



# FIDO UAF Authenticator-Specific Module API

FIDO Alliance Implementation Draft 02 February 2017

**This version:**

<https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-uaf-v1.1-id-20170202/fido-uaf-asm-api-v1.1-id-20170202.html>

**Previous version:**

<https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-uaf-v1.0-ps-20141208/fido-uaf-asm-api-v1.0-ps-20141208.html>

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## Abstract

UAF authenticators may be connected to a user device via various physical interfaces (SPI, USB, Bluetooth, etc). The UAF Authenticator-Specific Module (ASM) is a software interface on top of UAF authenticators which gives a standardized way for FIDO UAF Clients to detect and access the functionality of UAF authenticators and hides internal communication complexity from FIDO UAF Client.

This document describes the internal functionality of ASMs, defines the UAF ASM API and explains how FIDO UAF Clients should use the API.

This document's intended audience is FIDO authenticator and FIDO FIDO UAF Client vendors.

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## 1. Notation

Type names, attribute names and element names are written as `code`.

String literals are enclosed in `"`, e.g. `"UAF-TLV"`.

In formulas we use `"|"` to denote byte wise concatenation operations.

DOM APIs are described using the ECMAScript [ECMA-262] bindings for WebIDL [WebIDL-ED].

The notation `base64url` refers to "Base 64 Encoding with URL and Filename Safe Alphabet" [RFC4648] *without padding*.

Following [WebIDL-ED], dictionary members are optional unless they are explicitly marked as `required`.

WebIDL dictionary members **must not** have a value of null.

Unless otherwise specified, if a WebIDL dictionary member is DOMString, it **must not** be empty.

Unless otherwise specified, if a WebIDL dictionary member is a List, it **must not** be an empty list.

UAF specific terminology used in this document is defined in [FIDOGlossary].

All diagrams, examples, notes in this specification are non-normative.

### NOTE

Note: Certain dictionary members need to be present in order to comply with FIDO requirements. Such members are marked in the WebIDL definitions found in this document, as `required`. The keyword `required` has been introduced by [WebIDL-ED], which is a work-in-progress. If you are using a WebIDL parser which implements [WebIDL], then you may remove the keyword `required` from your WebIDL and use other means to ensure those fields are present.

## 1.1 Key Words

The key words `"must"`, `"must not"`, `"required"`, `"shall"`, `"shall not"`, `"should"`, `"should not"`, `"recommended"`, `"may"`, and `"optional"` in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

## 2. Overview

*This section is non-normative.*

UAF authenticators may be connected to a user device via various physical interfaces (SPI, USB, Bluetooth, etc). The UAF Authenticator-Specific module (ASM) is a software interface on top of UAF authenticators which gives a standardized way for FIDO UAF Clients to detect and access the

functionality of UAF authenticators, and hides internal communication complexity from clients.

The ASM is a platform-specific software component offering an API to FIDO UAF Clients, enabling them to discover and communicate with one or more available authenticators.

A single ASM may report on behalf of multiple authenticators.

The intended audience for this document is FIDO UAF authenticator and FIDO UAF Client vendors.

**NOTE**

Platform vendors might choose to not expose the ASM API defined in this document to applications. They might instead choose to expose ASM functionality through some other API (such as, for example, the Android KeyStore API, or iOS KeyChain API). In these cases it's important to make sure that the underlying ASM communicates with the FIDO UAF authenticator in a manner defined in this document.

The FIDO UAF protocol and its various operations is described in the FIDO UAF Protocol Specification [UAFProtocol]. The following simplified architecture diagram illustrates the interactions and actors this document is concerned with:




Fig. 1 UAF ASM API Architecture

### 2.1 Code Example format

ASM requests and responses are presented in WebIDL format.

## 3. ASM Requests and Responses

*This section is normative.*

The ASM API is defined in terms of JSON-formatted [ECMA-404] request and reply messages. In order to send a request to an ASM, a FIDO UAF Client creates an appropriate object (e.g., in ECMAScript), "stringifies" it (also known as serialization) into a JSON-formatted string, and sends it to the ASM. The ASM de-serializes the JSON-formatted string, processes the request, constructs a response, stringifies it, returning it as a JSON-formatted string.

**NOTE**

The ASM request processing rules in this document explicitly assume that the underlying authenticator implements the "UAFV1TLV" assertion scheme (e.g. references to TLVs and tags) as described in [UAFProtocol]. If an authenticator supports a different assertion scheme then the corresponding processing rules must be replaced with appropriate assertion scheme-specific rules.

Authenticator implementers **may** create custom authenticator command interfaces other than the one defined in [UAFAuthnrCommands]. Such implementations are not required to implement the exact message-specific processing steps described in this section. However,

1. the command interfaces **must** present the ASM with external behavior equivalent to that described below in order for the ASM to properly respond to the client request messages (e.g. returning appropriate UAF status codes for specific conditions).
2. all authenticator implementations **must** support an assertion scheme as defined [UAFRegistry] and **must** return the related objects, i.e. TAG\_UAFV1\_REG\_ASSERTION and TAG\_UAFV1\_AUTH\_ASSERTION as defined in [UAFAuthnrCommands].

### 3.1 Request enum

**WebIDL**

```
enum Request {
  "GetInfo",
  "Register",
  "Authenticate",
  "Deregister",
  "GetRegistrations",
  "OpenSettings"
};
```

Enumeration description	
GetInfo	GetInfo
Register	Register
Authenticate	Authenticate
Deregister	Deregister
GetRegistrations	GetRegistrations
OpenSettings	OpenSettings

### 3.2 StatusCode Interface

If the ASM needs to return an error received from the authenticator, it **shall** map the status code received from the authenticator to the appropriate ASM status code as specified here.

If the ASM doesn't understand the authenticator's status code, it **shall** treat it as `UAF_CMD_STATUS_ERR_UNKNOWN` and map it to `UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR` if it cannot be handled otherwise.

If the caller of the ASM interface (i.e. the FIDO Client) doesn't understand a status code returned by the ASM, it **shall** treat it as `UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR`. This might occur when new error codes are introduced.

#### WebIDL

```
interface StatusCode {
  const short UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK = 0x00;
  const short UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR = 0x01;
  const short UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED = 0x02;
  const short UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_CANCELLED = 0x03;
  const short UAF_ASM_STATUS_CANNOT_RENDER_TRANSACTION_CONTENT = 0x04;
  const short UAF_ASM_STATUS_KEY_DISAPPEARED_PERMANENTLY = 0x09;
  const short UAF_ASM_STATUS_AUTHENTICATOR_DISCONNECTED = 0x0b;
  const short UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_RESPONSIVE = 0x0e;
  const short UAF_ASM_STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_AUTHENTICATOR_RESOURCES = 0x0f;
  const short UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_LOCKOUT = 0x10;
  const short UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_ENROLLED = 0x11;
};
```

#### 3.2.1 Constants

`UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK` of type `short`  
No error condition encountered.

`UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR` of type `short`  
An unknown error has been encountered during the processing.

`UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED` of type `short`  
Access to this request is denied.

`UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_CANCELLED` of type `short`  
Indicates that user explicitly canceled the request.

`UAF_ASM_STATUS_CANNOT_RENDER_TRANSACTION_CONTENT` of type `short`  
Transaction content cannot be rendered, e.g. format doesn't fit authenticator's need.

`UAF_ASM_STATUS_KEY_DISAPPEARED_PERMANENTLY` of type `short`  
Indicates that the UAuth key disappeared from the authenticator and cannot be restored.

`UAF_ASM_STATUS_AUTHENTICATOR_DISCONNECTED` of type `short`  
Indicates that the authenticator is no longer connected to the ASM.

`UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_RESPONSIVE` of type `short`  
The user took too long to follow an instruction, e.g. didn't swipe the finger within the accepted time.

`UAF_ASM_STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_AUTHENTICATOR_RESOURCES` of type `short`  
Insufficient resources in the authenticator to perform the requested task.

`UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_LOCKOUT` of type `short`  
The operation failed because the user is locked out and the authenticator cannot automatically trigger an action to change that. Typically the user would have to enter an alternative password (formally: undergo some other alternative user verification method) to re-enable the use of the main user verification method.

#### NOTE

Any method the user can use to (re-) enable the main user verification method is considered an alternative user verification method and must be properly declared as such. For example, if the user can enter an alternative password to re-enable the use of fingerprints or to add additional fingers, the authenticator obviously supports fingerprint or password based user verification.

`UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_ENROLLED` of type `short`  
The operation failed because the user is not enrolled to the authenticator and the authenticator cannot automatically trigger user enrollment.

#### 3.2.2 Mapping Authenticator Status Codes to ASM Status Codes

Authenticators are returning a status code in their responses to the ASM. The ASM needs to act on those responses and also map the status code returned by the authenticator to an ASM status code.

The mapping of authenticator status codes to ASM status codes is specified here:

Authenticator Status Code	ASM Status Code	Comment
<code>UAF_CMD_STATUS_OK</code>	<code>UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK</code>	Pass-through success status.
<code>UAF_CMD_STATUS_ERR_UNKNOWN</code>	<code>UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR</code>	Pass-through unspecific error status.
<code>UAF_CMD_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED</code>	<code>UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED</code>	Pass-through status code.
		According to [UAFAuthnrCommands], t

Authenticator Status Code	ASM Status Code	Comment
UAF_CMD_STATUS_USER_NOT_ENROLLED	UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_ENROLLED (or UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED in some situations)	might occur at the <code>Register</code> command if the authenticator automatically trigger user enrollment. The mapping depends on the command as  In the case of "Register" command, the mapped to UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_EN in order to tell the calling FIDO Client that is an authenticator present but the user enrollment needs to be triggered outside of the authenticator.  In the case of the "Sign" command, the key needs to be protected by one of the authenticator's user verification methods. So if this error occurs it is considered an internal error and hence mapped to UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED.
UAF_CMD_STATUS_CANNOT_RENDER_TRANSACTION_CONTENT	UAF_ASM_STATUS_CANNOT_RENDER_TRANSACTION_CONTENT	Pass-through status code as it indicates a problem to be resolved by the entity providing the transaction text.
UAF_CMD_STATUS_USER_CANCELLED	UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_CANCELLED	Map to UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_CANCELLED
UAF_CMD_STATUS_CMD_NOT_SUPPORTED	UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK Or UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR	If the ASM is able to handle that command on behalf of the authenticator (e.g. remove a bound authenticator), the UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK must be returned. Map the status code UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR otherwise.
UAF_CMD_STATUS_ATTESTATION_NOT_SUPPORTED	UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR	Indicates an ASM issue as the ASM has obviously not requested one of the supported attestation types indicated in the authentication response to the <code>GetInfo</code> command.
UAF_CMD_STATUS_PARAMS_INVALID	UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR	Indicates an ASM issue as the ASM has obviously not provided the correct parameters to the authenticator when sending the command.
UAF_CMD_STATUS_KEY_DISAPPEARED_PERMANENTLY	UAF_ASM_STATUS_KEY_DISAPPEARED_PERMANENTLY	Pass-through status code. It indicates that the Uauth key disappeared permanently and the RP App might want to trigger re-registration of the authenticator.
UAF_STATUS_CMD_TIMEOUT	UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR	Retry operation and map to UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR if the problem persists.
UAF_CMD_STATUS_USER_NOT_RESPONSIVE	UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_RESPONSIVE	Pass-through status code. The RP App might want to retry the operation once the user pays attention to the application again.
UAF_CMD_STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES	UAF_ASM_STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_AUTHENTICATOR_RESOURCES	Pass-through status code.
UAF_CMD_STATUS_USER_LOCKOUT	UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_LOCKOUT	Pass-through status code.
Any other status code	UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR	Map any unknown error code to UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR. This might happen if an ASM communicates with an authenticator implementing a newer UAF specification than the ASM.

### 3.3 ASMRequest Dictionary

All ASM requests are represented as `ASMRequest` objects.

#### WebIDL

```
dictionary ASMRequest {
    required Request requestType;
    Version asmVersion;
    unsigned short authenticatorIndex;
    object args;
    Extension[] exts;
};
```

#### 3.3.1 Dictionary `ASMRequest` Members

`requestType` of type `required Request`  
Request type

`asmVersion` of type `Version`  
ASM message version to be used with this request. For the definition of the `Version` dictionary see [UAFProtocol]. The `asmVersion` must be 1.1 (i.e. major version is 1 and minor version is 1) for this version of the specification.

`authenticatorIndex` of type `unsigned short`  
Refer to the `GetInfo` request for more details. Field `authenticatorIndex` must not be set for `GetInfo` request.

`args` of type `object`  
Request-specific arguments. If set, this attribute may take one of the following types:

- `RegisterIn`
- `AuthenticateIn`
- `DeregisterIn`

**exts** of type array of [Extension](#)  
List of UAF extensions. For the definition of the [Extension](#) dictionary see [\[UAFProtocol\]](#).

### 3.4 ASMResponse Dictionary

All ASM responses are represented as [ASMResponse](#) objects.

#### WebIDL

```
dictionary ASMResponse {  
  required short statusCode;  
  object responseData;  
  Extension[] exts;  
};
```

#### 3.4.1 Dictionary [ASMResponse](#) Members

**statusCode** of type [required short](#)  
**must** contain one of the values defined in the [statusCode](#) interface

**responseData** of type [object](#)  
Request-specific response data. This attribute **must** have one of the following types:

- [GetInfoOut](#)
- [RegisterOut](#)
- [AuthenticateOut](#)
- [GetRegistrationOut](#)

**exts** of type array of [Extension](#)  
List of UAF extensions. For the definition of the [Extension](#) dictionary see [\[UAFProtocol\]](#).

