



IMPLEMENTATION DRAFT

# FIDO Registry of Predefined Values

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## Abstract

This document defines all the strings and constants reserved by FIDO protocols. The values defined in this document are referenced by various FIDO specifications.

## Status of This Document

*This section describes the status of this document at the time of its publication. Other documents may supersede this document. A list of current FIDO Alliance publications and the latest revision of this technical report can be found in the [FIDO Alliance specifications index](#) at <https://www.fidoalliance.org/specifications/>.*

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## 1. Notation

Type names, attribute names and element names are written as `code`.

String literals are enclosed in “”, e.g. “UAF-TLV”.

In formulas we use “|” to denote byte wise concatenation operations.

FIDO specific terminology used in this document is defined in [\[FIDOGlossary\]](#).

Some entries are marked as “**(optional)**” in this spec. The meaning of this is defined in other FIDO specifications referring to this document.

### 1.1 Conformance

As well as sections marked as non-normative, all authoring guidelines, diagrams, examples, and notes in this specification are non-normative. Everything else in this specification is normative.

The key words **must**, **must not**, **required**, **should**, **should not**, **recommended**, **may**, and **optional** in this specification are to be interpreted as described in [\[RFC2119\]](#).

## 2. Overview

*This section is non-normative.*

This document defines the registry of FIDO-specific constants common to multiple FIDO protocol families. It is expected that, over time, new constants will be added to this registry. For example new authentication algorithms and new types of authenticator characteristics will require new constants to be defined for use within the specifications.

## 3. Authenticator Characteristics

*This section is normative.*

### 3.1 User Verification Methods

The **USER\_VERIFY** constants are flags in a bitfield represented as a 32 bit long integer. They describe the methods and capabilities of an UAF authenticator for *locally* verifying a user. The operational details of these methods are opaque to the server. These constants are used in the authoritative metadata for an authenticator, reported and queried through the UAF Discovery APIs, and used to form authenticator policies in UAF protocol messages.

All user verification methods must be performed locally by the authenticator in order to meet FIDO privacy principles.

#### **USER\_VERIFY\_PRESENCE 0x00000001**

This flag **must** be set if the authenticator is able to confirm user presence in any fashion. If this flag and no other is set for user verification, the guarantee is only that the authenticator cannot be operated without some human intervention, not necessarily that the presence verification provides any level of authentication of the human's identity. (e.g. a device that requires a touch to activate)

#### **USER\_VERIFY\_FINGERPRINT 0x00000002**

This flag **must** be set if the authenticator uses any type of measurement of a fingerprint for user verification.

#### **USER\_VERIFY\_PASSCODE 0x00000004**

This flag **must** be set if the authenticator uses a local-only passcode (i.e. a passcode not known by the server) for user verification.

#### **USER\_VERIFY\_VOICEPRINT 0x00000008**

This flag **must** be set if the authenticator uses a voiceprint (also known as speaker recognition) for user verification.

#### **USER\_VERIFY\_FACEPRINT 0x00000010**

This flag **must** be set if the authenticator uses any manner of face recognition to verify the user.

#### **USER\_VERIFY\_LOCATION 0x00000020**

This flag **must** be set if the authenticator uses any form of location sensor or measurement for user verification.

#### **USER\_VERIFY\_EYEPRINT 0x00000040**

This flag **must** be set if the authenticator uses any form of eye biometrics for user verification.

#### **USER\_VERIFY\_PATTERN 0x00000080**

This flag **must** be set if the authenticator uses a drawn pattern for user verification.

#### **USER\_VERIFY\_HANDPRINT 0x00000100**

This flag **must** be set if the authenticator uses any measurement of a full hand (including palm-print, hand geometry or vein geometry) for user verification.

#### **USER\_VERIFY\_NONE 0x00000200**

This flag **must** be set if the authenticator will respond without any user interaction (e.g. Silent Authenticator).

#### **USER\_VERIFY\_ALL 0x00000400**

If an authenticator sets multiple flags for user verification types, it **may** also set this flag to indicate that all verification methods will be enforced (e.g. faceprint AND voiceprint). If flags for multiple user verification methods are set and this flag is not set, verification with only one is necessary (e.g. fingerprint OR passcode).

