TVNBd0hnWURW
UVFEREJKVFLMXdiR1VnUVhSMFpYTjBZWJFwYjI0Z1VtOXZkREVXTUJRR0EXVUVDZ3d0UmtsRVR5Qkji
R3hwVc1alpURVJNQThHQTfVRUN3d0lWVUZHSUZSWFJ5d3hFakFRQmd0VkJBY0lDVkJoYkC4Z1FXeDBi
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UFI3YU16SDMzblVTQnI4ZkhZRHJxT0JiNThweEdxSEpSeVgvNk5RTU0d0hRWURWUjBPQkJZRUZQb0hB
M0NMhaHGYkMwSXQ3ekU0dzhoazVFSi9NQjhHQTfVZEL3UvLNQMFBRLBvSEezQ0xoeEziQzBJdDd6RTR3
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aWhJYkVLWUtJanNQA3JpVmRMSWd0ZnNiRFN1N0VySmZ6cjRBAUJxb1LDWmYwK3pJNTVhUWVBSGpJekE5
WG02M3JydUF4Qlo5cHM5ejJYTmxRPT0iCgkJCQl9LAoJCQkJImljb24iOiAiZGF0YTppbWFnZS9wbmc7
YmFzZTY0LGLWQk9SdzBLR2dvQUFBQU5TVWhFVWdBUQFF0EFBQUF2Q0FZQUFBQ2l3SmZjQUFBQUFYTLNS
MElBcnM0YzZRQUFBQVJuUUVUxQkFBQ3hq3Y4WVfVQUFBQUjRWhaY3dBQURzTUFBQTEQWNkdNFHUUFB
QWFOU1VSQlZHaEQ3WnI1YnhSbEdNzjllLRC0EFNL1lFaEUyVzdwUVpjV0tLQmNsU3BIQVRsRUxBUKU3
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OU5kbG5HVGVZaSlAybjNuTysrODg5MzNmNmVCQngrUHFDEkprVFV2QmJMbXBVRFd2QlRjBxBjQ1NadlhM
Q2RYOVIwNVNrMTliYjVhdGY1OTlmRysvZXJBNTQxcTQ3YVAXTeXWYTLTSXlWTLVpOElpOGQla0dUc2kz
ME5GdjhaTluN1FaUE13YmR5czJlclUyWE1xVWR50CtaY2F0bUdpcU4eVhOM1JVZDNhMTuRjBmVwxv
dlorMENUeldwZDJWwaitLT20xYkV5eTZEeDRpNXBVTUdXdmVvNTA2cTIyN2R0dVdCSXVmZnI2b1dwVjBG
UE5MaG93MTc1MU5tMjFmdlBIM3JWdFdqZno2NkxmcWw4dFg3RLJs0VLGU1hzbVNzWl5Y2VPR2JZazdN
TLVjR1Bn0FpzYk1lOXJmUVVhYVYvSk1Y0XNzXHpEQ1N2cDBrWkhtVFpnOXg3YkxIY01uVGhiMTZLSitt
VmZRCTh5YVVAU5UHNjRpWForMC9rcTZ1T1pGTzBRdGF0ZFdLZlhuLE5OUJq0TFSNU9JRm5rNTRqTjBt
a1VpcWxPM1hEVyTnbCs50G1LQjZ0VzdyV3BaY1BjKzB6ZzR0THJZbFVjODZFNmVHRGpJTXViVnBjdXNl
YXJmZ0lZR1JRnMjYafPwci9KY0h6b29MNzU1MGplZEXFeG9wV2NBcGkyWLVxaHU3Skx2clZzUUVU4MXpr
ek9QZwVtTVJZdlZlUXNYN1BiaURRWTVKdlpvbmZ0SysxVlk4SDl1dHg1MzBoMG9iK2ptUlLxajZvdWFZ
dkVlb1cvV2xZanA4Y3diTW02ODJ0UHdxVzFSNHRQLzJTSDEzSVJKWwW0bW9adlhwaVNXRHl3ZFh0UUh4
YS9QSZMvK0JXc0sxZFRnSHU2Vjh0UUozYndGa3dwRnJVT1E1MHMxcjNsZXZt0HpaY3ExNytCQmF3N0s4
bEVLNXF6a1lLYXJR0UE4cDdQM0d6REsrbmQzRFFvdys2VUM4U1Z00DJpdXYz0Gltn050YVh0VjFDVnE2
Umd3NHBRc21iZGkzYnUyRGU3WWZhQkY4Y3FmdnFQclVqRlF0VFEyMmxmZFWVWlQ20HJUSktGNURuU21V
amdKcWc0bVNT0XBtc2ZESlIzRzUub0gwaVc5YVY3TFdMSFLYS2xsVER0MEUxUQXRrWUlhYWlWlMVfQVnYr
K3V5R1V4V4mRKMEROVlhtbStiMXFSeHBS0DRkZGYMUxwMU8vZDY5dHNvZDB2czV0R3JlOXh10G8rZnBM
UjFjR2h0VEQ2WjU3QzLlTVdYZWZKZE9a0TRIyjlvcWQxUk9uUzdXSVRUekhpBU1xaXZiZnNEMERkVnlr
M1dRQmhCenRLMzVZS05kT25jOE8zYWNNTNmZEWkZnS2FYTHNFSnA1cmRybGlCcXA40WNKY3MvbTduDmW
cmtqR2ZONGIwa1BvWm4zVUp1SU9ybloyMnlQMwZtdlV4K081Z1NxZWJWMM0relN1WU5WaHE3VFdiRGIM
VnZsanBsTGxvcDZDTfHqKzJxdHZHTElMLzF2aW1JU2RNQmd6U29Gwnl1NlRxZCtqenhnc1BhVjlCQ3Fl
ZS90a1lrNnY2bEs5Y3dpVmwvU1R0ZjFIRHBNM2I10TJ5N2gzVGh4NW96SzY5SExwVd1QXdhcVM1Y3Yy
NnE3Y2Vi0GvmVllhUmVQM2lGVTh6ajFrb1N3WlhtITW1uQ2pZME9nYwXvN1VRZlNDTTNuxUVFyMkgvWEZQ
N3NzWgH0NvlS0TFCeWVDZXA0bW9ab0grMWZHM3hENHRUN3g4a3d5ajhud2I5ZXyYnLYwQjZkKzdINHP
LdnVkJUg1MzdGanF5ek9IZEpuSEV1em1YcS9XanhPYnZ0TWJ2N25oeXdzWDJhVnNXdEM4KzQ4YuxlYXBF
N3A1d0taaTBBMkFRULY1bnZSNEUrdUpjK2I2MwtBChFJbnhCZ21kLzRWNVFLQ210MThIREM3c1JIZnRt
ZXU1bG1oVjBybi9BTFGyMzJicWQ0QkZuRHg3VmxY1dTmNvmZjBJYkI0N3FleHhtVwo5UXV0Wwp1cGQz
dFLEnmFiV0JCTXJoK2FwTmJPS3J0RjErdWdDYTRYaVhHZndNUFB0VmlhdmhVM1lNT0FBbnVYy9SMDdM
MHLPU2VPYWRFOdBChNYRkdmZjMweW50bEpntTUxQ1U2dk45RXpnbB2SEJGVXlpVnJhZVBpd0o1M0RG
NVpUwm5vbUVOZzg1a05VZDJvSmkyV3ByNE9tbWtmTjR4NHpIZmLWRmM4RHY4Tnp1aE5xT2lkaWxHdkE2
REd1Zvp3Tzc4QUFRbjZjaUVrNitydzVWY3ZqdNFORFLQT29JVXdhS1NocnhBdVhMbGtINGFZdUdmTVLE
YzEwV0Y1VGEzMWwQSk9mY1VocLUvSmxJTMk2YzZlbfJZZEJwbzYrK1lmang2MWxHTmZSbTRNRDVySjFq
M0ZvR0huakRTQk5hcllVZ01MeU1zektwYjd0WHBvSGZQczhoM1dwMUx6TmZ0azU0WHhDMXDER1vtWXPY
WwVmaDZ6L2NLdFZtNEVCeGE5VLFHRHpZcjNmclVNUmpIRUt razd6YUZLWVFBMmhUUVUxeis4NU5GV3BY
RH1reiN2eDFwR3F4IIT7CemV0Ym9CazVuoGc0hmVilUmgrazFoV274VEYwRDFEaVdVczVudi+k71ExS2FA