### 3.5 GetInfo Request

Return information about available authenticators.

1. Enumerate all of the authenticators this ASM supports
2. Collect information about all of them
3. Assign indices to them ([authenticatorIndex](#))
4. Return the information to the caller

#### NOTE

Where possible, an [authenticatorIndex](#) should be a persistent identifier that uniquely identifies an authenticator over time, even if it is repeatedly disconnected and reconnected. This avoids possible confusion if the set of available authenticators changes between a [GetInfo](#) request and subsequent ASM requests, and allows a FIDO client to perform caching of information about removable authenticators for a better user experience.

#### NOTE

It is up to the ASM to decide whether authenticators which are disconnected temporarily will be reported or not. However, if disconnected authenticators are reported, the FIDO Client might trigger an operation via the ASM on those. The ASM will have to notify the user to connect the authenticator and report an appropriate error if the authenticator isn't connected in time.

For a [GetInfo](#) request, the following [ASMRequest](#) member(s) **must** have the following value(s). The remaining [ASMRequest](#) members **should** be omitted:

- [ASMRequest.requestType](#) **must** be set to [GetInfo](#)

For a [GetInfo](#) response, the following [ASMResponse](#) member(s) **must** have the following value(s). The remaining [ASMResponse](#) members **should** be omitted:

- [ASMResponse.statusCode](#) **must** have one of the following values
  - [UAF\\_ASM\\_STATUS\\_OK](#)
  - [UAF\\_ASM\\_STATUS\\_ERROR](#)
- [ASMResponse.responseData](#) **must** be an object of type [GetInfoOut](#). In the case of an error the values of the fields might be empty (e.g. array with no members).

See section [3.2.2 Mapping Authenticator Status Codes to ASM Status Codes](#) for details on the mapping of authenticator status codes to ASM status codes.

#### 3.5.1 GetInfoOut Dictionary

##### WebIDL

```
dictionary GetInfoOut {  
  required AuthenticatorInfo[] Authenticators;  
};
```

##### 3.5.1.1 Dictionary [GetInfoOut](#) Members

**Authenticators** of type array of [required AuthenticatorInfo](#)  
List of authenticators reported by the current ASM. **may** be empty an empty list.

#### 3.5.2 AuthenticatorInfo Dictionary

##### WebIDL

```

dictionary AuthenticatorInfo {
  required unsigned short authenticatorIndex;
  required Version[] asmVersions;
  required boolean isUserEnrolled;
  required boolean hasSettings;
  required AAID aaid;
  required DOMString assertionScheme;
  required unsigned short authenticationAlgorithm;
  required unsigned short[] attestationTypes;
  required unsigned long userVerification;
  required unsigned short keyProtection;
  required unsigned short matcherProtection;
  required unsigned long attachmentHint;
  required boolean isSecondFactorOnly;
  required boolean isRoamingAuthenticator;
  required DOMString[] supportedExtensionIDs;
  required unsigned short tcDisplay;
  DOMString tcDisplayContentType;
  DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor[] tcDisplayPNGCharacteristics;
  DOMString title;
  DOMString description;
  DOMString icon;
};

```

### 3.5.2.1 Dictionary *AuthenticatorInfo* Members

**authenticatorIndex** of type **required unsigned short**  
Authenticator index. Unique, within the scope of all authenticators reported by the ASM, index referring to an authenticator. This index is used by the UAF Client to refer to the appropriate authenticator in further requests.

**asmVersions** of type array of **required Version**  
A list of ASM Versions that this authenticator can be used with. For the definition of the **Version** dictionary see [UAFProtocol].

**isUserEnrolled** of type **required boolean**  
Indicates whether a user is enrolled with this authenticator. Authenticators which don't have user verification technology **must** always return true. Bound authenticators which support different profiles per operating system (OS) user **must** report enrollment status for the current OS user.

**hasSettings** of type **required boolean**  
A boolean value indicating whether the authenticator has its own settings. If so, then a FIDO UAF Client can launch these settings by sending a **OpenSettings** request.

**aaid** of type **required AAID**  
The "Authenticator Attestation ID" (AAID), which identifies the type and batch of the authenticator. See [UAFProtocol] for the definition of the AAID structure.

**assertionScheme** of type **required DOMString**  
The assertion scheme the authenticator uses for attested data and signatures.  
AssertionScheme identifiers are defined in the UAF Protocol specification [UAFProtocol].

**authenticationAlgorithm** of type **required unsigned short**  
Indicates the authentication algorithm that the authenticator uses. Authentication algorithm identifiers are defined in are defined in [FIDORegistry] with **ALG\_** prefix.

**attestationTypes** of type array of **required unsigned short**  
Indicates attestation types supported by the authenticator. Attestation type TAGs are defined in [UAFRegistry] with **TAG\_ATTESTATION** prefix

**userVerification** of type **required unsigned long**  
A set of bit flags indicating the user verification method(s) supported by the authenticator. The values are defined by the **USER\_VERIFY** constants in [FIDORegistry].

**keyProtection** of type **required unsigned short**  
A set of bit flags indicating the key protections used by the authenticator. The values are defined by the **KEY\_PROTECTION** constants in [FIDORegistry].

**matcherProtection** of type **required unsigned short**  
A set of bit flags indicating the matcher protections used by the authenticator. The values are defined by the **MATCHER\_PROTECTION** constants in [FIDORegistry].

**attachmentHint** of type **required unsigned long**  
A set of bit flags indicating how the authenticator is currently connected to the system hosting the FIDO UAF Client software. The values are defined by the **ATTACHMENT\_HINT** constants defined in [FIDORegistry].

#### NOTE

Because the connection state and topology of an authenticator may be transient, these values are only hints that can be used by server-supplied policy to guide the user experience, e.g. to prefer a device that is connected and ready for authenticating or confirming a low-value transaction, rather than one that is more secure but requires more user effort. These values are not reflected in authenticator metadata and cannot be relied on by the relying party, although some models of authenticator may provide attested measurements with similar semantics as part of UAF protocol messages.

**isSecondFactorOnly** of type **required boolean**  
Indicates whether the authenticator can be used only as a second factor.

**isRoamingAuthenticator** of type **required boolean**  
Indicates whether this is a roaming authenticator or not.

**supportedExtensionIDs** of type array of **required DOMString**  
List of supported UAF extension Ids. **may** be an empty list.

**tcDisplay** of type **required unsigned short**  
A set of bit flags indicating the availability and type of the authenticator's transaction confirmation display. The values are defined by the **TRANSACTION\_CONFIRMATION\_DISPLAY** constants in [FIDORegistry].

This value **must** be 0 if transaction confirmation is not supported by the authenticator.

**tcDisplayContentType** of type **DOMString**  
Supported transaction content type [FIDOMetadataStatement].

This value **must** be present if transaction confirmation is supported, i.e. `tcDisplay` is non-zero.