### 3.2 Key Protection Types

The **KEY\_PROTECTION** constants are flags in a bit field represented as a 16 bit long integer. They describe the method an authenticator uses to protect the private key material for FIDO

registrations. Refer to [UAFAuthnrCommands] for more details on the relevance of keys and key protection. These constants are used in the authoritative metadata for an authenticator, reported and queried through the UAF Discovery APIs, and used to form authenticator policies in UAF protocol messages.

When used in metadata describing an authenticator, several of these flags are *exclusive* of others (i.e. can not be combined) - the certified metadata may have at most one of the mutually exclusive bits set to 1. When used in authenticator policy, any bit may be set to 1, e.g. to indicate that a server is willing to accept authenticators using either

`KEY_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE` or `KEY_PROTECTION_HARDWARE`.

## NOTE

These flags must be set according to the *effective* security of the keys, in order to follow the assumptions made in [FIDOSecRef]. For example, if a key is stored in a secure element *but* software running on the FIDO User Device could call a function in the secure element to export the key either in the clear or using an arbitrary wrapping key, then the effective security is `KEY_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE` and not

`KEY_PROTECTION_SECURE_ELEMENT`.

### `KEY_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE 0x0001`

This flag **must** be set if the authenticator uses software-based key management.

Exclusive in authenticator metadata with `KEY_PROTECTION_HARDWARE`,  
`KEY_PROTECTION_TEE`, `KEY_PROTECTION_SECURE_ELEMENT`

### `KEY_PROTECTION_HARDWARE 0x0002`

This flag **should** be set if the authenticator uses hardware-based key management.

Exclusive in authenticator metadata with `KEY_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE`

### `KEY_PROTECTION_TEE 0x0004`

This flag **should** be set if the authenticator uses the Trusted Execution Environment [TEE] for key management. In authenticator metadata, this flag should be set in

conjunction with `KEY_PROTECTION_HARDWARE`. Mutually exclusive in authenticator metadata with `KEY_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE`, `KEY_PROTECTION_SECURE_ELEMENT`

### `KEY_PROTECTION_SECURE_ELEMENT 0x0008`

This flag **should** be set if the authenticator uses a Secure Element [SecureElement] for key management. In authenticator metadata, this flag should be set in conjunction with

`KEY_PROTECTION_HARDWARE`. Mutually exclusive in authenticator metadata with `KEY_PROTECTION_TEE`, `KEY_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE`

### `KEY_PROTECTION_REMOTE_HANDLE 0x0010`

This flag **must** be set if the authenticator does not store (wrapped) UAuth keys at the client, but relies on a server-provided key handle. This flag **must** be set in conjunction with one of the other `KEY_PROTECTION` flags to indicate how the local key handle wrapping key and operations are protected. Servers **may** unset this flag in authenticator policy if they are not prepared to store and return key handles, for example, if they have a requirement to respond indistinguishably to authentication attempts against userIDs that do and do not exist. Refer to [UAFProtocol] for more details.

## 3.3 Matcher Protection Types

The `MATCHER_PROTECTION` constants are flags in a bit field represented as a 16 bit long integer. They describe the method an authenticator uses to protect the matcher that performs user verification. These constants are used in the authoritative metadata for an authenticator, reported and queried through the UAF Discovery APIs, and used to form authenticator policies in UAF protocol messages. Refer to [UAFAuthnrCommands] for more details on the matcher component.

## NOTE

These flags must be set according to the *effective* security of the matcher, in order to follow the assumptions made in [FIDOSecRef]. For example, if a passcode based matcher is implemented in a secure element, but the passcode is expected to be

provided as unauthenticated parameter, then the effective security is `MATCHER_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE` and not `MATCHER_PROTECTION_ON_CHIP`.

#### `MATCHER_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE 0x0001`

This flag **must** be set if the authenticator's matcher is running in software. Exclusive in authenticator metadata with `MATCHER_PROTECTION_TEE`, `MATCHER_PROTECTION_ON_CHIP`

#### `MATCHER_PROTECTION_TEE 0x0002`

This flag **should** be set if the authenticator's matcher is running inside the Trusted Execution Environment [TEE]. Mutually exclusive in authenticator metadata with `MATCHER_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE`, `MATCHER_PROTECTION_ON_CHIP`