nm0EjnzEELWkSt40tZCmV0tmsCdZv00S0bmVl0mgt0Zt0VZ24VETWk0tFeV0vCZv0d1kR21tXZ1t
enVDZEUwaXNIbDAyTlE4YWgwbVhyMTJMYTNtMGY5d2lr0St3TE5UTVkv0DZNUG84eWkzMU9meG1UNlBX
b3FH0StEWnVrWw5hNTZtU1p0NVdXU3k1cVZBMXJ3VXlKcVhBbG56a2lhaS9nSFNEN1JrVHlpaG9nQUFB
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ImhtYWMtc2VjcmV0IiwKCQkJCQkJIImZhaWxfafWZfdW5rbm93biI6IGZhbHNlCgkJCQkJfSwKCQkJCQl7
CgkJCQkJCJSJpZCI6ICJjcmVkuUHJvdGVjdCIscGkJCQkJCJSJmYwlsX2lmX3Vua25vd24i0iBmYwzZQoJ
CQkJCX0KCQkJCv0sCgkJCQkiYXV0aGVudGljYXRvckdldeLUZm8i0iB7CgkJCQkJInZlcnNpb25zIjog
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InV2IjogInRydWUiLAoJCQkJCQkidXZUb2t1biI6ICJmYwzZSIsCgkJCQkJCJSJjb25maWci0iAiZmFs
c2UiCgkJCQkJfSwKCQkJCQkibWF4TXNnU2l6ZSI6IDEyMDAsCgkJCQkJInBpb25zIjogW3sKCQkJCQk
cyI6IFsXSwKCQkJCQkibWF4Q3JlZGVudGlhbENvdW50SW5MaXN0IjogMTYsCgkJCQkJImlheENyZWRL
bnRyYwJZEXlbmd0aCI6IDEyMDAsCgkJCQkJCQkidHJhbnNwb3J0cyI6IFsidXNiIiwgIm5mYyJdLAoJCQkJ
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IC03CgkJCQkJCX0sCgkJCQkJCXsKCQkJCQkJCJSJ0eXBlIjogInB1YmXpYy1rZXkiLAoJCQkJCQkJImlFs
ZyI6IC0yNTcKCQkJCQkJfQoJCQkJCv0sCgkJCQkJImlheEF1dGh1bnRyY2F0b3JDb25maWdMZW5ndGgi
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Q0VSVElGSUVEIiwKCQkJCQkiZWZmZWNoaXZlRGF0ZSI6ICIyMDAsCgkJCQkJCJSJlcCI6ICJ0cnVlIiwKCQkJCQk
CQkJCQkic3RhdHVzIjogIkZJRE9fQ0VSVElGSUVEIiwKCQkJCQkiZWZmZWNoaXZlRGF0ZSI6ICIy
MDIwLTExLTE5IiwKCQkJCQkiY2VydGlmaWNoZGlvdGh1bnRlc2NyaXB0b3Ii0iAiRklETyBBbGxpYW5jZSBT
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MTAwMDIwMTUxMjIxMDAxIiwKCQkJCQkiY2VydGlmaWNoZGlvdGh1bnRlc2NyaXB0b3Ii0iAiRklETyBBbGxpYW5jZSBT
LAoJCQkJCJSJjZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uUmVxdWlyZW11bnRzVmVyc2lvbiI6IClXlAUMSIKCQkJCX0KCQkJ
XSwKCQkJInRpbWVPZkxhc3RTdGF0dXNDaGFuZ2Uu0iAiMjAxOS0wMS0wNCIKCQl9CgldCn0