`tcDisplayPNGCharacteristics` of type array of `DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor` Supported transaction Portable Network Graphic (PNG) type `FIDOMetadataStatement`. For the definition of the `DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor` structure see `[FIDOMetadataStatement]`.

This list **must** be present if PNG-image based transaction confirmation is supported, i.e. `tcDisplay` is non-zero and `tcDisplayContentType` is `image/png`.

`title` of type `DOMString`  
A human-readable short title for the authenticator. It should be localized for the current locale.

#### NOTE

If the ASM doesn't return a title, the FIDO UAF Client must provide a title to the calling App. See section "Authenticator interface" in `[UAFAppAPIAndTransport]`.

`description` of type `DOMString`  
Human-readable longer description of what the authenticator represents.

#### NOTE

This text should be localized for current locale.

The text is intended to be displayed to the user. It might deviate from the description specified in the metadata statement for the authenticator `[FIDOMetadataStatement]`.

If the ASM doesn't return a description, the FIDO UAF Client will provide a description to the calling application. See section "Authenticator interface" in `[UAFAppAPIAndTransport]`.

`icon` of type `DOMString`  
Portable Network Graphic (PNG) format image file representing the icon encoded as a data: url `[RFC2397]`.

#### NOTE

If the ASM doesn't return an icon, the FIDO UAF Client will provide a default icon to the calling application. See section "Authenticator interface" in `[UAFAppAPIAndTransport]`.

## 3.6 Register Request

Verify the user and return an authenticator-generated UAF registration assertion.

For a Register request, the following `ASMRequest` member(s) **must** have the following value(s). The remaining `ASMRequest` members **should** be omitted:

- `ASMRequest.requestType` **must** be set to `Register`
- `ASMRequest.asmVersion` **must** be set to the desired version
- `ASMRequest.authenticatorIndex` **must** be set to the target authenticator index
- `ASMRequest.args` **must** be set to an object of type `RegisterIn`

For a Register response, the following `ASMResponse` member(s) **must** have the following value(s). The remaining `ASMResponse` members **should** be omitted:

- `ASMResponse.statusCode` **must** have one of the following values:
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_CANCELLED`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_AUTHENTICATOR_DISCONNECTED`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_RESPONSIVE`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_AUTHENTICATOR_RESOURCES`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_LOCKOUT`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_ENROLLED`
- `ASMResponse.responseData` **must** be an object of type `RegisterOut`. In the case of an error the values of the fields might be empty (e.g. empty strings).

### 3.6.1 RegisterIn Object

#### WebIDL

```
dictionary RegisterIn {  
  required DOMString appID;  
  required DOMString username;  
  required DOMString finalChallenge;  
  required unsigned short attestationType;  
};
```

#### 3.6.1.1 Dictionary `RegisterIn` Members

`appID` of type `required DOMString`  
The FIDO server Application Identity.

`username` of type `required DOMString`  
Human-readable user account name

`finalChallenge` of type `required DOMString`  
base64url-encoded challenge data `[RFC4648]`



**attestationType** of type **required unsigned short**  
Single requested attestation type

### 3.6.2 RegisterOut Object

#### WebIDL

```
dictionary RegisterOut {  
    required DOMString assertion;  
    required DOMString assertionScheme;  
};
```

#### 3.6.2.1 Dictionary *RegisterOut* Members

**assertion** of type **required DOMString**  
FIDO UAF authenticator registration assertion, base64url-encoded

**assertionScheme** of type **required DOMString**  
Assertion scheme.

AssertionScheme identifiers are defined in the UAF Protocol specification [UAFProtocol].

### 3.6.3 Detailed Description for Processing the Register Request

Refer to [UAFAuthnrCommands] document for more information about the TAGs and structure mentioned in this paragraph.

1. Locate authenticator using **authenticatorIndex**. If the authenticator cannot be located, then fail with **UAF\_ASM\_STATUS\_AUTHENTICATOR\_DISCONNECTED**.
2. If a user is already enrolled with this authenticator (such as biometric enrollment, PIN setup, etc. for example) then the ASM **must** request that the authenticator verifies the user.

#### NOTE

If the authenticator supports **UserVerificationToken** (see [UAFAuthnrCommands]), then the ASM must obtain this token in order to later include it with the **Register** command.

If the user is locked out (e.g. too many failed attempts to get verified) and the authenticator cannot automatically trigger unblocking, return **UAF\_ASM\_STATUS\_USER\_LOCKOUT**.

- If verification fails, return **UAF\_ASM\_STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED**
3. If the user is not enrolled with the authenticator then take the user through the enrollment process.
    - If neither the ASM nor the Authenticator can trigger the enrollment process, return **UAF\_ASM\_STATUS\_USER\_NOT\_ENROLLED**.
    - If enrollment fails, return **UAF\_ASM\_STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED**
  4. Construct **KHAccessToken** (see section **KHAccessToken** for more details)
  5. Hash the provided **RegisterIn.finalChallenge** using the authenticator-specific hash function (**FinalChallengeHash**)

An authenticator's preferred hash function information **must** meet the algorithm defined in the **AuthenticatorInfo.authenticationAlgorithm** field.

6. Create a **TAG\_UAFV1\_REGISTER\_CMD** structure and pass it to the authenticator
  1. Copy **FinalChallengeHash**, **KHAccessToken**, **RegisterIn.Username**, **UserVerificationToken**, **RegisterIn.AppID**, **RegisterIn.AttestationType**
    1. Depending on **AuthenticatorType** some arguments may be optional. Refer to [UAFAuthnrCommands] for more information on authenticator types and their required arguments.
7. Invoke the command and receive the response. If the authenticator returns an error, handle that error appropriately. If the connection to the authenticator gets lost and cannot be restored, return **UAF\_ASM\_STATUS\_AUTHENTICATOR\_DISCONNECTED**. If the operation finally fails, map the authenticator error code to the the appropriate ASM error code (see section 3.2.2 **Mapping Authenticator Status Codes to ASM Status Codes** for details).
8. Parse **TAG\_UAFV1\_REGISTER\_CMD\_RESP**
  1. Parse the content of **TAG\_AUTHENTICATOR\_ASSERTION** (e.g. **TAG\_UAFV1\_REG\_ASSERTION**) and extract **TAG\_KEYID**
9. If the authenticator is a bound authenticator
  1. Store **CallerID**, **AppID**, **TAG\_KEYHANDLE**, **TAG\_KEYID** and **CurrentTimestamp** in the ASM's database.

#### NOTE

What data an ASM will store at this stage depends on underlying authenticator's architecture. For example some authenticators might store AppID, KeyHandle, KeyID inside their own secure storage. In this case ASM doesn't have to store these data in its database.

