FIDO UAF Authenticator-Specific Module API

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The English version of this specification is the only normative version. Non-normative translations may also be available.

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Abstract

UAF authenticators may be connected to a user device via various physical interfaces (SPI, USB, Bluetooth, etc). The UAF Authenticator-Specific Module (ASM) is a software interface on top of UAF authenticators which gives a standardized way for FIDO UAF Clients to detect and access the functionality of UAF authenticators and hides internal communication complexity from FIDO UAF Client.

This document describes the internal functionality of ASMs, defines the UAF ASM API and explains how FIDO UAF Clients should use the API.

This document's intended audience is FIDO authenticator and FIDO FIDO UAF Client vendors.

Status of This Document
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1. Notation
Type names, attribute names and element names are written as code.

String literals are enclosed in “”, e.g. “UAF-TLV”.

In formulas we use “|” to denote byte wise concatenation operations.

DOM APIs are described using the ECMAScript [ECMA-262] bindings for WebIDL [WebIDL-ED].

The notation base64url refers to "Base 64 Encoding with URL and Filename Safe Alphabet" [RFC4648] without padding.

Following [WebIDL-ED], dictionary members are optional unless they are explicitly marked as required. WebIDL dictionary members MUST NOT have a value of null.

Unless otherwise specified, if a WebIDL dictionary member is DOMString, it MUST NOT be empty.

Unless otherwise specified, if a WebIDL dictionary member is a List, it MUST NOT be an empty list.

UAF specific terminology used in this document is defined in [FIDO Glossary].

All diagrams, examples, notes in this specification are non-normative.

**NOTE**

Note: Certain dictionary members need to be present in order to comply with FIDO requirements. Such members are marked in the WebIDL definitions found in this document, as required. The keyword required has been introduced by [WebIDL-ED], which is a work-in-progress. If you are using a WebIDL parser which implements [WebIDL], then you may remove the keyword required from your WebIDL and use other means to ensure those fields are present.

1.1 Key Words

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Overview

This section is non-normative.

UAF authenticators may be connected to a user device via various physical interfaces (SPI, USB, Bluetooth, etc.). The UAF Authenticator-Specific module (ASM) is a software interface on top of UAF authenticators which gives a standardized way for FIDO UAF Clients to detect and access the functionality of UAF authenticators, and hides internal communication complexity from clients.

The ASM is a platform-specific software component offering an API to FIDO UAF Clients, enabling them to discover and communicate with one or more available authenticators.

A single ASM may report on behalf of multiple authenticators.

The intended audience for this document is FIDO UAF authenticator and FIDO UAF Client vendors.

**NOTE**

Platform vendors might choose to not expose the ASM API defined in this document to applications. They
The FIDO UAF protocol and its various operations is described in the FIDO UAF Protocol Specification [UAFProtocol]. The following simplified architecture diagram illustrates the interactions and actors this document is concerned with:

![UAF ASM API Architecture Diagram](image)

**Fig. 1 UAF ASM API Architecture**

2.1 Code Example format

ASM requests and responses are presented in WebIDL format.

3. ASM Requests and Responses

*This section is normative.*

The ASM API is defined in terms of JSON-formatted [ECMA-404] request and reply messages. In order to send a request to an ASM, a FIDO UAF Client creates an appropriate object (e.g., in ECMAscript), "stringifies" it (also known as serialization) into a JSON-formatted string, and sends it to the ASM. The ASM de-serializes the JSON-formatted string, processes the request, constructs a response, stringifies it, returning it as a JSON-formatted string.

**NOTE**
The ASM request processing rules in this document explicitly assume that the underlying authenticator implements the "UAFV1TLV" assertion scheme (e.g. references to TLVs and tags) as described in [UAFProtocol]. If an authenticator supports a different assertion scheme then the corresponding processing rules must be replaced with appropriate assertion scheme-specific rules.

Authenticator implementers may create custom authenticator command interfaces other than the one defined in [UAFAuthnrCommands]. Such implementations are not required to implement the exact message-specific processing steps described in this section. However,

1. the command interfaces must present the ASM with external behavior equivalent to that described below in order for the ASM to properly respond to the client request messages (e.g. returning appropriate UAF status codes for specific conditions).

2. all authenticator implementations must support an assertion scheme as defined [UAFRegistry] and must return the related objects, i.e. TAG_UAFV1_REG_ASSERTION and TAG_UAFV1_AUTH_ASSERTION as defined in [UAFAuthnrCommands].

3.1 Request enum

```webidl
enum Request {
    "GetInfo",
    "Register",
    "Authenticate",
    "Deregister",
    "GetRegistrations",
    "OpenSettings"
};
```

### Enumeration description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Request</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GetInfo</td>
<td>GetInfo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Register</td>
<td>Register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authenticate</td>
<td>Authenticate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deregister</td>
<td>Deregister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GetRegistrations</td>
<td>GetRegistrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OpenSettings</td>
<td>OpenSettings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 StatusCode Interface

If the ASM needs to return an error received from the authenticator, it shall map the status code received from the authenticator to the appropriate ASM status code as specified here.

If the ASM doesn't understand the authenticator's status code, it shall treat it as UAF_CMD_STATUS_ERR_UNKNOWN and map it to UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR if it cannot be handled otherwise.

If the caller of the ASM interface (i.e. the FIDO Client) doesn't understand a status code returned by the ASM, it shall treat it as UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR. This might occur when new error codes are introduced.

```webidl
interface StatusCode {
    const short UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK = 0x00;
    const short UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR = 0x01;
    const short UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED = 0x02;
    const short UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_CANCELLED = 0x03;
};
```
3.2.1 Constants

**UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK** of type *short*
No error condition encountered.

**UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR** of type *short*
An unknown error has been encountered during the processing.

**UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED** of type *short*
Access to this request is denied.

**UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_CANCELLED** of type *short*
Indicates that user explicitly canceled the request.

**UAF_ASM_STATUS_CANNOT_RENDER_TRANSACTION_CONTENT** of type *short*
Transaction content cannot be rendered, e.g. format doesn't fit authenticator's need.

**UAF_ASM_STATUS_KEY_DISAPPEARED_PERMANENTLY** of type *short*
Indicates that the UAuth key disappeared from the authenticator and cannot be restored.

**UAF_ASM_STATUS_AUTHENTICATOR_DISCONNECTED** of type *short*
Indicates that the authenticator is no longer connected to the ASM.

**UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_RESPONSIVE** of type *short*
The user took too long to follow an instruction, e.g. didn't swipe the finger within the accepted time.

**UAF_ASM_STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_AUTHENTICATOR_RESOURCES** of type *short*
Insufficient resources in the authenticator to perform the requested task.

**UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_LOCKOUT** of type *short*
The operation failed because the user is locked out and the authenticator cannot automatically trigger an action to change that. Typically the user would have to enter an alternative password (formally: undergo some other alternative user verification method) to re-enable the use of the main user verification method.

**NOTE**
Any method the user can use to (re-) enable the main user verification method is considered an alternative user verification method and must be properly declared as such. For example, if the user can enter an alternative password to re-enable the use of fingerprints or to add additional fingers, the authenticator obviously supports fingerprint or password based user verification.

**UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_ENROLLED** of type *short*
The operation failed because the user is not enrolled to the authenticator and the authenticator cannot automatically trigger user enrollment.

**UAF_ASM_STATUS_SYSTEM_INTERRUPTED** of type *short*
Indicates that the system interrupted the operation. Retry might make sense.
### 3.2.2 Mapping Authenticator Status Codes to ASM Status Codes

Authenticators are returning a status code in their responses to the ASM. The ASM needs to act on those responses and also map the status code returned by the authenticator to an ASM status code.