EXAMPLE: JWT HEADER

```
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "typ": "JWT",
  "x5c": [
    "MIICZTCCAgugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkJOPQQDAjCBozEnMCUGA1UEAwweRVhBTBVM
    RSBNRfMzIFRFU1QgSU5URVJNRURJQVRfMSIwIAYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhNleGFtcGxl
    QGV4YW1wbGUuY29tMRQwEgYDVQKDAFeGFtcGxlIE9SRzEQMA4GA1UECwwHRXhh
    bXBsZTELMAGGA1UEBhMCVVMxCzAJBgNVBAGMAk1ZMRlWwEAYDVQKHDA1XYWt1Zm1l
    bGQwHhcNMjEwNDE5MTEzNTA3WhcNMzEwNDE3MTEzNTA3WjCBpTEpMCcGA1UEAwg
    RVhBTBVMRSBNRfMzIFNJR05JTkcqQ0VSVElGSUNBVEUxIjAgBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEW
    E2V4YW1wbGVAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20xZDASBgNVBAoMC0V4YW1wbGUgT1JHMRAdGdYD
    VQQLDAdFeGFtcGxlMQswCQYDVQKGEwJVUzELMAKGA1UECAwCTVxkEjAQBGNVBACM
    CVdha2VmaWVsZDBZMBMBGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABNQJs6wTqixc+S+V
    DAajFLPNat10KEWJE5jcw0vm6qp09SDAAMZvb4HHRvs+P5YRpHrSLUPdvK+uEQbd
    Wg31P9uJLDAqMAKGA1UdEwQCMAAwHQYDVRO0BBYEFQsapcXV4Z0VHAnRpPZWQe7
    Yy20MAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIQC67za8EIuyRiKgNDXIP1s1aLr3jzH9WVXf
    Hx4bJ+zCsgIgG/tVBut0JUu+vvoHio/otAUACH5bNHP3uIziDS+PTUc=",
    "MIIeH2CCAgagAwIBAgIBAJANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCBMzEfmB0GA1UEAwWRVhB
    TVBMRsBNRfMzIFRFU1QgUk9PVDEiMCAgCSqGSIb3DQEJARYTZXhhbXBsZUBleGFt
    cGxlMnVbTEUMBIGA1UECgwLRXhhbXBsZSBPUkcwEDAOBgNVBAsMB0V4YW1wbGUx
    CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQIDAjNwTESMBAGA1UEBwwJV2FrZWZpZWxkMB4X
    DTIEMDQxOTExMzUwN1oXDTQ4MDkxNDExMzUwN1owGAxmJzAlBgNVBAMMHkVYU1Q
    TEUgTURTMYBURVNUIElOVEVSTUVESUFURTEiMCAgCSqGSIb3DQEJARYTZXhhbXBs
    ZUBleGFtcGxlMnVbTEUMBIGA1UECgwLRXhhbXBsZSBPUkcwEDAOBgNVBAsMB0V4
    YW1wbGUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQIDAjNwTESMBAGA1UEBwwJV2FrZWZp
    ZWxkMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAENGumBbYnFQnTjP1RSfc70hsh
    gbiI1ZtpwQ5n6xRLA/Wq0PSCfLL5qQ+r7dlcK1d3r3vLa+vm6G6vKHGCPEeUzqMv
    MC0wDAYDVR0TBAAUwAwEB/zAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUNK6F4RjnGGVFe+0/cbZwfrZd7ZUw
    DQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggIBACnp1fm0FKlWmUtTPlLuYg7mps4xP/C0u8dnb38u
    1nMDVu0t4+CZaiM9AGz313GD22hjLGrmPuYn86wGOKI3H0rEpsGdMmfy7tTmKX/e
    M/eS3FEDXZnE82Pn5oFIyBT/f8sGuXy0sFZqWBvVdBIIDldCpD4mxMQZZ0ZtTrlv
    3WvBQMC/dsic0xe3QKXvWHi6Qb/Rhuaip3rPmwMf+4JpnJO+JMPqAaU1cAH8HVsf
    rLAMoKs148j2+cvbpaWmsT5rIoH/ezVrPaG/M0iIgg79w/efuvSi5AX8J+kDoLSE
    f3d5w0gkJYAqUqcRxXTEEtKIzDM6hzaBQFiAwvTn9IlVWgntQamSXvH+txaTF9iE
    lHxUf5INYFVciCpztSrydeHv/OCNrf7/LVricMSlo8Rh+03yP9V+2uNf3X8sQJNt
    ufrQNaqq18wiXliTLufSn02/g+mkhIUiNKfT0JpvCjKeCnCFcxQU2/XT3Kh3G8gD
    Jws06EVRjMUJt4AYKze/hEUCwF55IF2m3jHIoCu8jVfj24CeEX5dnfvSr+SVvN5Q
    B0uZ05M4rmyZXyqBm0zk3fR+ie0/ZpInuWLC7X+W82zXlnMkplI3Q+Jxd7jfQ15S
    YNE2K6rvRIT01w0P9ZqyDF7knGKpRlp70qxd37bD/VUbwPQ7gIAfsJNH5KBLowHJ
    FFjW"
  ]
}
```

In order to produce the tbsPayload, we first need the base64url-encoded (without padding) JWT Header:

EXAMPLE: ENCODED JWT HEADER

```
ewogICJhbGciOiAiAUMyNTYiLAogICJ0eXAiOiAiSlldUiIiwKICAieDvjIjogWwogICAgIk1JSUNaVEND
QWd1Z0F3SUJBZ0lCQVRBS0JnZ3Foa2pPUFFRREtFQ0JvekvUUNVR0ExVUVBd3dlU1Z0QlRWQk1SU0J0
UkZNek1GUGZVMVFNuU1U1VjVWSk5SVVJKUUVZSRk1TSXZlQVlKS29aSWh2Y05BUWtCRmh0bGVHRnRjR3hs
UUDWNF1XMXdiR1V1WTI5dE1SUxdFZ1lEVlFRS0R0BdEzLR0Z0Y0d4bElFOVNSekVRTUE0R0ExVUVBd3dl
U1hoaGJYQnNaVEVMTUFR0ExVUVCaE1DVlZNeEN6QUoPCZ05WQkFnTUFrMVpNUkl3RUFZRFZRUUUEQWxY
WVd0bFptbGxiR1F3SGhjTk1qRXd0REU1TVRFek5UQTNXaGNOTXpFd05ERTNNVEV6TlRBM1dqQ0JwVEVw
TUNjR0ExVUVBd3dnU1Z0QlRWQk1SU0J0UkZNek1GUGZVMVFNuU1U1VjVWSk5SVVJKUUVZSRk1TSXZlQVlKS29aSWh2Y05BUWtCRmh0bGVHRnRjR3hsTVFzd0NRWURWUWFHRXdkVlV6RUxNQWtH
QTFVRUNBd0NUVmt4RWpBUUJnTlZCQWNNQ1ZkaGEyVm1hV1ZzWkRCWk1CTUdCeXHU0000UFRnRUDQ3FH
U0000UF3RUhBMElBQk5SRnM2d1RxaXhjK1MrVkrBYWpGbFB0YXQxMEtFV0pFNWpjV092bTzxcE85U0RB
QU1admI0SEhydnMrUDVZUNBiClNsVVBkdksrdUVRyMRXZzMxUDl1akxEQXFNQWtHQTFVZEV3UUNNQUF3
SFFZRFZSME9CQl1FRkxc2FwY1hWNFpVvKbBlJwUFp3UWU3WxkyME1Bb0dDQ3FHU0000UJBTUNBMGdB
TUVVQ0lRQzY3emE4RU1leVJpS2d0RfHJUDFzMWFMcjNqekg5V1ZYk4NGJKK3pDc2dJZ0cVdFZCdXRP
SlVVK3Z2b0hJby9vdEFVQWNIWJOSFAZdU16aURTk1BUVVM9IiwKICAieDvjIjogWwogICAgIk1JSUNaVEND
QWd1Z0F3SUJBZ0lCQVRBS0JnZ3Foa2pPUFFRREtFQ0JvekvUUNVR0ExVUVBd3dlU1Z0QlRWQk1SU0J0
SUZSRlUxUWdVazlQVkrFaU1DQudDU3FHU0l1M0RRRUUpBU1lUWlhoaGJYQnNaVUJ3ZUdGdGNHeGxMbU52
YlRFVU1CSUdBMVVFQ2d3TFJYaGhiWEJzWlNCUFVrY3hFREFPQmd0VkJBc01CMFY0WVcx2JHVXhDekFK
Qmd0VkJBWBVRBbFZUTVFzd0NRWURWUWFJREFKtldURVNNQkFHQTFVRUJ3d0pWMkZyWldacFpXeGtNqjRY
RFRJe1EUXhPVEV4TXpVd04xb1hEVFE0TURd05ERXhNeLV3TjFvd2dhTXhKekFsQmd0VkJBTU1Ia1ZZ
UVUxUVRVWdUUVJUTXlCVVJWTVJRWxPVkVWU1RVVkvTVUzVU1RFaU1DQudDU3FHU0l1M0RRRUUpBU1lU
WlhoaGJYQnNaVUJ3ZUdGdGNHeGxMbU52YlRFVU1CSUdBMVVFQ2d3TFJYaGhiWEJzWlNCUFVrY3hFREFP
Qmd0VkJBc01CMFY0WVcx2JHVXhDekFKQmd0VkJBWBVRBbFZUTVFzd0NRWURWUWFJREFKtldURVNNQkFH
QTFVRUJ3d0pWMkZyWldacFpXeGtNRmt3RXZdZSEtVWkl6ajBDQVFZSUtVWkl6ajBEQVFjRFFnQUVOR3Vt
QmJZbkZrblRqUDFSU2ZjNzBoc2hnYm1JMVP0cHdRNW42eFJMOS9XcTBQU0NmTGw1cVErcjdbkGNLMWQz
cjN2TGErdm02RzZ2S0hHQ1BFZV6cU12TUMwd0RBWURWUjBUQkFVd0F3RU1IvekFkQmd0VkhRNEVGZ1FV
Tms2RjRSSm5HR1ZGZSswL2NiWndmclpkn1pVd0RRWUpLb1pJaHJzTkFRRUxUUFEEZ2dJQkFDbnAxZm0w
RktsV21vdFRwbExlWwc3bXBzNHhQL0NPdThkbnIzOHUxbk1EVnVPVDQrQ1phaU05QUd6MzEzR0QyMmhq
TEdybVB1Ww44NndHT0tJM0hPckVvc0dkTW1meTd0VG1LWC9lTS9lUzNGRURYWm5FODJQbjVvRkl5QlQv
ZjhzR3VYeU9zRlpxV0J2VmRCSU1EbGRDcEQ0bXhNUVpaT1p0VHJsdjNXdkJRTUMvZHNpY094ZTNRS1h2
V0hpNlFiL1JodWFpcDNyUG13TWYrNEpwbkpkPK0pNUHFBYVUxY0FI0EhWc2ZyTEFNb0tzMTQ4ajIrY3Zi
cGFxbXNUNXJJb0gvdXpWclBhRy9NT2lJZ3E3OXcvZWZ1d1NpNUFY0Eora0RvTFNFZjNkNXdPZ2tKWUFx
VXFjUnhYVEVfEdEtJekRNNmh6YUJRm1BV3Ubj1JbFZXZ250UWFtU1h2SCt0eGFURjlpRWxIeFVmNU10
WUZWY2lDcHp0U3J5ZGVldi9PQ05SZjcvTFZyaWNNu2xv0FJoK08zeVA5VisydU5mM1g4c1FKTnR1ZnJR
TmFxcTE4d2lYbGlUTHVmuU24wMi9nK21raElVaU5LZlRPSnB2Q2pLZUNuQ0ZjeFFVMi9YVDNLADNHOGdE
SndzTzZfVLJqTVVKdDRBWUt6ZS9oRVVdD0Y1NU1GMM0zakhJb0N10GpWZmoyNENLRVg1ZG5mdlNyK1NW
dk41UUIwdVowNU00cm15Wlh5CUJtMHpLM2ZSK2lFMC9acEludXdmQzdyK1c4MnpYbG5Na3BsSTNRK0p4
ZDdqZlExNVNZTKUySzYd1JJVDAxdzBQ0VpxeURGN2tuR0twUmxwN09xeGQzN2JEL1ZVYldwUtdnSUFm
c0p0SDVLQkxvd0hKrkZqYyIKICBdCn0
```

then we have to append a period (".") and the base64url encoding of the `EncodedMetadataBLOBPayload` (taken from the example in section [Metadata BLOB Format](#)):