10. Create a **RegisterOut** object
  1. Set **RegisterOut.assertionScheme** according to **AuthenticatorInfo.assertionScheme**
  2. Encode the content of **TAG\_AUTHENTICATOR\_ASSERTION** (e.g. **TAG\_UAFV1\_REG\_ASSERTION**) in base64url format and set as **RegisterOut.assertion**.
  3. Return **RegisterOut** object

## 3.7 Authenticate Request

Verify the user and return authenticator-generated UAF authentication assertion.

For an Authenticate request, the following **ASMRequest** member(s) **must** have the following value(s). The remaining **ASMRequest** members **should** be omitted:

- **ASMRequest.requestType** **must** be set to **Authenticate**.
- **ASMRequest.asmVersion** **must** be set to the desired version.
- **ASMRequest.authenticatorIndex** **must** be set to the target authenticator index.
- **ASMRequest.args** **must** be set to an object of type **AuthenticateIn**

For an Authenticate response, the following **ASMResponse** member(s) **must** have the following value(s). The remaining **ASMResponse** members **should** be omitted:

- `ASMResponse.statusCode` must have one of the following values:
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_CANCELLED`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_CANNOT_RENDER_TRANSACTION_CONTENT`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_KEY_DISAPPEARED_PERMANENTLY`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_AUTHENTICATOR_DISCONNECTED`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_RESPONSIVE`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_LOCKOUT`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_NOT_ENROLLED`
- `ASMResponse.responseData` must be an object of type `AuthenticateOut`. In the case of an error the values of the fields might be empty (e.g. empty strings).

### 3.7.1 AuthenticateIn Object

#### WebIDL

```
dictionary AuthenticateIn {
  required DOMString appID;
  DOMString[] keyIDs;
  required DOMString finalChallenge;
  Transaction[] transaction;
};
```

#### 3.7.1.1 Dictionary `AuthenticateIn` Members

`appID` of type required `DOMString`  
appID string

`keyIDs` of type array of `DOMString`  
base64url [RFC4648] encoded keyIDs

`finalChallenge` of type required `DOMString`  
base64url [RFC4648] encoded final challenge

`transaction` of type array of `Transaction`  
An array of transaction data to be confirmed by user. If multiple transactions are provided, then the ASM must select the one that best matches the current display characteristics.

#### NOTE

This may, for example, depend on whether user's device is positioned horizontally or vertically at the moment of transaction.

### 3.7.2 Transaction Object

#### WebIDL

```
dictionary Transaction {
  required DOMString contentType;
  required DOMString content;
  DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor tcDisplayPNGCharacteristics;
};
```

#### 3.7.2.1 Dictionary `Transaction` Members

`contentType` of type required `DOMString`  
Contains the MIME Content-Type supported by the authenticator according to its metadata statement (see [FIDOMetadataStatement])

`content` of type required `DOMString`  
Contains the base64url-encoded [RFC4648] transaction content according to the `contentType` to be shown to the user.

`tcDisplayPNGCharacteristics` of type `DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor`  
Transaction content PNG characteristics. For the definition of the `DisplayPNGCharacteristicsDescriptor` structure See [FIDOMetadataStatement].

### 3.7.3 AuthenticateOut Object

#### WebIDL

```
dictionary AuthenticateOut {
  required DOMString assertion;
  required DOMString assertionScheme;
};
```

#### 3.7.3.1 Dictionary `AuthenticateOut` Members

`assertion` of type required `DOMString`  
Authenticator UAF authentication assertion.

`assertionScheme` of type required `DOMString`  
Assertion scheme

### 3.7.4 Detailed Description for Processing the Authenticate Request

Refer to the [UAFAuthnrCommands] document for more information about the TAGs and structure mentioned in this paragraph.

1. Locate the authenticator using `authenticatorIndex`. If the authenticator cannot be located, then fail with `UAF_ASM_STATUS_AUTHENTICATOR_DISCONNECTED`.
2. If no user is enrolled with this authenticator (such as biometric enrollment, PIN setup, etc.), return `UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED`
3. The ASM **must** request the authenticator to verify the user.
  - If the user is locked out (e.g. too many failed attempts to get verified) and the authenticator cannot automatically trigger unblocking, return `UAF_ASM_STATUS_USER_LOCKOUT`.
  - If verification fails, return `UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED`

#### NOTE

If the authenticator supports `UserVerificationToken` (see [\[UAFAuthnrCommands\]](#)), the ASM must obtain this token in order to later pass to `Sign` command.

4. Construct `KHAccessToken` (see section [KHAccessToken](#) for more details)
5. Hash the provided `AuthenticateIn.finalChallenge` using an authenticator-specific hash function (`FinalChallengeHash`).

The authenticator's preferred hash function information **must** meet the algorithm defined in the `AuthenticatorInfo.authenticationAlgorithm` field.

6. If this is a Second Factor authenticator and `AuthenticateIn.keyIDs` is empty, then return `UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED`
7. If `AuthenticateIn.keyIDs` is not empty,
  1. If this is a bound authenticator, then look up ASM's database with `AuthenticateIn.appID` and `AuthenticateIn.keyIDs` and obtain the `KeyHandles` associated with it.
    - Return `UAF_ASM_STATUS_KEY_DISAPPEARED_PERMANENTLY` if the related key disappeared permanently from the authenticator.
    - Return `UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED` if no entry has been found.
  2. If this is a roaming authenticator, then treat `AuthenticateIn.keyIDs` as `KeyHandles`
8. Create `TAG_UAFV1_SIGN_CMD` structure and pass it to the authenticator.
  1. Copy `AuthenticateIn.AppID`, `AuthenticateIn.Transaction.content` (if not empty), `FinalChallengeHash`, `KHAccessToken`, `UserVerificationToken`, `KeyHandles`
    - Depending on `AuthenticatorType` some arguments may be optional. Refer to [\[UAFAuthnrCommands\]](#) for more information on authenticator types and their required arguments.
    - If multiple transactions are provided, select the one that best matches the current display characteristics.

#### NOTE

This may, for example, depend on whether user's device is positioned horizontally or vertically at the moment of transaction.

- Decode the base64url encoded `AuthenticateIn.Transaction.content` before passing it to the authenticator
9. Invoke the command and receive the response. If the authenticator returns an error, handle that error appropriately. If the connection to the authenticator gets lost and cannot be restored, return `UAF_ASM_STATUS_AUTHENTICATOR_DISCONNECTED`. If the operation finally fails, map the authenticator error code to the appropriate ASM error code (see section [3.2.2 Mapping Authenticator Status Codes to ASM Status Codes](#) for details).
  10. Parse `TAG_UAFV1_SIGN_CMD_RESP`
    - If it's a first-factor authenticator and the response includes `TAG_USERNAME_AND_KEYHANDLE`, then
      1. Extract usernames from `TAG_USERNAME_AND_KEYHANDLE` fields
      2. If two or more equal usernames are found, then choose the one which has registered most recently

#### NOTE

After this step, a first-factor bound authenticator which stores `KeyHandles` inside the ASM's database may delete the redundant `KeyHandles` from the ASM's database. This avoids having unusable (old) private key in the authenticator which (surprisingly) might become active after deregistering the newly generated one.