The mapping of authenticator status codes to ASM status codes is specified here:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authenticator Status Code</th>
<th>ASM Status Code</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UAF_CMD_STATUS_OK</td>
<td>UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK</td>
<td>Pass-through success status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAF_CMD_STATUS_ERR_UNKNOWN</td>
<td>UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR</td>
<td>Pass-through unspecific error status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAF_CMD_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED</td>
<td>UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED</td>
<td>Pass-through status code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAF_CMD_STATUS_USER_NOT_ENROLLED</td>
<td>UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_ENROLLED (or UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED in some situations)</td>
<td>According to [UAFAuthnrCommands], this might occur at the Sign command or at the Register command if the authenticator cannot automatically trigger user enrollment. The mapping depends on the command as follows. In the case of &quot;Register&quot; command, the error is mapped to UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_ENROLLED in order to tell the calling FIDO Client there is an authenticator present but the user enrollment needs to be triggered outside the authenticator. In the case of the &quot;Sign&quot; command, the Uauth key needs to be protected by one of the authenticator's user verification methods at all times. So if this error occurs it is considered an internal error and hence mapped to UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAF_CMD_STATUS_CANNOT_RENDER_TRANSACTION_CONTENT</td>
<td>UAF_ASM_STATUS_CANNOT_RENDER_TRANSACTION_CONTENT</td>
<td>Pass-through status code as it indicates a problem to be resolved by the entity providing the transaction text.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAF_CMD_STATUS_USER_CANCELLED</td>
<td>UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_CANCELLED</td>
<td>Map to UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_CANCELLED.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAF_CMD_STATUS_CMD_NOT_SUPPORTED</td>
<td>UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK or UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR</td>
<td>If the ASM is able to handle that command on behalf of the authenticator (e.g. removing the key handle in the case of Dereg command for a bound authenticator), the UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK must be returned. Map the status code to UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR otherwise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAF_CMD_STATUS_ATTESTATION_NOT_SUPPORTED</td>
<td>UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR</td>
<td>Indicates an ASM issue as the ASM has obviously not requested one of the supported attestation types indicated in the authenticator's response to the GetInfo command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAF_CMD_STATUS_PARAMS_INVALID</td>
<td>UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR</td>
<td>Indicates an ASM issue as the ASM has obviously not provided the correct parameters to the authenticator when sending the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>ASM Status Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAF_CMD_STATUS_KEY_DISAPPEARED_PERMANENTLY</td>
<td>UAF_ASM_STATUS_KEY_DISAPPEARED_PERMANENTLY</td>
<td>Pass-through status code. It indicates that the Uauth key disappeared permanently and the RP App might want to trigger re-registration of the authenticator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAF_STATUS_CMD_TIMEOUT</td>
<td>UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR</td>
<td>Retry operation and map to UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR if the problem persists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAF_CMD_STATUS_USER_NOT_RESPONSIVE</td>
<td>UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_RESPONSIVE</td>
<td>Pass-through status code. The RP App might want to retry the operation once the user pays attention to the application again.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAF_CMD_STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES</td>
<td>UAF_ASM_STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_AUTHENTICATOR_RESOURCES</td>
<td>Pass-through status code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAF_CMD_STATUS_USER_LOCKOUT</td>
<td>UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_LOCKOUT</td>
<td>Pass-through status code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other status code</td>
<td>UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR</td>
<td>Map any unknown error code to UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR. This might happen when an ASM communicates with an authenticator implementing a newer UAF specification than the ASM.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3 ASMRequest Dictionary

All ASM requests are represented as ASMRequest objects.

```webidl
dictionary ASMRequest {
  required Request requestType;
  Version asmVersion;
  unsigned short authenticatorIndex;
  object args;
  Extension[] exts;
};
```

3.3.1 Dictionary ASMRequest Members

- **requestType** of type required Request
  Request type

- **asmVersion** of type Version
  ASM message version to be used with this request. For the definition of the Version dictionary see [UAFProtocol]. The **asmVersion** must be 1.2 (i.e. major version is 1 and minor version is 2) for this version of the specification.

- **authenticatorIndex** of type unsigned short
  Refer to the GetInfo request for more details. Field **authenticatorIndex** must not be set for GetInfo request.

- **args** of type object
  Request-specific arguments. If set, this attribute may take one of the following types:

  - **RegisterIn**
- AuthenticateIn
- DeregisterIn

exts of type array of Extension
List of UAF extensions. For the definition of the Extension dictionary see [UAFProtocol].

### 3.4 ASMResponse Dictionary

All ASM responses are represented as ASMResponse objects.

```webidl
dictionary ASMResponse {
  required short statusCode;
  object responseData;
  Extension[] exts;
};
```

#### 3.4.1 Dictionary ASMResponse Members

- **statusCode** of type required short
  MUST contain one of the values defined in the StatusCode interface

- **responseData** of type object
  Request-specific response data. This attribute MUST have one of the following types:
  - GetInfoOut
  - RegisterOut
  - AuthenticateOut
  - GetRegistrationOut

- exts of type array of Extension
  List of UAF extensions. For the definition of the Extension dictionary see [UAFProtocol].

### 3.5 GetInfo Request

Return information about available authenticators.

1. Enumerate all of the authenticators this ASM supports
2. Collect information about all of them
3. Assign indices to them (authenticatorIndex)
4. Return the information to the caller

**NOTE**

Where possible, an authenticatorIndex should be a persistent identifier that uniquely identifies an authenticator over time, even if it is repeatedly disconnected and reconnected. This avoids possible confusion if the set of available authenticators changes between a GetInfo request and subsequent ASM requests, and allows a FIDO client to perform caching of information about removable authenticators for a better user experience.
For a GetInfo request, the following `ASMRequest` member(s) **MUST** have the following value(s). The remaining `ASMRequest` members **SHOULD** be omitted:

- `ASMRequest.requestType` **MUST** be set to `GetInfo`

For a GetInfo response, the following `ASMResponse` member(s) **MUST** have the following value(s). The remaining `ASMResponse` members **SHOULD** be omitted:

- `ASMResponse.statusCode` **MUST** have one of the following values
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR`
- `ASMResponse.responseData` **MUST** be an object of type `GetInfoOut`. In the case of an error the values of the fields might be empty (e.g. array with no members).

See section 3.2.2 [Mapping Authenticator Status Codes to ASM Status Codes](#) for details on the mapping of authenticator status codes to ASM status codes.

### 3.5.1 GetInfoOut Dictionary

```webidl
dictionary GetInfoOut {
  required AuthenticatorInfo[] Authenticators;
};
```

#### 3.5.1.1 Dictionary GetInfoOut Members

**Authenticators** of type array of `required AuthenticatorInfo`

List of authenticators reported by the current ASM. **MAY** be empty an empty list.

### 3.5.2 AuthenticatorInfo Dictionary

```webidl
dictionary AuthenticatorInfo {
  required unsigned short authenticatorIndex;
  required Version[] asmVersions;
  required boolean isUserEnrolled;
  required boolean hasSettings;
  required AAID aaid;
  required DOMString assertionScheme;
  required AuthenticatorAlgorithm authenticationAlgorithm;
  required attestationTypes;
  required DOMString[] supportedExtensionIDs;
  required unsigned short tcDisplay;
  required DOMString tcDisplayContentType;
};
```

It is up to the ASM to decide whether authenticators which are disconnected temporarily will be reported or not. However, if disconnected authenticators are reported, the FIDO Client might trigger an operation via the ASM on those. The ASM will have to notify the user to connect the authenticator and report an appropriate error if the authenticator isn't connected in time.
3.5.2.1 Dictionary AuthenticatorInfo Members

authenticatorIndex of type required unsigned short
Authenticator index. Unique, within the scope of all authenticators reported by the ASM, index referring to an authenticator. This index is used by the UAF Client to refer to the appropriate authenticator in further requests.

asmVersions of type array of required Version
A list of ASM Versions that this authenticator can be used with. For the definition of the Version dictionary see [UAFProtocol].

isUserEnrolled of type required boolean
Indicates whether a user is enrolled with this authenticator. Authenticators which don't have user verification technology MUST always return true. Bound authenticators which support different profiles per operating system (OS) user MUST report enrollment status for the current OS user.

hasSettings of type required boolean
A boolean value indicating whether the authenticator has its own settings. If so, then a FIDO UAF Client can launch these settings by sending a OpenSettings request.

aaid of type required AAID
The "Authenticator Attestation ID" (AAID), which identifies the type and batch of the authenticator. See [UAFProtocol] for the definition of the AAID structure.

assertionScheme of type required DOMString
The assertion scheme the authenticator uses for attested data and signatures.