EXAMPLE: TBSPAYLOAD

```
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCIsIng1YyI6WyJNSUdWlRlRDQ0FndWdBd0lCQWdJQkFUQutC
Z2dxaGtqT1BRUURBakNCb3pFbk1DVUdBMVVFQXd3ZVJWaEJUVk1JNU1NCTlJGTXpJRLJGVtFRZ1NVNVVS
Vkp0U1VSSlFWUkZNU0l3SUFZSk1vWklodmN0QVFRkZ0TmxlR0Z0Y0d4bFFHVjRZVzF3YkdVdVkyOXRN
U1F3RwdZRFZRUUUEQXRGZUdGdGNHeGxJRTl1UnpFUU1BNEdBMVVFQ3d3SFJYaGhiWEJzWlRfTE1Ba0dB
MVVFQmhnNQ1ZWtXhDekFKQmd0VkJBZ0lBazFaTVJJd0VBWURWUWFIREFsWFlXdGxabWxsYkdRd0hoY05N
akV3TKRfNU1URXp0VEEzV2hjTk16RXd0REUzTVRFek5UQTNXakNCCFRFcE1DY0dBMVVFQXd3Z1JWaEJU
Vk1JNU1NCTlJGTXpJRK5KUjA1SlRrY2dRMFZTVkVsR1NVTKJWRV45SwPBZ0Jna3Foa2lHOXcwQkNRRVdF
MlY0WVcx2JHVkFawGhoYlhcClpTNWpiMjB4RkrBU0JnTlZCQW9NQzBWNFlXMXdiR1VnVDFKSE1SQXdE
Z1lEVlFRTERBZEZLR0Z0Y0d4bE1Rc3dDUVlEVlFRR0V3SlZVekVMTUFR0ExVUVBd3dlU1Z0QlRWQk1SU0J0
Z05WQkFjTUNWZGhhMlZtYVdWclpEQlPnQk1HQnlxR1NNNDlBZ0VHq0Nxr1NNNDlBd0VIQTBJQUJOUUpz
NndUcWl4YytTK1ZEQWfQrmxQTmF0MTBLRVdKRTVqY1dPdm02cXBPOVNEQUFNWnZiNEhIcnZkK1A1WVJw
SHJTBfVQZHZLK3VFUWJkV2czMVA5dWpMREffTUFrR0ExVWRf1FDUFBD0hRWURWUjBPQkJZRUZMcXNh
cGNYVjRab1ZlQW5ScfBad1FlN1l5MjBNQW9HQ0Nxr1NNNDlCQU1DQTBnQU1FVUNJUUM2N3ph0EVJdXlS
aUtnTKRYSVAXczFhTHIzanpIOvdWwGZIEdRiSi6Q3NnSwdHL3RWQnV0T0pVVSt2dm9ISW8vb3RBVUFj
SDViTkhQM3VJemlEUytQVfVjPSiSiK1JSUVIEkNDQWdlZ0F3SUJBZ0lCQWpBTk1Jna3Foa2lHOXcwQkFR
c0ZBRENCbXpFZk1CMEdBMVVFQXd3V1JWaEJUVk1JNU1NCTlJGTXpJRLJGVtFRZ1Vr0VBWREVpTUNBR0NT
c0p0SDVLQkxvd0hKrkZqYyIKICBdCn0
```