3. Show remaining distinct usernames and ask the user to choose a single username
  4. Set `TAG_UAFV1_SIGN_CMD.KeyHandles` to the single `KeyHandle` associated with the selected username.
  5. Go to step #8 and send a new `TAG_UAFV1_SIGN_CMD` command
11. Create the `AuthenticateOut` object
    1. Set `AuthenticateOut.assertionScheme` as `AuthenticatorInfo.assertionScheme`
    2. Encode the content of `TAG_AUTHENTICATOR_ASSERTION` (e.g. `TAG_UAFV1_AUTH_ASSERTION`) in base64url format and set as `AuthenticateOut.assertion`
    3. Return the `AuthenticateOut` object

#### NOTE

Some authenticators might support "Transaction Confirmation Display" functionality not inside the authenticator but within the boundaries of the ASM. Typically these are software based Transaction Confirmation Displays. When processing the `Sign` command with a given transaction such ASM should show transaction content in its own UI and after user confirms it -- pass the content to authenticator so that the authenticator includes it in the final assertion.

See [\[FIDORegistry\]](#) for flags describing Transaction Confirmation Display type.

The authenticator metadata statement **must** truly indicate the type of transaction confirmation display implementation. Typically the "Transaction Confirmation Display" flag will be set to `TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY_ANY` (bitwise) or `TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY_PRIVILEGED_SOFTWARE`.

## 3.8 Deregister Request

Delete registered UAF record from the authenticator.

For a Deregister request, the following `ASMRequest` member(s) **MUST** have the following value(s). The remaining `ASMRequest` members **should** be omitted:

- `ASMRequest.requestType` **must** be set to `Deregister`

- `ASMRequest.asmVersion` **must** be set to the desired version
- `ASMRequest.authenticatorIndex` **must** be set to the target authenticator index
- `ASMRequest.args` **must** be set to an object of type `DeregisterIn`

For a Deregister response, the following `ASMResponse` member(s) **must** have the following value(s). The remaining `ASMResponse` members **should** be omitted:

- `ASMResponse.statusCode` **must** have one of the following values:
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_AUTHENTICATOR_DISCONNECTED`

### 3.8.1 DeregisterIn Object

#### WebIDL

```
dictionary DeregisterIn {
    required DOMString appID;
    required DOMString keyID;
};
```

#### 3.8.1.1 Dictionary `DeregisterIn` Members

`appID` of type required `DOMString`  
FIDO Server Application Identity

`keyID` of type required `DOMString`  
Base64url-encoded [RFC4648] key identifier of the authenticator to be de-registered. The `keyID` can be an empty string. In this case all `keyIDs` related to this `appID` **must** be deregistered.

### 3.8.2 Detailed Description for Processing the Deregister Request

Refer to [UAFAuthnrCommands] for more information about the TAGs and structures mentioned in this paragraph.

1. Locate the authenticator using `authenticatorIndex`
2. Construct `KHAccessToken` (see section [KHAccessToken](#) for more details).
3. If this is a bound authenticator, then
  - If the value of `DeregisterIn.keyID` is an empty string, then lookup all pairs of this `appID` and any `keyID` mapped to this `authenticatorIndex` and delete them. Go to step 4.
  - Otherwise, lookup the authenticator related data in the ASM database and delete the record associated with `DeregisterIn.appID` and `DeregisterIn.keyID`. Go to step 4.
4. Create the `TAG_UAFV1_DEREGISTER_CMD` structure, copy `KHAccessToken` and `DeregisterIn.keyID` and pass it to the authenticator.

#### NOTE

In the case of roaming authenticators, the `keyID` passed to the authenticator might be an empty string. The authenticator is supposed to deregister all keys related to this `appID` in this case.

5. Invoke the command and receive the response. If the authenticator returns an error, handle that error appropriately. If the connection to the authenticator gets lost and cannot be restored, return `UAF_ASM_STATUS_AUTHENTICATOR_DISCONNECTED`. If the operation finally fails, map the authenticator error code to the appropriate ASM error code (see section [3.2.2 Mapping Authenticator Status Codes to ASM Status Codes](#) for details). Return proper `ASMResponse`.

### 3.9 GetRegistrations Request

Return all registrations made for the calling FIDO UAF Client.

For a GetRegistrations request, the following `ASMRequest` member(s) **must** have the following value(s). The remaining `ASMRequest` members **should** be omitted:

- `ASMRequest.requestType` **must** be set to `GetRegistrations`
- `ASMRequest.asmVersion` **must** be set to the desired version
- `ASMRequest.authenticatorIndex` **must** be set to corresponding ID

For a GetRegistrations response, the following `ASMResponse` member(s) **must** have the following value(s). The remaining `ASMResponse` members **should** be omitted:

- `ASMResponse.statusCode` **must** have one of the following values:
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_ERROR`
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_AUTHENTICATOR_DISCONNECTED`
- The `ASMResponse.responseData` **must** be an object of type `GetRegistrationsOut`. In the case of an error the values of the fields might be empty (e.g. empty strings).

#### 3.9.1 GetRegistrationsOut Object

##### WebIDL

```
dictionary GetRegistrationsOut {
    required AppRegistration[] appRegs;
};
```

#### 3.9.1.1 Dictionary `GetRegistrationsOut` Members

`appRegs` of type array of required `AppRegistration`

List of registrations associated with an `appID` (see `AppRegistration` below). `may` be an empty list.

### 3.9.2 AppRegistration Object

#### WebIDL

```
dictionary AppRegistration {  
  required DOMString appID;  
  required DOMString[] keyIDs;  
};
```

#### 3.9.2.1 Dictionary `AppRegistration` Members

`appID` of type required `DOMString`  
FIDO Server Application Identity.

`keyIDs` of type array of required `DOMString`  
List of key identifiers associated with the `appID`

### 3.9.3 Detailed Description for Processing the GetRegistrations Request

1. Locate the authenticator using `authenticatorIndex`
2. If this is bound authenticator, then
  - Lookup the registrations associated with `CallerID` and `AppID` in the ASM database and construct a list of `AppRegistration` objects

#### NOTE

Some ASMs might not store this information inside their own database. Instead it might have been stored inside the authenticator's secure storage area. In this case the ASM must send a proprietary command to obtain the necessary data.

3. Create `GetRegistrationsOut` object and return

### 3.10 OpenSettings Request

Display the authenticator-specific settings interface. If the authenticator has its own built-in user interface, then the ASM **must** invoke `TAG_UAFV1_OPEN_SETTINGS_CMD` to display it.