AssertionScheme identifiers are defined in the UAF Protocol specification [UAFProtocol].

authenticationAlgorithm of type required unsigned short
Indicates the authentication algorithm that the authenticator uses. Authentication algorithm identifiers are defined in are defined in [FIDORegistry] with ALG_prefix.

attestationTypes of type array of required unsigned short
Indicates attestation types supported by the authenticator. Attestation type TAGs are defined in [UAFRegistry] with TAG_ATTESTATION_prefix.

userVerification of type required unsigned long
A set of bit flags indicating the user verification method(s) supported by the authenticator. The algorithm for combining the flags is defined in [UAFProtocol], section 3.1.12.1. The values are defined by the USER_VERIFY constants in [FIDORegistry].

keyProtection of type required unsigned short
A set of bit flags indicating the key protections used by the authenticator. The values are defined by the KEY_PROTECTION constants in [FIDORegistry].

matcherProtection of type required unsigned short
A set of bit flags indicating the matcher protections used by the authenticator. The values are defined by the MATCHER_PROTECTION constants in [FIDORegistry].

attachmentHint of type required unsigned long
A set of bit flags indicating how the authenticator is currently connected to the system hosting the FIDO
UAF Client software. The values are defined by the ATTACHMENT_HINT constants defined in [FIDORegistry].

**NOTE**

Because the connection state and topology of an authenticator may be transient, these values are only hints that can be used by server-supplied policy to guide the user experience, e.g. to prefer a device that is connected and ready for authenticating or confirming a low-value transaction, rather than one that is more secure but requires more user effort. These values are not reflected in authenticator metadata and cannot be relied on by the relying party, although some models of authenticator may provide attested measurements with similar semantics as part of UAF protocol messages.

- **isSecondFactorOnly** of type **required boolean**
  Indicates whether the authenticator can be used only as a second factor.

- **isRoamingAuthenticator** of type **required boolean**
  Indicates whether this is a roaming authenticator or not.

- **supportedExtensionIDs** of type array of **required DOMString**
  List of supported UAF extension IDs. **MAY** be an empty list.

- **tcDisplay** of type **required unsigned short**
  A set of bit flags indicating the availability and type of the authenticator's transaction confirmation display. The values are defined by the TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY constants in [FIDORegistry].

  This value **MUST** be 0 if transaction confirmation is not supported by the authenticator.

- **tcDisplayContentType** of type **DOMString**
  Supported transaction content type [FIDOMetadataStatement].

  This value **MUST** be present if transaction confirmation is supported, i.e. tcDisplay is non-zero.

- **tcDisplayPNGCharacteristics** of type array of DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor
  Supported transaction Portable Network Graphic (PNG) type [FIDOMetadataStatement]. For the definition of the DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor structure see [FIDOMetadataStatement].

  This list **MUST** be present if PNG-image based transaction confirmation is supported, i.e. tcDisplay is non-zero and tcDisplayContentType is image/png.

- **title** of type **DOMString**
  A human-readable short title for the authenticator. It should be localized for the current locale.

  **NOTE**

  If the ASM doesn't return a title, the FIDO UAF Client must provide a title to the calling App. See section "Authenticator interface" in [UAFAppAPIAndTransport].

- **description** of type **DOMString**
  Human-readable longer description of what the authenticator represents.

  **NOTE**

  This text should be localized for current locale.
3.6 Register Request

Verify the user and return an authenticator-generated UAF registration assertion.

For a Register request, the following `ASMRequest` member(s) **MUST** have the following value(s). The remaining `ASMRequest` members **SHOULD** be omitted:

- `ASMRequest.requestType` **MUST** be set to `Register`
- `ASMRequest.asmVersion` **MUST** be set to the desired version
- `ASMRequest.authenticatorIndex` **MUST** be set to the target authenticator index
- `ASMRequest.args` **MUST** be set to an object of type `RegisterIn`
- `ASMRequest.exts` **MAY** include some extensions to be processed by the ASM or the by Authenticator.

For a Register response, the following `ASMResponse` member(s) **MUST** have the following value(s). The remaining `ASMResponse` members **SHOULD** be omitted:

- `ASMResponse.statusCode` **MUST** have one of the following values:
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_CANCELLED`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_AUTHENTICATOR_DISCONNECTED`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_RESPONSIVE`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_AUTHENTICATOR_RESOURCES`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_LOCKOUT`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_ENROLLED`
- `ASMResponse.responseData` **MUST** be an object of type `RegisterOut`. In the case of an error the values of the fields might be empty (e.g. empty strings).

3.6.1 RegisterIn Object

```webidl
dictionary RegisterIn {
```

NOTE
If the ASM doesn't return an icon, the FIDO UAF Client will provide a default icon to the calling application. See section "Authenticator interface" in [UAFAppAPIAndTransport].
3.6.1 Dictionary **RegisterIn Members**

- **appId** of type **required DOMString**
  The FIDO server Application Identity.

- **username** of type **required DOMString**
  Human-readable user account name

- **finalChallenge** of type **required DOMString**
  base64url-encoded challenge data [RFC4648]

- **attestationType** of type **required unsigned short**
  Single requested attestation type

3.6.2 RegisterOut Object

WebIDL

```webidl
dictionary RegisterOut {
  required DOMString assertion;
  required DOMString assertionScheme;
};
```

3.6.2.1 Dictionary **RegisterOut Members**

- **assertion** of type **required DOMString**
  FIDO UAF authenticator registration assertion, base64url-encoded

- **assertionScheme** of type **required DOMString**
  Assertion scheme.

  AssertionScheme identifiers are defined in the UAF Protocol specification [UAFProtocol].

3.6.3 Detailed Description for Processing the Register Request

Refer to [UAFAuthnrCommands] document for more information about the TAGs and structure mentioned in this paragraph.

1. Locate authenticator using `authenticatorIndex`. If the authenticator cannot be located, then fail with `UAF_ASM_STATUS_AUTHENTICATOR_DISCONNECTED`.

2. If a user is already enrolled with this authenticator (such as biometric enrollment, PIN setup, etc. for example) then the ASM **MUST** request that the authenticator verifies the user.

   **NOTE**

   If the authenticator supports `UserVerificationToken` (see [UAFAuthnrCommands]), then the ASM must obtain this token in order to later include it with the `Register` command.
If the user is locked out (e.g. too many failed attempts to get verified) and the authenticator cannot automatically trigger unblocking, return UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_LOCKOUT.

- If verification fails, return UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED

3. If the user is not enrolled with the authenticator then take the user through the enrollment process.
   - If neither the ASM nor the Authenticator can trigger the enrollment process, return UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_ENROLLED.
   - If enrollment fails, return UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED

4. Verify whether registerIn.appID and the appID included in the finalChallenge parameter are identical. The registerIn.finalChallenge value needs to be (1) base64url decoded and (2) parsed into a JSON object first.
   - If verification fails, return UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED

5. Construct KHAccessToken (see section KHAccessToken for more details)

6. Hash the provided RegisterIn.finalChallenge using the authenticator-specific hash function (FinalChallengeHash)

   An authenticator's preferred hash function information MUST meet the algorithm defined in the AuthenticatorInfo.authenticationAlgorithm field.

7. Create a TAG_UAFV1_REGISTER_CMD structure and pass it to the authenticator
   1. Copy FinalChallengeHash, KHAccessToken, RegisterIn.Username, UserVerificationToken, RegisterIn.AppID, RegisterIn.AppID
      1. Depending on AuthenticatorType some arguments may be optional. Refer to [UAFAuthnrCommands] for more information on authenticator types and their required arguments.
      2. Add the extensions from the ASMRequest.exts dictionary appropriately to the TAG_UAFV1_REGISTER_CMD as TAG_EXTENSION object.