yQTU0MXE0N2FQMuxMvME5U0l5Vk5VaThJaThkNwTHVHNpMzB0RnY3Ywk5bjdRWlBNd2JkeXMyZXJVMlh
NcVVkeTgrWmNhTm1HaWlF0HlYTjNSVWQzYTE4bkYwZlVsb3ZaKzBDVHpXcGQyVmorZU9tMWJFexK2RHg
0aTVwVU1HV3ZlzbUwNnEyMjdkdHVXQkl1ZmZyNm9XcFYwRlB0TGhvdzE3NTF0bTixTHZQSDNyVnRXamZ
6NjZMznFs0HRYN0ZSbDlZRlNYc21Tc2Vi0WNLt0diWws3TU5VY0dQZzhac2JNZTlyZlFVYFWL0pNWDl
zcWR6RENTdnAwa1pIbVraZzL4N2JMSGNNblRoYjE2ZUorbVZmUXE4eWfVWlF0RzY0aVhaKzAva3E2dU9
aRk8wUXRhDGRXS2ZYblJR0TlCaJkxUjVPSUZuazU0ak4wbWtVaXFsTzNYRFcrTWwr0ThtS0I2dFc3cld
wWmNQYyswemc0dExyWwXVYzg2RTZlR0RqSU11YlZwY3VzZWfYzmdJWUdSazZicmhaVnIvSmNIem9vTDc
1NTBqZWrmRXhvcFdjQXBpMlpVcWh1N0pMdnJwc1FV0DF6a3pPUGVlbU1SWXZWdVFzWdDQYmleUVk1SnZ
ab25mdEsrmVZ0Eg5dXR4NTMwaDBvYitqbVJZCwo2b3VhWwXZFZW5XL1dsWwPw0GN3Yk1tNjgydFB3cVc
xUjR0ai8yU0gxM0lSSllsNG1vWnZYcGlTcURyN2RYdFFIEgeVUESzLytCV3NLMWRUZO0h1NlY4dFFKM2J
3Rmt3cEzyVU9RNTBzMXIzbgV2bTh6WmNMTcrQkjhZdzdLOGxFSzVxemtZZWfYazlBOHA3UDNHekRLK25
kM0RRb3crNlVD0FNWTjgyaXV2MzhpbTd0dGFYdFYxQ1ZxNlJndzRwa3NtYmRpM2J1MkRlNl1mYUJCeGN
xZnZxUHJVakZRTLRRMjJsZmRVVLZUNjhyVEPlRjVEblntVWpnZHFNG1TUzLwbXNmREpSM0c2VG9IMGL
X0WfWn0xXTEhZWEtsbFREdDBMVEF0a1LJYwFtcDFRaLZ2Kyt1eUdVeFZkSjBETLYZU20rYjFxFUnhwbDg
0ZGRmWDFMcDFPL2Q20XRzb2QwdnM1aEdyZTL4dThvK2ZWfIXY0doTLRENlo1N0M5S01XWGVmSmRPWjk
0YmI5b3FkMVJPblM3cULUVHpIaw1NcWl2Yk8zZzBEZFZ5azNXUUJoQnp0SzM1WUt0ZE9uYzhPM2FjUzZ
mRFpGZ0thWEzRUUpwNXJkcmxpQnFwODljSmNzL203VHZzMHJrakdmTjRiMGtQb1puM1VKdULPcm5aMjJ
5UDFmbXZVeCtPNWdTCwViVjFtK3pTdVl0VmhxN1RXyKRpTFZ2bGpwbExsb3A2Q0xYUCsycXR2R0xJTC8
xdmltSVNkTUJnelNvRlp5dTZUcWQranp4Z3NQYVY5QkNxZWUvTmPZazZ2NmXL0WN3aVVjL1NUdGYxSER
wTTNiNTkyeTdoM1RoEDvveks20UhmCfLXdUF3YXFTNWN2MjZxN2NlYjhlZlZZYVJlUDNpRLU4emoxa25
Td1pYSE1tbkNqWTBPZ2FsbzdVUWZTQ00zcVFRcjJIL1hGUDDzc1h4NDVZbDkxQnlLQ2VwNGlVwM9IKzF
mRzN4RDR0VdD40Gt3eWo4bndi0WV2MjZWMEI2ZCs3SDR6S3Z1ZEFINTM3RmpxeXpPSGRKbkhFdXptWHE
vV2p4T2J2Tk1idduaHl3c1gyYVZzV3RD0Cs00GFMZWfWRTdwNXdLWmkwQTJBuVJWNW52UjRfK3VKYyt
iNjFrQXBxSW54QmdtZC80VjVRUC9tdDE4SERDN3NSSGZ0bWV1NWxtaFYwcm4vQUxYmJmYnFkNEJGbkR
4N1ZpMWNXUzJ1ZmYwSWJCNDdxZXh4bVvQ0VF1dFlqdXBkM3RZRdZHyldCQk1yaCthcE5iT0tyTkYxK3V
nQ2E0cmLYR2Z3TVBQdFZpYXZoVTNZTU9BQW51VWlVUjA3TDB5T1NLT2FkRTg4QXBzWEZHmYzMHluaGx
KZ001MUNVNnZ00UV6Z25wdkhCRLV5aVZyYwVQaXdkNTNERjVaVFpub21FTmc4Nwt0VWQyb0ppMldwcjR
PbW1rZk40eDR6SGZpVkJz0ER20E56dWh0cU9pZGLsR3ZBNkRHdWVad0830EFBUW42Y2lFazYrcnc1VmN
2anZxTkRZUE9vSVV3YUtTaHJ4QXVYTgxRSdrhWxVHZk1ZRGmXMFdGNVRhMzFoUEpPZmNvaHJVl0psSU5
pNmM2WxSWWRCCG82KytZZmp4NjFsR05mUm00TUQ1ckoxajNGb0dIbmpEU0JOYXJZWdNTHlNc3pLcGI
3dFhwb0hmUHM4aDNxcDFMek5mTms1NFh4QzF3REdVbVl6WfllZmg2ei9jS3RWbTRFQnhh0VZRR0R6WXI
zTHJVTVJqSEVLa2s3emFGS1lRQTJoR1FVMXor0DV0RldwERYa3ozdngxMEDxeFE2QnplTmJvQms1bjh
rNG5lYlJoK2sxaFdmeFRGMEQxRXlXVXM1bnYrZgDRcUtheHp1Q2RFMGLzSGwwMk5R0GFoMG1YcYyTGE
zbTbm0XdpazkrD0x0VE1ZLzg2TVBv0HlPMzFPZnhtVDZQV29xRzkrRFP1a1luYTU2bVNadDVXV1N5NXF
WQTFyd1V5SnFYQWxuemptYwkvZ0hTRDdSa1R5aWhvZ0FBQUFCslJVNUVya0pnZ2c9PSJ9LCJzdGF0dXN
SZXBvcnRzIjpbeyJzdGF0dXMiOiJGSURPXF0NFu1RJRklFRcIsImVmZmVjdG12ZURhdGUiOiIyMDE0LTA
xLTA0In1dLCJ0aW1lT2ZMYXN0U3RhdHVzQ2hhbmdlIjoImjAxc0wMS0wNCJ9LHsiYWFnZWlkiIjoImDE
zMmQxMTAtYmY0ZS00MjA4LWE0MDMtYWI0ZjVmMTJlZmU1IiwibWV0YWRhdGF0ZmV1bnQ1O3nsibGV
nYwXlZWfKZXI0iJodHRwcZovL2ZpZG9hbGxpYw5jZS5vcmcvbwV0YWRhdGEvbwV0YWRhdGEtC3RhdGV
tZW50LWxlZ2FsLWhlYWRlci8iLlCjKZXNjcmlwdGlvbiI6IkZJRE8gQWxsawFuY2UgU2FtcGx1IEZJRE8
yIEF1dGh1bnRyY2F0b3IiLlCjYhYwd1aWQiOiIwMTMyZDExMC1iZjRlLTQyMDgtYTQwMy1hYjRmNWYxMmV
mZTU1LlCjhbHRLcm5hdG12ZURlc2NyaXB0aW9ucyI6eyJydS1SVSI6I0tCf0YDQUNc80LXRgCBGSURPMiD
QsNGD0YLQtdC90YLQuNGE0LjQutCw0YLQvtGA0LAG0L7RgiBGSURPIEFsbGhbmNlIiwiZnItRlIiOiJ
FeGVtcGx1IEZJRE8yIGF1dGh1bnRyY2F0b3IjZGUgRklETyBBbGxpYw5jZSIsInpoLUN0IjoI5L6G6Ie
qRklETyBBbGxpYw5jZeeah0ekuuS-i0ZJRE8y6Lqr5Lu96amX6K2J5ZmoIn0sInByb3RvY29sRmFtaWx
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MM5S1sImvmZmvjdGL2ZUKndGU1U1IyMD1WL1EXL1E511w1Y2VydGLmawNndGLvDKKLCZNYaXB0B311U1J
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hdHVzQ2hhbmdlIjo1MjAxOS0wMS0wNCJ9XX0
```

and finally we have to append another period (".") followed by the base64url-encoded signature.

EXAMPLE: JWT

```
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The line breaks are for display purposes only.