For an `OpenSettings` request, the following `ASMRequest` member(s) **must** have the following value(s). The remaining `ASMRequest` members **should** be omitted:

- `ASMRequest.requestType` **must** be set to `OpenSettings`
- `ASMRequest.asmVersion` **must** be set to the desired version
- `ASMRequest.authenticatorIndex` **must** be set to the target authenticator index

For an `OpenSettings` response, the following `ASMResponse` member(s) **must** have the following value(s). The remaining `ASMResponse` members **should** be omitted:

- `ASMResponse.statusCode` **must** have one of the following values:
  - `UAF_ASM_STATUS_OK`

## 4. Using ASM API

*This section is non-normative.*

In a typical implementation, the FIDO UAF Client will call `GetInfo` during initialization and obtain information about the authenticators. Once the information is obtained it will typically be used during FIDO UAF message processing to find a match for given FIDO UAF policy. Once a match is found the FIDO UAF Client will send the appropriate request (Register/Authenticate/Deregister...) to this ASM.

The FIDO UAF Client may use the information obtained from a `GetInfo` response to display relevant information about an authenticator to the user.

## 5. Using the ASM API on various platforms

*This section is normative.*

### 5.1 Android ASM Intent API

On Android systems FIDO UAF ASMs **may** be implemented as a separate APK-packaged application.

The FIDO UAF Client invokes ASM operations via Android Intents. All interactions between the FIDO UAF Client and an ASM on Android takes place through the following intent identifier:

```
org.fidoalliance.intent.FIDO_OPERATION
```

To carry messages described in this document, an intent **must** also have its `type` attribute set to `application/fido.uaf_asm+json`.

ASMs **must** register that intent in their manifest file and implement a handler for it.

FIDO UAF Clients **must** append an extra, `message`, containing a `String` representation of a `ASMRequest`, before invoking the intent.

FIDO UAF Clients **must** invoke ASMs by calling `startActivityForResult()`

FIDO UAF Clients **should** assume that ASMs will display an interface to the user in order to handle this intent, e.g. prompting the user to complete the verification ceremony. However, the ASM **should not** display any user interface when processing a `GetInfo` request.

After processing is complete the ASM will return the response intent as an argument to `onActivityResult()`. The response intent will have an extra, `message`, containing a `String` representation of a `ASMResponse`.

#### 5.1.1 Discovering ASMs

FIDO UAF Clients can discover the ASMs available on the system by using `PackageManager.queryIntentActivities(Intent intent, int flags)` with the FIDO Intent described above to see if any activities are available.

A typical FIDO UAF Client will enumerate all ASM applications using this function and will invoke the `GetInfo` operation for each one discovered.

### 5.1.2 Alternate Android AIDL Service ASM Implementation

The Android Intent API can also be implemented using Android AIDL services as an alternative transport mechanism to Android Intents. Please see Android Intent API section [[UAFAppAPIAndTransport](#)] for differences between the Android AIDL service and Android Intent implementation.

## 5.2 Windows ASM API

On Windows, an ASM is implemented in the form of a Dynamic Link Library (DLL). The following is an example `asmplugin.h` header file defining a Windows ASM API:

### EXAMPLE 1

```
/*! @file asm.h
*/

#ifndef __ASMH__
#define __ASMH__
#ifdef _WIN32
#define ASM_API __declspec(dllexport)
#endif

#ifdef _WIN32
#pragma warning ( disable : 4251 )
#endif

#define ASM_FUNC extern "C" ASM_API
#define ASM_NULL 0

/*! \brief Error codes returned by ASM Plugin API.
 * Authenticator specific error codes are returned in JSON form.
 * See JSON schemas for more details.
 */

enum asmResult_t
{
    Success = 0, /**< Success */
    Failure /**< Generic failure */
};

/*! \brief Generic structure containing JSON string in UTF-8
 * format.
 * This structure is used throughout functions to pass and receives
 * JSON data.
 */

struct asmJSONData_t
{
    int length; /**< JSON data length */
    char pData; /**< JSON data */
};

/*! \brief Enumeration event types for authenticators.
These events will be fired when an authenticator becomes
available (plugged) or unavailable (unplugged).
*/

enum asmEnumerationType_t
{
    Plugged = 0, /**< Indicates that authenticator Plugged to system */
    Unplugged /**< Indicates that authenticator Unplugged from system */
};

namespace ASM
{
    /*! \brief Callback listener.
    FIDO UAF Client must pass an object implementing this interface to
    Authenticator::Process function. This interface is used to provide
    ASM JSON based response data.*/
    class ICallback
    {
    public:
        virtual ~ICallback() {}
        /**
        This function is called when ASM's response is ready.
        *
        @param response JSON based event data
        @param exchangeData must be provided by ASM if it needs some
        data back right after calling the callback function.
        The lifecycle of this parameter must be managed by ASM. ASM must
        allocate enough memory for getting the data back.
        */
        virtual void Callback(const asmJSONData_t &response,
            asmJSONData_t &exchangeData) = 0;
    };

    /*! \brief Authenticator Enumerator.
    FIDO UAF Client must provide an object implementing this
    interface. It will be invoked when a new authenticator is plugged or
    when an authenticator has been unplugged. */
    class IEnumerator
    {
    public:
        virtual ~IEnumerator() {}
        /**
        This function is called when an authenticator is plugged or
        unplugged.
        * @param eventType event type (plugged/unplugged)
        * @param AuthenticatorInfo JSON based GetInfoResponse object
        */
        virtual void Notify(const asmEnumerationType_t eventType, const
            asmJSONData_t &AuthenticatorInfo) = 0;
    };

    /**
    Initializes ASM plugin. This is the first function to be
    called.
    *
    @param pEnumerationListener caller provided Enumerator
    */
    ASM_FUNC asmResult_t asmInit(ASM::IEnumerator
```

```

    *pEnumerationListener);
/**
Process given JSON request and returns JSON response.
*
If the caller wants to execute a function defined in ASM JSON
schema then this is the function that must be called.
*
@param pInData input JSON data
@param pListener event listener for receiving events from ASM
*/
ASM_FUNC asmResult_t asmProcess(const asmJSONData_t *pInData,
    ASM::ICallback *pListener);
/**
Unitializes ASM plugin.
*
*/
ASM_FUNC asmResult_t asmUninit();
#endif // __ASMPUGINH__

```

A Windows-based FIDO UAF Client **must** look for ASM DLLs in the following registry paths:

`HKCU\Software\FIDO\UAF\ASM`

`HKLM\Software\FIDO\UAF\ASM`

The FIDO UAF Client iterates over all keys under this path and looks for "path" field:

`[HK*\Software\FIDO\UAF\ASM\<exampleASMName>]`

`"path"="<ABSOLUTE_PATH_TO_ASM>.dll"`

`path` **must** point to the absolute location of the ASM DLL.

## 6. Security and Privacy Guidelines

*This section is normative.*

ASM developers must carefully protect the FIDO UAF data they are working with. ASMs must follow these security guidelines:

- ASMs **must** implement a mechanism for isolating UAF credentials registered by two different FIDO UAF Clients from one another. One FIDO UAF Client **must not** have access to FIDO UAF credentials that have been registered via a different FIDO UAF Client. This prevents malware from exercising credentials associated with a legitimate FIDO Client.