8. Invoke the command and receive the response. If the authenticator returns an error, handle that error appropriately. If the connection to the authenticator gets lost and cannot be restored, return UAF_ASM_STATUS_AUTHENTICATOR_DISCONNECTED. If the operation finally fails, map the authenticator error code to the the appropriate ASM error code (see section 3.2.2 Mapping Authenticator Status Codes to ASM Status Codes for details).

9. Parse TAG_UAFV1_REGISTER_CMD_RESP
   1. Parse the content of TAG_AUTHENTICATOR_ASSERTION (e.g. TAG_UAFV1_REG_ASSERTION) and extract TAG_KEYID

10. If the authenticator is a bound authenticator

    **NOTE**

    What data an ASM will store at this stage depends on underlying authenticator's architecture. For example some authenticators might store AppID, KeyHandle, KeyID inside their own secure storage. In this case ASM doesn't have to store these data in its database.

11. Create a RegisterOut object
    1. Set RegisterOut.assertionScheme according to AuthenticatorInfo.assertionScheme
    2. Encode the content of TAG_AUTHENTICATOR_ASSERTION (e.g. TAG_UAFV1_REG_ASSERTION) in base64url format and set as RegisterOut.assertion.
    3. Return RegisterOut object

3.7 Authenticate Request
Verify the user and return authenticator-generated UAF authentication assertion.

For an Authenticate request, the following `ASMRequest` member(s) **MUST** have the following value(s). The remaining `ASMRequest` members **SHOULD** be omitted:

- `ASMRequest.requestType` **MUST** be set to `Authenticate`.
- `ASMRequest.asmVersion` **MUST** be set to the desired version.
- `ASMRequest.authenticatorIndex` **MUST** be set to the target authenticator index.
- `ASMRequest.args` **MUST** be set to an object of type `AuthenticateIn`.
- `ASMRequest.exts` **MAY** include some extensions to be processed by the ASM or the by Authenticator.

For an Authenticate response, the following `ASMResponse` member(s) **MUST** have the following value(s). The remaining `ASMResponse` members **SHOULD** be omitted:

- `ASMResponse.statusCode` **MUST** have one of the following values:
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_CANCELLED`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_CANNOT_RENDER_TRANSACTION_CONTENT`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_KEY_DISAPPEARED_PERMANENTLY`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_AUTHENTICATOR_DISCONNECTED`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_RESPONSIVE`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_LOCKOUT`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_ENROLLED`
- `ASMResponse.responseData` **MUST** be an object of type `AuthenticateOut`. In the case of an error the values of the fields might be empty (e.g. empty strings).

### 3.7.1 AuthenticateIn Object

**WebIDL**

```webidl
dictionary AuthenticateIn {
  required DOMString appID;
  DOMString[] keyIDs;
  required DOMString finalChallenge;
  Transaction[] transaction;
}
```

### 3.7.1.1 Dictionary `AuthenticateIn` Members

- **appID** of type **required DOMString**
  appID string

- **keyIDs** of type array of **DOMString**
  base64url [RFC4648] encoded keyIDs

- **finalChallenge** of type **required DOMString**
  base64url [RFC4648] encoded final challenge

- **transaction** of type array of **Transaction**
  An array of transaction data to be confirmed by user. If multiple transactions are provided, then the ASM
MUST select the one that best matches the current display characteristics.

NOTE
This may, for example, depend on whether user’s device is positioned horizontally or vertically at the moment of transaction.

### 3.7.2 Transaction Object

```webidl
dictionary Transaction {
  required DOMString contentType;
  required DOMString content;
  DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor tcDisplayPNGCharacteristics;
};
```

#### 3.7.2.1 Dictionary Transaction Members

- **contentType** of type `required DOMString`
  Contains the MIME Content-Type supported by the authenticator according to its metadata statement (see [FIDOMetadataStatement])

- **content** of type `required DOMString`
  Contains the base64url-encoded [RFC4648] transaction content according to the `contentType` to be shown to the user.

- **tcDisplayPNGCharacteristics** of type `DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor`
  Transaction content PNG characteristics. For the definition of the `DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor` structure See [FIDOMetadataStatement].

### 3.7.3 AuthenticateOut Object

```webidl
dictionary AuthenticateOut {
  required DOMString assertion;
  required DOMString assertionScheme;
};
```

#### 3.7.3.1 Dictionary AuthenticateOut Members

- **assertion** of type `required DOMString`
  Authenticator UAF authentication assertion.

- **assertionScheme** of type `required DOMString`
  Assertion scheme

### 3.7.4 Detailed Description for Processing the Authenticate Request

Refer to the [UAFAuthnrCommands] document for more information about the TAGs and structure mentioned in this paragraph.

1. Locate the authenticator using `authenticatorIndex`. If the authenticator cannot be located, then fail with
UAF_ASM_STATUS_AUTHENTICATOR_DISCONNECTED.

2. If no user is enrolled with this authenticator (such as biometric enrollment, PIN setup, etc.), return UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED

3. The ASM MUST request the authenticator to verify the user.
   - If the user is locked out (e.g. too many failed attempts to get verified) and the authenticator cannot automatically trigger unblocking, return UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_LOCKOUT.
   - If verification fails, return UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED

   **NOTE**
   If the authenticator supports UserVerificationToken (see [UAFAuthnrCommands]), the ASM must obtain this token in order to later pass to Sign command.

4. Construct KHAccessToken (see section KHAccessToken for more details)

5. Hash the provided AuthenticateIn.finalChallenge using an authenticator-specific hash function (FinalChallengeHash).

   The authenticator's preferred hash function information MUST meet the algorithm defined in the AuthenticatorInfo.authenticationAlgorithm field.

6. If this is a Second Factor authenticator and AuthenticateIn.keyIDs is empty, then return UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED

7. If AuthenticateIn.keyIDs is not empty,
   1. If this is a bound authenticator, then look up ASM's database with AuthenticateIn.appId and AuthenticateIn.keyIDs and obtain the KeyHandles associated with it.
      - Return UAF_ASM_STATUS_KEY_DISAPPEARED_PERMANENTLY if the related key disappeared permanently from the authenticator.
      - Return UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED if no entry has been found.
   2. If this is a roaming authenticator, then treat AuthenticateIn.keyIDs as KeyHandles

8. Create TAG_UAFV1_SIGN_CMD structure and pass it to the authenticator.
   1. Copy AuthenticateIn.AppID, AuthenticateIn.Transaction.content (if not empty), FinalChallengeHash, KHAccessToken, UserVerificationToken, KeyHandles
      - Depending on AuthenticatorType some arguments may be optional. Refer to [UAFAuthnrCommands] for more information on authenticator types and their required arguments.
      - If multiple transactions are provided, select the one that best matches the current display characteristics.

   **NOTE**
   This may, for example, depend on whether user's device is positioned horizontally or vertically at the moment of transaction.

   - Decode the base64url encoded AuthenticateIn.Transaction.content before passing it to the authenticator

   - Add the extensions from the ASMRequest.exts dictionary appropriately to the TAG_UAFV1_REGISTER_CMD as TAG_EXTENSION object.

9. Invoke the command and receive the response. If the authenticator returns an error, handle that error appropriately. If the connection to the authenticator gets lost and cannot be restored, return
If the operation finally fails, map the authenticator error code to the appropriate ASM error code (see section 3.2.2 Mapping Authenticator Status Codes to ASM Status Codes for details).