EXAMPLE: ECDSA KEY USED FOR SIGNATURE COMPUTATION

The root certificate to validate certificate path in the X5C is:

EXAMPLE: CERTIFICATE PATH ROOT CERTIFICATE

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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FgQU8sWwq1TrurK7xMTw01dKfeJBbCMwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU8sWwq1TrurK7xMTw
01dKfeJBbCMwHwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAA0CAgEAFw6M
1PiIfCPIBQ5EBUPNmRvRFuDPo10mDofnf/+mv63LqwQZAdo/W8tzZ9k0Fhq24SiL
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Zp0myqPNBq28w6qGMyoJN0Z4RzME03R6i/MQNfhK55/802HciM6xb5t/aBSuHPK
lBDrFWhpRnKYkaNtLU035qV5IbKKGau3SdZdSRciaXUd/p81YmoF01UlhhMz/Rqr
1k2gyA0a9tF8+awCeanYt5izl8Y00Flr0U1S05UQw4szqqZqbrf4e8fRuU2TXN4
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eyJIKAsl5Rm2Bmgyg5IoyWwSG5W+WekGyEokpslou2Yc6EjUj5ndZWz5EiHAIQ74
hNfDoCZixVVLU3Qbp8a0S1bms0T2J0sspIbtZUG=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

3.2. Metadata BLOB object processing rules

The FIDO Server MUST follow these processing rules:

1. Download and cache the root signing trust anchor from the respective MDS root location "mds.fidoalliance.org". More information can be found at <https://fidoalliance.org/metadata/>

The system may pass the serial number of the latest cached Metadata Service BLOB to the service (GET /?localCopySerial=77). In that case, the MDS will return HTTP code 304 (Not Modified) if no newer MDS blob is available. Alternatively, the serial number of the local copy could be provided through the "If-None-Match" header field. The server will always return the serial number in the ETag header field. If both, the "localCopySerial" parameter and the "If-None-Match" header are provided, the server will only process the "localCopySerial" parameter.

2. To validate the digital certificates used in the digital signature, the certificate revocation information MUST be available in the form of CRLs at the respective MDS CRL location e.g. More information can be found at <https://fidoalliance.org/metadata/>
3. The FIDO Server MUST be able to download the latest metadata BLOB object from the well-known URL when appropriate, e.g. <https://mds.fidoalliance.org/>. The nextUpdate field of the [Metadata BLOB](#) specifies a date when the download SHOULD occur at latest.

4. If the x5u attribute is present in the JWT Header, then:

1. The FIDO Server MUST verify that the URL specified by the x5u attribute has the same web-origin as the URL used to download the metadata BLOB from. The FIDO Server SHOULD ignore the file if the web-origin differs (in order to prevent loading objects from arbitrary sites).
2. The FIDO Server MUST download the certificate (chain) from the URL specified by the x5u attribute [JWS]. The certificate chain MUST be verified to properly chain to the metadata BLOB signing trust anchor according to [RFC5280]. All certificates in the chain MUST be checked for revocation according to [RFC5280].
3. The FIDO Server SHOULD ignore the file if the chain cannot be verified or if one of the chain certificates is revoked.

The requirements for verifying certificate revocation, are only applicable to the MDS BLOB payload certificates. It is up to the server vendors whether to enforce CRL check for the certificates in the individual metadata statements.

5. If the x5u attribute is missing, the chain should be retrieved from the x5c attribute. If that attribute is missing as well, Metadata BLOB signing trust anchor is considered the BLOB signing certificate chain.
6. Verify the signature of the Metadata BLOB object using the BLOB signing certificate chain (as determined by the steps above). The FIDO Server SHOULD ignore the file if the signature is invalid. It SHOULD also ignore the file if its number (no) is less or equal to the number of the last Metadata BLOB object cached locally.
7. Write the verified object to a local cache as required.
8. Iterate through the individual entries (of type MetadataBLOBPayloadEntry). For each entry:
 1. Ignore the entry if the AAID, AAGUID or attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers is not relevant to the relying party (e.g. not acceptable by any policy)

Note: To remain compatible with future versions the FIDO Server SHOULD ignore unrecognized fields when processing any element of an entry. The addition, subtraction or change in interpretation of any fields in an entry of this specification which substantively changes the processing logic of a consumer will only occur alongside an update to the major version number of the specification.

2. Check whether the status report of the authenticator model has changed compared to the cached entry by looking at the fields timeOfLastStatusChange and statusReport.

Update the status of the cached entry. It is up to the relying party to specify behavior for authenticators with status reports that indicate a lack of certification, or known security issues. However, the status REVOKED indicates significant security issues related to such authenticators.

Authenticators with an unacceptable status should be marked accordingly. This information is required for building registration and authentication policies included in the registration request and the authentication request [UAFProtocol].

3. Update the cached metadata statement.

4. Considerations

This section is not normative.

This section describes the key considerations for designing this metadata service.

Need for Authenticator Metadata

When defining policies for acceptable authenticators, it is often better to describe the required authenticator characteristics in a generic way than to list individual authenticator AAIDs. The metadata statements provide such information. Authenticator metadata also provides the trust anchor required to verify attestation objects.

The metadata service provides a standardized method to access such metadata statements.

Integrity and Authenticity

Metadata statements include information relevant for the security. Some business verticals might even have the need to document authenticator policies and trust anchors used for verifying attestation objects for auditing purposes.

It is important to have a strong method to verify and proof integrity and authenticity and the freshness of metadata statements. We are using a single digital signature to protect the integrity and authenticity of the Metadata BLOB object and all metadata statements.

Organizational Impact

The FIDO Alliance has control over the FIDO certification process and authentication vendors provide the metadata as part of that process. With this metadata service, the list of known authenticators and their metadata statements need to be updated, signed and published regularly. A single signature needs to be generated in order to protect the integrity and authenticity of the metadata BLOB object and all embedded metadata statements.

Performance Impact

Metadata BLOB objects and metadata statements can be cached by the FIDO Server.

The update policy can be specified by the relying party.

The metadata BLOB object includes a date for the next scheduled update. As a result there *is no additional impact* to the FIDO Server during FIDO Authentication or FIDO Registration operations.

High Security Environments

Some high security environments might only trust internal policy authorities. FIDO Servers in such environments could be restricted to use metadata BLOB objects from a proprietary trusted source only. The metadata service is the baseline for most relying parties.