### NOTE

ASMs must properly protect their sensitive data against malware using platform-provided isolation capabilities in order to follow the assumptions made in [FIDOSecRef]. Malware with root access to the system or direct physical attack on the device are out of scope for this requirement.

### NOTE

The following are examples for achieving this:

- If an ASM is bundled with a FIDO UAF Client, this isolation mechanism is already built-in.
- If the ASM and FIDO UAF Client are implemented by the same vendor, the vendor may implement proprietary mechanisms to bind its ASM exclusively to its own FIDO UAF Client.
- On some platforms ASMs and the FIDO UAF Clients may be assigned with a special privilege or permissions which regular applications don't have. ASMs built for such platforms may avoid supporting isolation of UAF credentials per FIDO UAF Clients since all FIDO UAF Clients will be considered equally trusted.

- An ASM designed specifically for bound authenticators **must** ensure that FIDO UAF credentials registered with one ASM cannot be accessed by another ASM. This is to prevent an application pretending to be an ASM from exercising legitimate UAF credentials.
  - Using a [KHAccessToken](#) offers such a mechanism.
- An ASMs must implement platform-provided security best practices for protecting UAF related stored data.
- ASMs **must not** store any sensitive FIDO UAF data in its local storage, except the following:
  - `CallerID`, `ASMTOKEN`, `PersonaID`, `KeyID`, `KeyHandle`, `AppID`

### NOTE

An ASM, for example, must never store a username provided by a FIDO Server in its local storage in a form other than being decryptable exclusively by the authenticator.

- ASMs **should** ensure that applications cannot use silent authenticators for tracking purposes. ASMs implementing support for a silent authenticator **must** show, during every registration, a user interface which explains what a silent authenticator is, asking for the users consent for the registration. Also, it is **recommended** that ASMs designed to support roaming silent authenticators either
  - Run with a special permission/privilege on the system, or
  - Have a built-in binding with the authenticator which ensures that other applications cannot directly communicate with the authenticator by bypassing this ASM.

### 6.1 KHAccessToken

`KHAccessToken` is an access control mechanism for protecting an authenticator's FIDO UAF credentials from unauthorized use. It is created by the ASM by mixing various sources of information together. Typically, a `KHAccessToken` contains the following four data items in it: `AppID`, `PersonaID`, `ASMTOKEN` and

[CallerID](#).

**AppID** is provided by the FIDO Server and is contained in every FIDO UAF message.

**PersonaID** is obtained by the ASM from the operational environment. Typically a different **PersonaID** is assigned to every operating system user account.

**ASMTOKEN** is a randomly generated secret which is maintained and protected by the ASM.

#### NOTE

In a typical implementation an ASM will randomly generate an **ASMTOKEN** when it is launched the first time and will maintain this secret until the ASM is uninstalled.

**CallerID** is the ID the platform has assigned to the calling FIDO UAF Client (e.g. "bundle ID" for iOS). On different platforms the *CallerID* can be obtained differently.

#### NOTE

For example on Android platform ASM can use the hash of the caller's **apk-signing-cert**.

The ASM uses the **KHAccessToken** to establish a link between the ASM and the key handle that is created by authenticator on behalf of this ASM.

The ASM provides the **KHAccessToken** to the authenticator with every command which works with key handles.

#### NOTE

The following example describes how the ASM constructs and uses **KHAccessToken**.

- During a **Register** request
  - Set **KHAccessToken** to a secret value only known to the ASM. This value will always be the same for this ASM.
  - Append **AppID**
    - **KHAccessToken = AppID**
  - If a bound authenticator, append **ASMTOKEN**, **PersonaID** and **CallerID**
    - **KHAccessToken |= ASMTOKEN | PersonaID | CallerID**
  - Hash **KHAccessToken**
    - Hash **KHAccessToken** using the authenticator's hashing algorithm. The reason of using authenticator specific hash function is to make sure of interoperability between ASMs. If interoperability is not required, an ASM can use any other secure hash function it wants.
    - **KHAccessToken=hash(KHAccessToken)**
  - Provide **KHAccessToken** to the authenticator
  - The authenticator puts the **KHAccessToken** into **RawKeyHandle** (see [\[UAFAuthnrCommands\]](#) for more details)
- During other commands which require **KHAccessToken** as input argument
  - The ASM computes **KHAccessToken** the same way as during the **Register** request and provides it to the authenticator along with other arguments.
  - The authenticator unwraps the provided key handle(s) and proceeds with the command only if **RawKeyHandle.KHAccessToken** is equal to the provided **KHAccessToken**.

Bound authenticators **must** support a mechanism for binding generated key handles to ASMs. The binding mechanism **must** have at least the same security characteristics as mechanism for protecting **KHAccessToken** described above. As a consequence it is **recommended** to securely derive **KHAccessToken** from **AppID**, **ASMTOKEN**, **PersonaID** and the **CallerID**.

#### NOTE

It is recommended for roaming authenticators that the **KHAccessToken** contains only the **AppID** since otherwise users won't be able to use them on different machines (**PersonaID**, **ASMTOKEN** and **CallerID** are platform specific). If the authenticator vendor decides to do that in order to address a specific use case, however, it is allowed.

Including **PersonaID** in the **KHAccessToken** is optional for all types of authenticators. However an authenticator designed for multi-user systems will likely have to support it.

If an ASM for roaming authenticators doesn't use a **KHAccessToken** which is different for each **AppID**, the ASM **must** include the **AppID** in the command for a **deregister** request containing an empty **KeyID**.

## 6.2 Access Control for ASM APIs

The following table summarizes the access control requirements for each API call.

ASMs **must** implement the access control requirements defined below. ASM vendors **may** implement additional security mechanisms.

Terms used in the table:

- **NoAuth** -- no access control
- **CallerID** -- FIDO UAF Client's platform-assigned ID is verified
- **UserVerify** -- user must be explicitly verified
- **KeyIDList** -- must be known to the caller

Commands	First-factor bound authenticator	Second-factor bound authenticator	First-factor roaming authenticator	Second-factor roaming authenticator
GetInfo	NoAuth	NoAuth	NoAuth	NoAuth
OpenSettings	NoAuth	NoAuth	NoAuth	NoAuth
Register	UserVerify	UserVerify	UserVerify	UserVerify



Authenticate	UserVerify AppID CallerID PersonalID	UserVerify AppID KeyIDList CallerID PersonalID	UserVerify AppID	UserVerify AppID KeyIDList
GetRegistrations*	CallerID PersonalID	CallerID PersonalID	X	X
Deregister	AppID KeyID PersonalID CallerID	AppID KeyID PersonalID CallerID	AppID KeyID	AppID KeyID

## A. References

### A.1 Normative references

#### [ECMA-262]

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### A.2 Informative references

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