10. Parse \texttt{TAG\_UAFV1\_SIGN\_CMD\_RESP}
   - If it's a first-factor authenticator and the response includes \texttt{TAG\_USERNAME\_AND\_KEYHANDLE}, then
     1. Extract usernames from \texttt{TAG\_USERNAME\_AND\_KEYHANDLE} fields
     2. If two or more equal usernames are found, then choose the one which has registered most recently

   \begin{quote}
   \textbf{NOTE}
   After this step, a first-factor bound authenticator which stores KeyHandles inside the ASM's database may delete the redundant KeyHandles from the ASM's database. This avoids having unusable (old) private key in the authenticator which (surprisingly) might become active after deregistering the newly generated one.
   \end{quote}

   3. Show remaining distinct usernames and ask the user to choose a single username
   4. Set \texttt{TAG\_UAFV1\_SIGN\_CMD.KeyHandles} to the single KeyHandle associated with the selected username.
   5. Go to step #8 and send a new \texttt{TAG\_UAFV1\_SIGN\_CMD} command

11. Create the \texttt{AuthenticateOut} object
   1. Set \texttt{AuthenticateOut.assertionScheme} as \texttt{AuthenticatorInfo.assertionScheme}
   2. Encode the content of \texttt{TAG\_AUTHENTICATOR\_ASSERTION} (e.g. \texttt{TAG\_UAFV1\_AUTH\_ASSERTION}) in base64url format and set as \texttt{AuthenticateOut.assertion}
   3. Return the \texttt{AuthenticateOut} object

\begin{quote}
\textbf{NOTE}
Some authenticators might support "Transaction Confirmation Display" functionality not inside the authenticator but within the boundaries of the ASM. Typically these are software based Transaction ConfirmationDisplays. When processing the \texttt{Sign} command with a given transaction such ASM should show transaction content in its own UI and after user confirms it -- pass the content to authenticator so that the authenticator includes it in the final assertion.

See [FIDORegistry] for flags describing Transaction Confirmation Display type.
\end{quote}

The authenticator metadata statement \texttt{MUST} truly indicate the type of transaction confirmation display implementation. Typically the "Transaction Confirmation Display" flag will be set to \texttt{TRANSACTION\_CONFIRMATION\_DISPLAY\_ANY} (bitwise) or \texttt{TRANSACTION\_CONFIRMATION\_DISPLAY\_PRIVILEGED\_SOFTWARE}.

### 3.8 Deregister Request

Delete registered UAF record from the authenticator.

For a Deregister request, the following \texttt{ASMRequest} member(s) \texttt{MUST} have the following value(s). The remaining \texttt{ASMRequest} members \texttt{SHOULD} be omitted:

- \texttt{ASMRequest.requestType} \texttt{MUST} be set to \texttt{Deregister}
- \texttt{ASMRequest.asmVersion} \texttt{MUST} be set to the desired version
- \texttt{ASMRequest.authenticatorIndex} \texttt{MUST} be set to the target authenticator index
ASMRequest.args MUST be set to an object of type DeregisterIn

For a Deregister response, the following ASMResponse member(s) MUST have the following value(s). The remaining ASMResponse members SHOULD be omitted:

- ASMResponse.statusCode MUST have one of the following values:
  - UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK
  - UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR
  - UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
  - UAF_ASM_STATUS_AUTHENTICATOR_DISCONNECTED

3.8.1 DeregisterIn Object

```webidl
dictionary DeregisterIn {
    required DOMString appID;
    required DOMString keyID;
};
```

3.8.1.1 Dictionary DeregisterIn Members

- **appID** of type required DOMString
  FIDO Server Application Identity

- **keyID** of type required DOMString
  Base64url-encoded [RFC4648] key identifier of the authenticator to be de-registered. The keyID can be an empty string. In this case all keyIDs related to this appID MUST be deregistered.

3.8.2 Detailed Description for Processing the Deregister Request

Refer to [UAFAuthnrCommands] for more information about the TAGs and structures mentioned in this paragraph.

1. Locate the authenticator using authenticatorIndex
2. Construct KHAccessToken (see section KHAccessToken for more details).
3. If this is a bound authenticator, then
   - If the value of DeregisterIn.keyID is an empty string, then lookup all pairs of this appID and any keyID mapped to this authenticatorIndex and delete them. Go to step 4.
   - Otherwise, lookup the authenticator related data in the ASM database and delete the record associated with DeregisterIn.appID and DeregisterIn.keyID. Go to step 4.
4. Create the TAG_UAFV1_DEREGISTER_CMD structure, copy KHAccessToken and DeregisterIn.keyID and pass it to the authenticator.

   **NOTE**

   In the case of roaming authenticators, the keyID passed to the authenticator might be an empty string. The authenticator is supposed to deregister all keys related to this appID in this case.

5. Invoke the command and receive the response. If the authenticator returns an error, handle that error appropriately. If the connection to the authenticator gets lost and cannot be restored, return UAF_ASM_STATUS_AUTHENTICATOR_DISCONNECTED. If the operation finally fails, map the authenticator error code to
the appropriate ASM error code (see section 3.2.2 Mapping Authenticator Status Codes to ASM Status Codes for details). Return proper ASMResponse.

3.9 GetRegistrations Request

Return all registrations made for the calling FIDO UAF Client.

For a GetRegistrations request, the following ASMRequest member(s) MUST have the following value(s). The remaining ASMRequest members SHOULD be omitted:

- ASMRequest.requestType MUST be set to GetRegistrations
- ASMRequest.asmVersion MUST be set to the desired version
- ASMRequest.authenticatorIndex MUST be set to corresponding ID

For a GetRegistrations response, the following ASMResponse member(s) MUST have the following value(s). The remaining ASMResponse members SHOULD be omitted:

- ASMResponse.statusCode MUST have one of the following values:
  - UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK
  - UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR
  - UAF_ASM_STATUS_AUTHENTICATOR_DISCONNECTED
- The ASMResponse.responseData MUST be an object of type GetRegistrationsOut. In the case of an error the values of the fields might be empty (e.g. empty strings).

3.9.1 GetRegistrationsOut Object

```webidl
dictionary GetRegistrationsOut {
  required AppRegistration[] appRegs;
};
```

3.9.1.1 Dictionary GetRegistrationsOut Members

- **appRegs** of type array of required AppRegistration
  List of registrations associated with an appID (see AppRegistration below). MAY be an empty list.

3.9.2 AppRegistration Object

```webidl
dictionary AppRegistration {
  required DOMString appID;
  required DOMString[] keyIDs;
};
```

3.9.2.1 Dictionary AppRegistration Members

- **appID** of type required DOMString
  FIDO Server Application Identity.

- **keyIDs** of type array of required DOMString
  List of key identifiers associated with the appID
3.9.3 Detailed Description for Processing the GetRegistrations Request

1. Locate the authenticator using authenticatorIndex.
2. If this is bound authenticator, then
   - Lookup the registrations associated with CallerID and AppID in the ASM database and construct a list of AppRegistration objects.

   **NOTE**
   Some ASMs might not store this information inside their own database. Instead it might have been stored inside the authenticator's secure storage area. In this case the ASM must send a proprietary command to obtain the necessary data.

3. If this is not a bound authenticator, then set the list to empty.
4. Create GetRegistrationsOut object and return.

3.10 OpenSettings Request

Display the authenticator-specific settings interface. If the authenticator has its own built-in user interface, then the ASM MUST invoke TAG_UAFV1_OPEN_SETTINGS_CMD to display it.

For an OpenSettings request, the following ASMRequest member(s) MUST have the following value(s). The remaining ASMRequest members SHOULD be omitted:

- ASMRequest.requestType MUST be set to OpenSettings
- ASMRequest.asmVersion MUST be set to the desired version
- ASMRequest.authenticatorIndex MUST be set to the target authenticator index

For an OpenSettings response, the following ASMResponse member(s) MUST have the following value(s). The remaining ASMResponse members SHOULD be omitted:

- ASMResponse.statusCode MUST have one of the following values:
  - UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK

4. Using ASM API

This section is non-normative.

In a typical implementation, the FIDO UAF Client will call GetInfo during initialization and obtain information about the authenticators. Once the information is obtained it will typically be used during FIDO UAF message processing to find a match for given FIDO UAF policy. Once a match is found the FIDO UAF Client will send the appropriate request (Register/Authenticate/Deregister...) to this ASM.

The FIDO UAF Client may use the information obtained from a GetInfo response to display relevant information about an authenticator to the user.

5. ASM APIs for various platforms

This section is normative.
5.1 Android ASM Intent API

On Android systems FIDO UAF ASMs may be implemented as a separate APK-packaged application.