Extended Authenticator Information

Some relying parties might want additional information about authenticators before accepting them. The policy configuration is under control of the relying party, so it is possible to only accept authenticators for which additional data is available and meets the requirements.

Implementer Guidance

For typical applications, we recommend checking for updated Metadata Statements once a day. This ensures up-to-date information about available security keys and passkey providers and their respective characteristics and certification status.

In order to minimize bandwidths needs and system load, we also recommend providing the serial number of the most recent local copy that is available, see section [Metadata BLOB object processing rules](#) for more details. This avoids downloading the data again if there is no change.

Note that the nextUpdate field denotes the latest time the FIDO Alliance would publish an update even if there are no changes.

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Terms defined by this specification§

[aaguid](#)

[aaid](#)
[attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers](#)
["ATTESTATION_KEY_COMPROMISE"](#)
[AuthenticatorStatus](#)
[authenticatorVersion](#)
[batchCertificate](#)
[BiometricStatusReport](#)
[biometricStatusReports](#)
[certificate](#)
certificateNumber
[dict-member for BiometricStatusReport](#)
[dict-member for StatusReport](#)
certificationDescriptor
[dict-member for BiometricStatusReport](#)
[dict-member for StatusReport](#)
certificationPolicyVersion
[dict-member for BiometricStatusReport](#)
[dict-member for StatusReport](#)
[certificationProfiles](#)
certificationRequirementsVersion
[dict-member for BiometricStatusReport](#)
[dict-member for StatusReport](#)
[certLevel](#)
[date](#)
effectiveDate
[dict-member for BiometricStatusReport](#)
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["FIDO_CERTIFIED"](#)
["FIDO_CERTIFIED_L1"](#)
["FIDO_CERTIFIED_L1plus"](#)
["FIDO_CERTIFIED_L2"](#)
["FIDO_CERTIFIED_L2plus"](#)
["FIDO_CERTIFIED_L3"](#)
["FIDO_CERTIFIED_L3plus"](#)
["FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L1"](#)
["FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L2"](#)
["FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L3"](#)
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[metadataStatement](#)
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[nextUpdate](#)
[no](#)
["NOT_FIDO_CERTIFIED"](#)
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[RogueListEntry](#)
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["SELF_ASSERTION_SUBMITTED"](#)
[sk](#)
[status](#)
[StatusReport](#)
[statusReports](#)
[sunsetDate](#)
[timeOfLastStatusChange](#)
["UPDATE_AVAILABLE"](#)
[url](#)
["USER_KEY_PHYSICAL_COMPROMISE"](#)
["USER_KEY_REMOTE_COMPROMISE"](#)
["USER_VERIFICATION_BYPASS"](#)

Terms defined by reference§

[ECMASCRIPT] defines the following terms:

Number

[WebIDL] defines the following terms:

DOMString

unsigned long

unsigned short

References§

Normative References§

[ECMASCRIPT]

ECMAScript Language Specification. URL: <https://tc39.es/ecma262/multipage/>

[FIDOAuthenticatorSecurityRequirements]

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[JWT]

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[FIDOGlossary]

R. Lindemann; et al. *FIDO Technical Glossary*. 23 May 2022. Proposed Standard. URL: <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/common-specs/fido-glossary-v2.1-ps-20220523.html>

[FIDOKeyAttestation]

FIDO 2.0: Key attestation format. URL: <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20150904/fido-key-attestation-v2.0-ps-20150904.html>

[ITU-X690-2008]

X.690: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER), (T-REC-X.690-200811). November 2008. URL: <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690-200811-S>

[RFC2119]

S. Bradner. *Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels*. March 1997. Best Current Practice. URL: <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119>

[UAFProtocol]

R. Lindemann; et al. *FIDO UAF Protocol Specification v1.2*. Proposed Standard. URL: <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-uaf-v1.2-ps-20201020/fido-uaf-protocol-v1.2-ps-20201020.html>

IDL Index

```
dictionary MetadataBlobPayloadEntry {  
    Aaid aaid;  
    Aaguid aaguid;  
    DOMString[] attestationCertificateKeyIdentifiers;  
    required MetadataStatement metadataStatement;  
    BiometricStatusReport[] biometricStatusReports;  
    required StatusReport[] statusReports;  
    required DOMString timeOfLastStatusChange;  
    DOMString requestID;  
};
```

```

    DOMString rogueListCore;
    DOMString rogueListHash;
};

dictionary BiometricStatusReport {
    required unsigned short certLevel;
    required DOMString modality;
    DOMString effectiveDate;
    DOMString certificationDescriptor;
    DOMString certificateNumber;
    DOMString certificationPolicyVersion;
    DOMString certificationRequirementsVersion;
};

dictionary StatusReport {
    required AuthenticatorStatus status;
    DOMString effectiveDate;
    unsigned long authenticatorVersion;
    DOMString batchCertificate;
    DOMString certificate;
    DOMString url;
    DOMString certificationDescriptor;
    DOMString certificateNumber;
    DOMString certificationPolicyVersion;
    DOMString[] certificationProfiles;
    DOMString certificationRequirementsVersion;
    DOMString sunsetDate;
    unsigned long fipsRevision;
    unsigned long fipsPhysicalSecurityLevel;
};

enum AuthenticatorStatus {
    "NOT_FIDO_CERTIFIED",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED",
    "USER_VERIFICATION_BYPASS",
    "ATTESTATION_KEY_COMPROMISE",
    "USER_KEY_REMOTE_COMPROMISE",
    "USER_KEY_PHYSICAL_COMPROMISE",
    "UPDATE_AVAILABLE",
    "REVOKED",
    "SELF_ASSERTION_SUBMITTED",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L1",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L1plus",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L2",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L2plus",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L3",
    "FIDO_CERTIFIED_L3plus",
    "FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L1",
    "FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L2",
    "FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L3",
    "FIPS140_CERTIFIED_L4"
};

dictionary RogueListEntry {
    required DOMString sk;
    required DOMString date;
};

dictionary MetadataBLOBPayload {
    DOMString legalHeader;
    required Number no;
    required DOMString nextUpdate;
    required MetadataBLOBPayloadEntry[] entries;
};

```

```
};
```