The FIDO UAF Client invokes ASM operations via Android Intents. All interactions between the FIDO UAF Client and an ASM on Android takes place through the following intent identifier:

```
org.fidoalliance.intent.FIDO_OPERATION
```

To carry messages described in this document, an intent must also have its type attribute set to application/fido.uaf_asm+json.

ASMs must register that intent in their manifest file and implement a handler for it.

FIDO UAF Clients must append an extra, message, containing a String representation of a ASMRequest, before invoking the intent.

FIDO UAF Clients must invoke ASMs by calling `startActivityForResult()`.

FIDO UAF Clients should assume that ASMs will display an interface to the user in order to handle this intent, e.g. prompting the user to complete the verification ceremony. However, the ASM should not display any user interface when processing a GetInfo request.

After processing is complete the ASM will return the response intent as an argument to `onActivityResult()`. The response intent will have an extra, message, containing a String representation of a ASMResponse.

5.1.1 Discovering ASMs

FIDO UAF Clients can discover the ASMs available on the system by using `PackageManager.queryIntentActivities(Intent intent, int flags)` with the FIDO Intent described above to see if any activities are available.

A typical FIDO UAF Client will enumerate all ASM applications using this function and will invoke the GetInfo operation for each one discovered.

5.1.2 Alternate Android AIDL Service ASM Implementation

The Android Intent API can also be implemented using Android AIDL services as an alternative transport mechanism to Android Intents. Please see Android Intent API section [UAFAppAPIAndTransport] for differences between the Android AIDL service and Android Intent implementation.

This API should be used if the ASM itself doesn't implement any user interface.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The advantage of this AIDL Server based API is that it doesn't cause a focus lose on the caller App.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2 Java ASM API for Android

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Java ASM API is useful for ASMs for KeyStore based authenticators. In this case the platform limits key use-access to the application generating the key. The ASM runs in the process scope of the RP App.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
public interface IASM {
    enum Event {
        PLUGGED,  /**< Indicates that the authenticator was Plugged to system */
        UNPLUGGED /**< Indicates that the authenticator was Unplugged from system */
    }

    public interface IEnumeratorListener {
        /**
         * This function is called when an authenticator is plugged or
         * unplugged.
         * @param eventType event type (plugged/unplugged)
         * @param serialized AuthenticatorInfo JSON based GetInfoResponse object
         */
        void onNotify(Event eventType, String authenticatorInfo);
    }

    public interface IResponseReceiver {
        /**
         * This function is called when ASM's response is ready.
         * @param response serialized response JSON based event data
         * @param exchangeData for ASM if it needs some
         * data back right after calling the callback function.
         * onResponse will set the exchangeData to the data to
         * be returned to the ASM.
         */
        void onResponse(String response, StringBuilder exchangeData);
    }

    /**
     * Initializes the ASM. This is the first function to
     * be called.
     * @param ctx the Android Application context of the calling application (or null)
     * @param enumeratorListener caller provided Enumerator
     * @return ASM StatusCode value
     */
    short init(Context ctx, IEnumeratorListener enumeratorListener);

    /**
     * Process given JSON request and returns JSON response.
     * If the caller wants to execute a function defined in ASM JSON
     * schema then this is the function that must be called.
     * @param act the calling Android Activity or null
     * @param inData input JSON data
     * @param ProcessListener event listener for receiving events from ASM
     * @return ASM StatusCode value
     */
    short process(Activity act, String inData, IResponseReceiver responseReceiver);

    /**
     * Uninitializes (shut's down) the ASM.
     * @return ASM StatusCode value
     */
    short uninit();
}

5.3 C++ ASM API for iOS

NOTE
The C++ ASM API is useful for ASMs for KeyChain based authenticators. In this case the platform limits key use-access to the application generating the key. The ASM runs in the process scope of the RP App.

#include
namespace FIDO_UAF {

class IASM {

    typedef enum {
        PLUGGED,  /**< Indicates that the authenticator was Plugged to system */
        UNPLUGGED /**< Indicates that the authenticator was Unplugged from system */
    } Event;

    class IEnumeratorListener {
        virtual ~IEnumeratorListener() {}  
        /**
         * This function is called when an authenticator is plugged or
         * unplugged.
         * @param eventType event type (plugged/unplugged)
         * @param serialized AuthenticatorInfo JSON based GetInfoResponse object
         */
    };

}
class IResponseReceiver {
    virtual ~IResponseReceiver() {}
    /**
     * This function is called when ASM's response is ready.
     * @param response serialized JSON based event data
     * @param exchangeData for ASM if it needs some
     *     data back right after calling the callback function.
     */
    virtual void onResponse(const std::string& response, std::string &exchangeData) {};
};
/**
 * Initializes the ASM. This is the first function to be called.
 * @param unc the platform UINavigationController or one of the derived classes
 *     (e.g. UINavigationController) in order to allow smooth UI integration of the ASM.
 * @param EnumerationListener caller provided Enumerator
 * @return ASM StatusCode value
 */
virtual short int init(UINavigationController unc, IEnumerator EnumerationListener)=0;
/**
 * Process given JSON request and returns JSON response.
 * If the caller wants to execute a function defined in ASM JSON
 * schema then this is the function that must be called.
 * @param unc the platform UINavigationController or one of the derived classes
 *     (e.g. UINavigationController) in order to allow smooth UI integration of the ASM
 * @param InData input JSON data
 * @param ProcessListener event listener for receiving events from ASM
 * @return ASM StatusCode value
 */
virtual short int process(UINavigationController unc, const std::string& InData, ICallback ProcessListener)=0;
/**
 * Uninitializes (shut's down) the ASM.
 * @return ASM StatusCode value
 */
virtual short int uninit()=0;
}

5.4 Windows ASM API

On Windows, an ASM is implemented in the form of a Dynamic Link Library (DLL). The following is an example asmplugin.h header file defining a Windows ASM API:

```cpp
/*! @file asm.h

#ifndef __ASMH
#define __ASMH
#ifdef _WIN32
#define ASM_API __declspec(dllexport)
#endif
#ifdef _WIN32
#pragma warning ( disable : 4251 )
#endif
#define ASM_FUNC extern "C" ASM_API
#define ASM_NULL 0

/*! rief Error codes returned by ASM Plugin API.
* Authenticator specific error codes are returned in JSON form.
* See JSON schemas for more details.
*/
enum asmResult_t
{
    Success = 0, /**< Success */
    Failure /**< Generic failure */
};

/*! @brief Generic structure containing JSON string in UTF-8 format.
* This structure is used throughout functions to pass and receives
```
struct asmJSONData_t
{
    int length; /**< JSON data length */
    char *pData; /**< JSON data */
};

/*! \brief Enumeration event types for authenticators. 
These events will be fired when an authenticator becomes 
available (plugged) or unavailable (unplugged). */
enum asmEnumerationType_t
{
    Plugged = 0, /**< Indicates that authenticator Plugged to system */
    Unplugged /**< Indicates that authenticator Unplugged from system */
};

namespace ASM
{
    /*! \brief Callback listener. 
    FIDO UAF Client must pass an object implementing this interface to 
    Authenticator::Process function. This interface is used to provide 
    ASM JSON based response data. */
    class ICallback
    {
    public
        virtual ~ICallback() {}
        /**
         * This function is called when ASM's response is ready.
         * @param response JSON based event data
         * @param exchangeData must be provided by ASM if it needs some
         * data back right after calling the callback function.
         * The lifecycle of this parameter must be managed by ASM. ASM must
         * allocate enough memory for getting the data back.
         */
        virtual void Callback(const asmJSONData_t &response,
                                asmJSONData_t &exchangeData) = 0;
    }; 

    /*! \brief Authenticator Enumerator. 
    FIDO UAF Client must provide an object implementing this 
    interface. It will be invoked when a new authenticator is plugged or 
    when an authenticator has been unplugged. */
    class IEnumerator
    {
    public
        virtual ~IEnumerator() {}
        /**
         * This function is called when an authenticator is plugged or
         * unplugged.
         * @param eventType event type (plugged/unplugged)
         * @param AuthenticatorInfo JSON based GetInfoResponse object
         */
        virtual void Notify(const asmEnumerationType_t eventType, const
                                asmJSONData_t &AuthenticatorInfo) = 0;
    };

    /** 
    Initializes ASM plugin. This is the first function to be 
    called.
    * @param pEnumerationListener caller provided Enumerator 
    */
    ASM_FUNC asmResult_t asmInit(ASM::IEnumerator *pEnumerationListener);

    /** 
    Process given JSON request and returns JSON response.
    * If the caller wants to execute a function defined in ASM JSON 
    * schema then this is the function that must be called.
    * @param pInData input JSON data
    * @param pListener event listener for receiving events from ASM 
    */
    ASM_FUNC asmResult_t asmProcess(const asmJSONData_t *pInData,
                                      ASM::ICallback *pListener);

    /** 
    Uninitializes ASM plugin.
    */
    ASM_FUNC asmResult_t asmUninit();
A Windows-based FIDO UAF Client must look for ASM DLLs in the following registry paths:

HKCU\Software\FIDO\UAF\ASM
HKLM\Software\FIDO\UAF\ASM

The FIDO UAF Client iterates over all keys under this path and looks for "path" field:

[HK**\Software\FIDO\UAF\ASM\<exampleASMName>]
"path"="<ABSOLUTE_PATH_TO_ASM>.dll"

path must point to the absolute location of the ASM DLL.

6. CTAP2 Interface

This section is normative.

ASMs can (optionally) provide a FIDO CTAP 2 interface in order to allow the authenticator being used as external authenticator from a FIDO2 or Web Authentication enabled platform supporting the CTAP 2 protocol [FIDOCTAP].

In this case the CTAP2 enabled ASM provides the CTAP2 interface upstream through one or more of the transport protocols defined in [FIDOCTAP] (e.g. USB, NFC, BLE). Note that the CTAP2 interface is the connection to the FIDO Client / FIDO enabled platform.

In the following section we specify how the ASM needs to map the parameters received via the FIDO CTAP2 interface to FIDO UAF Authenticator Commands [UAFAuthnrCommands].

6.1 authenticatorMakeCredential

This section is normative.

NOTE

This interface has the following input parameters (see [FIDOCTAP]):

1. clientDataHash (required, byte array).
2. rp (required, PublicKeyCredentialEntity). Identity of the relying party.
3. user (required, PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity).
4. pubKeyCredParams (required, CBOR array).
5. excludeList (optional, sequence of PublicKeyCredentialDescriptors).
6. extensions (optional, CBOR map). Parameters to influence authenticator operation.
7. options (optional, sequence of authenticator options, i.e. "rk" and "uv"). Parameters to influence authenticator operation.
8. pinAuth (optional, byte array).
9. pinProtocol (optional, unsigned integer).

The output parameters are (see [FIDOCTAP]):

1. authData (required, sequence of bytes). The authenticator data object.
2. fmt (required, String). The attestation statement format identifier.
6.1.1 Processing rules for authenticatorMakeCredential

This section is normative.

1. invoke `Register` command for UAF authenticator as described in [UAFAuthnrCommands] section 6.2.4 using the following field mapping instructions:
   - authenticatorIndex set appropriately, e.g. 1.
   - If `webauthn_appid` is present, then
     1. Verify that the effective domain of `AppID` is identical to the effective domain of `rp.id`.
     2. Set `AppID` to the value of extension `webauthn_appid` (see [WebAuthn]).
   - If `webauthn_appid` is not present, then set `AppId` to `rp.id` (see [WebAuthn]).
   - `FinalChallengeHash` set to `clientDataHash`.
   - `Username` set to `user.displayName` (see [WebAuthn]). This string will be displayed to the user in order to select a specific account if the user has multiple accounts at that relying party.
   - `attestationType` set to the attestation supported by that authenticator, e.g. `ATTESTATION_BASIC_FULL` or `ATTESTATION_ECDAA`.
   - `KHAccessToken` set to some persistent identifier used for this authenticator. If the authenticator is bound to the platform this ASM is running on, it needs to be a secret identifier only known to this ASM instance. If the authenticator is a "roaming authenticator", i.e. external to the platform this ASM is running on, the identifier can have value 0.
   - Add the `fido.uaf.userid` extension with value `user.id` to the Register command.
   - Use the `pinAuth` and `pinProtocol` parameters appropriately when communicating with the authenticator (if supported).

2. If this is a bound authenticator and the Authenticator doesn't support the `fido.uaf.userid`, let the ASM remember the `user.id` value related to the generated UAuth key pair.

3. If the command was successful, create the result object as follows
   - set authData to a freshly generated authenticator data object, containing the corresponding values taken from the assertion generated by the authenticator. That means:
     - set `authData.rpID` to the SHA256 hash of `AppID`.
     - initialize `authData` with 0 and then set set flag `authData.AT` to 1 and set `authData.UP` to 1 if the authenticator is not a silent authenticator. Set flag `authData.uv` to 1 if the authenticator is not a silent authenticator. The flags `authData.UP` and `authData.UV` need to be 0 if it is a silent authenticator. Set `authData.ED` to 1 if the authenticator added extensions to the assertion. In this case add the individual extensions to the CBOR map appropriately.
     - set `authData.signCount` to the `uafAssertion.signCounter`.
     - set `authData.attestationData.AAGUID` to the `AAID` of this authenticator. Setting the remaining bytes to 0.
     - set `authData.attestationData.CredentialID` to `uafAssertion.keyHandle` and set the length L of the Credential ID to the size of the keyHandle.
     - set `authData.attestationData.pubKey` to `uafAssertion.publicKey` with appropriate encoding conversion
     - set `fmt` to the "fido-uaf".
     - set `attStmt` to the `AUTHENTICATOR_ASSERTION` element of the `TAG_UAFV1_REGISTER_CMD_RESPONSE` returned by the authenticator.

4. Return `authData`, `fmt` and `attStmt`.  

3. `attStmt` (required, sequence of bytes). The attestation statement.
6.2 authenticatorGetAssertion

This section is normative.

NOTE

This interface has the following input parameters (see [FIDOCTAP]):

1. rpId (required, String). Identity of the relying party.
2. clientDataHash (required, byte array).
3. allowList (optional, sequence of PublicKeyCredentialDescriptors).
4. extensions (optional, CBOR map).
5. options (optional, sequence of authenticator options, i.e. "up" and "uv").

The output parameters are (see [FIDOCTAP]):

1. credential (optional, PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor).
2. authData (required, byte array).
3. signature (required, byte array).
4. user (required, PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity).
5. numberOfCredentials (optional, integer).

6.2.1 Processing rules for authenticatorGetAssertion

This section is normative.

1. invoke Sign command for UAF authenticator as described in [UAFAuthnrCommands] section 6.3.4 using the following field mapping instructions
   
   o authenticatorIndex set appropriately, e.g. 1.
   
   o If webauthn_appid is present, then
     
     1. Verify that the effective domain of AppID is identical to the effective domain of rpId.
     
     2. Set AppID to the value of extension webauthn_appid (see [WebAuthn]).
   
   o If webauthn_appid is not present, then set AppID to rpId (see [WebAuthn]).
   
   o FinalChallengeHash set to clientDataHash.
   
   o TransactionContent set to value of extension webauthn_txAuthGeneric or webauthn_txAuthSimple (see [WebAuthn]) depending on which extension is present and supported by this authenticator. If the authenticator doesn't natively support transactionConfirmation, the hash of the value included in either of the webauthn_tx* extensions can be computed by the ASM and passed to the authenticator in TransactionContentHash. See [UAFAuthnrCommands] section 6.3.1 for details.
   
   o KHAccessToken set to the persistent identifier used for this authenticator (at authenticatorMakeCredential).
   
   o If allowList is present then add the .id field of each element as KeyHandle element to the command.
   
   o Use the pinAuth and pinProtocol parameters appropriately when communicating with the authenticator (if supported).

2. If the command was successful (with potential ambiguities of RawKeyHandles resolved), create the result object as follows
   
   o set credential.id to the keyHandle returned by the authenticator command. Set credential.type to "public-key-uaf" and set credential.transports to the transport currently being used by this authenticator (e.g. "usb").
- set authData to the UAFV1_SIGNED_DATA element included in the AUTHENTICATOR_ASSERTION element.
- set signature to the SIGNATURE element included in the AUTHENTICATOR_ASSERTION element.
- If the authenticator returned the fido.uaf.userid extension, then set user.id to the value of the fido.uaf.userid extension as returned by the authenticator.
- If the authenticator did not return the fido.uaf.userid extension but the ASM remembered the user ID, then set user.id to the value of the user ID remembered by the ASM.

3. Return credential, authData, signature, user.

6.3 authenticatorGetNextAssertion

*This section is normative.*

Not supported. This interface will always return a single assertion.

6.4 authenticatorCancel

*This section is normative.*

Cancel the existing authenticator command if it is still pending.

6.5 authenticatorReset

*This section is normative.*

Reset the authenticator back to factory default state. In order to prevent accidental trigger of this mechanism, some form of user approval *MAY* be performed by the authenticator itself.

6.6 authenticatorGetInfo

*This section is normative.*

This interface has no input parameters.

**NOTE**

Output parameters are (see [FIDOCTAP]):

1. versions (required, sequence of strings). List of FIDO protocol versions supported by the authenticator.
2. extensions (optional, sequence of strings). List of extensions supported by the authenticator.
3. aaguid (optional, string). The AAGUID claimed by the authenticator.
4. options (optional, map). Map of "plat", "rk", "clientPin", "up", "uv"
5. maxMsgSize (optional, unsigned integer). The maximum message size accepted by the authenticator.
6. pinProtocols (optional, array of unsigned integers).

6.6.1 Processing rules for authenticatorGetInfo

*This section is normative.*

This interface is expected to report a single authenticator only.

1. Invoke the GetInfo command [UAFAuthnrCommands] for the connected authenticator.
2. If the command was successful, create the result object as follows
   - set `versions` to "FIDO_2_0" as this is the only version supported by CTAP2 at this time.
   - set `extensions` to the list of extensions returned by the authenticator (one entry per field `SupportedExtensionID`).
   - set `aaguid` to the AAID returned by the authenticator, setting all remaining bytes to 0.
   - set `options` appropriately.
   - set `maxMsgSize` to the maximum message size supported by the authenticator - if known
   - set `pinProtocols` to the list of supported pin protocols (if any).

3. Return `versions`, `extensions`, `aaguid`, `options`, `mxMsgSize` (if known) and `pinProtocols` (if any).

7. Security and Privacy Guidelines

   *This section is normative.*

   ASM developers must carefully protect the FIDO UAF data they are working with. ASMs must follow these security guidelines:

   - ASMs **MUST** implement a mechanism for isolating UAF credentials registered by two different FIDO UAF Clients from one another. One FIDO UAF Client **MUST NOT** have access to FIDO UAF credentials that have been registered via a different FIDO UAF Client. This prevents malware from exercising credentials associated with a legitimate FIDO Client.

     **NOTE**

     ASMs must properly protect their sensitive data against malware using platform-provided isolation capabilities in order to follow the assumptions made in [FIDOSecRef]. Malware with root access to the system or direct physical attack on the device are out of scope for this requirement.

     **NOTE**

     The following are examples for achieving this:

     - If an ASM is bundled with a FIDO UAF Client, this isolation mechanism is already built-in.
     - If the ASM and FIDO UAF Client are implemented by the same vendor, the vendor may implement proprietary mechanisms to bind its ASM exclusively to its own FIDO UAF Client.
     - On some platforms ASMs and the FIDO UAF Clients may be assigned with a special privilege or permissions which regular applications don't have. ASMs built for such platforms may avoid supporting isolation of UAF credentials per FIDO UAF Clients since all FIDO UAF Clients will be considered equally trusted.

   - An ASM designed specifically for bound authenticators **MUST** ensure that FIDO UAF credentials registered with one ASM cannot be accessed by another ASM. This is to prevent an application pretending to be an ASM from exercising legitimate UAF credentials.

     - Using a [KHAccessToken](#) offers such a mechanism.

   - An ASM **MUST** implement platform-provided security best practices for protecting UAF-related stored data.
• ASMs **MUST NOT** store any sensitive FIDO UAF data in its local storage, except the following:
  
  - CallerID, ASMTokem, PersonaID, KeyID, KeyHandle, AppID

**NOTE**

An ASM, for example, must never store a username provided by a FIDO Server in its local storage in a form other than being decryptable exclusively by the authenticator.

• ASMs **SHOULD** ensure that applications cannot use silent authenticators for tracking purposes. ASMs implementing support for a silent authenticator **MUST** show, during every registration, a user interface which explains what a silent authenticator is, asking for the users consent for the registration. Also, it is **RECOMMENDED** that ASMs designed to support roaming silent authenticators either
  
  - Run with a special permission/privilege on the system, or
  - Have a built-in binding with the authenticator which ensures that other applications cannot directly communicate with the authenticator by bypassing this ASM.

### 7.1 KHAccessToken

*KHAccessToken* is an access control mechanism for protecting an authenticator's FIDO UAF credentials from unauthorized use. It is created by the ASM by mixing various sources of information together. Typically, a KHAccessToken contains the following four data items in it: AppID, PersonaID, ASMTokem and CallerID.

**AppID** is provided by the FIDO Server and is contained in every FIDO UAF message.

**PersonaID** is obtained by the ASM from the operational environment. Typically a different PersonaID is assigned to every operating system user account.

**ASMTokem** is a randomly generated secret which is maintained and protected by the ASM.

**NOTE**

In a typical implementation an ASM will randomly generate an ASMTokem when it is launched the first time and will maintain this secret until the ASM is uninstalled.

**CallerID** is the ID the platform has assigned to the calling FIDO UAF Client (e.g. "bundle ID" for iOS). On different platforms the CallerID can be obtained differently.

**NOTE**

For example on Android platform ASM can use the hash of the caller's apk-signing-cert.

The ASM uses the KHAccessToken to establish a link between the ASM and the key handle that is created by authenticator on behalf of this ASM.

The ASM provides the KHAccessToken to the authenticator with every command which works with key handles.
Bound authenticators **MUST** support a mechanism for binding generated key handles to ASMs. The binding mechanism **MUST** have at least the same security characteristics as mechanism for protecting KHAccessToken described above. As a consequence it is **RECOMMENDED** to securely derive KHAccessToken from AppID, ASMToken, PersonaID and the CallerID.

Alternative methods for binding key handles to ASMs can be used if their security level is equal or better.

From a security perspective, the KHAccessToken method relies on the OS/platform to:

1. allow the ASM keeping the ASMToken secret
2. and let the ASM determine the CalledID correctly
3. and let the FIDO Client verify the AppID/FacetID correctly

**NOTE**

It is recommended for roaming authenticators that the KHAccessToken contains only the AppID since otherwise users won’t be able to use them on different machines (PersonaID, ASMToken and CallerID are platform specific). If the authenticator vendor decides to do that in order to address a specific use case, however, it is allowed.

Including PersonaID in the KHAccessToken is optional for all types of authenticators. However an authenticator designed for multi-user systems will likely have to support it.

If an ASM for roaming authenticators doesn’t use a KHAccessToken which is different for each AppID, the ASM **MUST**...
include the AppID in the command for a deregister request containing an empty KeyID.

7.2 Access Control for ASM APIs

The following table summarizes the access control requirements for each API call.

ASMs must implement the access control requirements defined below. ASM vendors may implement additional security mechanisms.

Terms used in the table:

- **NoAuth** -- no access control
- **CallerID** -- FIDO UAF Client's platform-assigned ID is verified
- **UserVerify** -- user must be explicitly verified
- **KeyIDList** -- must be known to the caller

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A. References

A.1 Normative references

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