#### `MATCHER_PROTECTION_ON_CHIP 0x0004`

This flag **should** be set if the authenticator's matcher is running on the chip. Mutually exclusive in authenticator metadata with `MATCHER_PROTECTION_TEE`, `MATCHER_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE`

### 3.4 Authenticator Attachment Hints

The `ATTACHMENT_HINT` constants are flags in a bit field represented as a 32 bit long. They describe the method an authenticator uses to communicate with the FIDO User Device. These constants are reported and queried through the UAF Discovery APIs [UAFAppAPIAndTransport], and used to form Authenticator policies in UAF protocol messages. Because the connection state and topology of an authenticator may be transient, these values are only hints that can be used by server-supplied policy to guide the user experience, e.g. to prefer a device that is connected and ready for authenticating or confirming a low-value transaction, rather than one that is more secure but requires more user effort.

#### NOTE

These flags are not a mandatory part of authenticator metadata and, when present, only indicate possible states that may be reported during authenticator discovery.

#### `ATTACHMENT_HINT_INTERNAL 0x0001`

This flag **may** be set to indicate that the authenticator is permanently attached to the FIDO User Device.

A device such as a smartphone may have authenticator functionality that is able to be used both locally and remotely. In such a case, the FIDO client **must** filter and exclusively report only the relevant bit during Discovery and when performing policy matching.

This flag cannot be combined with any other `ATTACHMENT_HINT` flags.

#### `ATTACHMENT_HINT_EXTERNAL 0x0002`

This flag **may** be set to indicate, for a hardware-based authenticator, that it is removable or remote from the FIDO User Device.

A device such as a smartphone may have authenticator functionality that is able to be used both locally and remotely. In such a case, the FIDO UAF Client **must** filter and exclusively report only the relevant bit during discovery and when performing policy matching.

#### `ATTACHMENT_HINT_WIRED 0x0004`

This flag **may** be set to indicate that an external authenticator currently has an exclusive wired connection, e.g. through USB, Firewire or similar, to the FIDO User Device.

#### `ATTACHMENT_HINT_WIRELESS 0x0008`

This flag **may** be set to indicate that an external authenticator communicates with the FIDO User Device through a personal area or otherwise non-routed wireless protocol, such as Bluetooth or NFC.

#### `ATTACHMENT_HINT_NFC 0x0010`

This flag **may** be set to indicate that an external authenticator is able to communicate by NFC to the FIDO User Device. As part of authenticator metadata, or when reporting characteristics through discovery, if this flag is set, the `ATTACHMENT_HINT_WIRELESS` flag **should** also be set as well.

**ATTACHMENT\_HINT\_BLUETOOTH 0x0020**

This flag **may** be set to indicate that an external authenticator is able to communicate using Bluetooth with the FIDO User Device. As part of authenticator metadata, or when reporting characteristics through discovery, if this flag is set, the `ATTACHMENT_HINT_WIRELESS` flag **should** also be set.

**ATTACHMENT\_HINT\_NETWORK 0x0040**

This flag **may** be set to indicate that the authenticator is connected to the FIDO User Device over a non-exclusive network (e.g. over a TCP/IP LAN or WAN, as opposed to a PAN or point-to-point connection).

**ATTACHMENT\_HINT\_READY 0x0080**

This flag **may** be set to indicate that an external authenticator is in a "ready" state. This flag is set by the ASM at its discretion.

## NOTE

Generally this should indicate that the device is immediately available to perform user verification without additional actions such as connecting the device or creating a new biometric profile enrollment, but the exact meaning may vary for different types of devices. For example, a USB authenticator may only report itself as ready when it is plugged in, or a Bluetooth authenticator when it is paired and connected, but an NFC-based authenticator may always report itself as ready.

**ATTACHMENT\_HINT\_WIFI\_DIRECT 0x0100**

This flag **may** be set to indicate that an external authenticator is able to communicate using WiFi Direct with the FIDO User Device. As part of authenticator metadata and when reporting characteristics through discovery, if this flag is set, the `ATTACHMENT_HINT_WIRELESS` flag **should** also be set.

## 3.5 Transaction Confirmation Display Types

The `TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY` constants are flags in a bit field represented as a 16 bit long integer. They describe the availability and implementation of a transaction confirmation display capability required for the transaction confirmation operation. These constants are used in the authoritative metadata for an authenticator, reported and queried through the UAF Discovery APIs, and used to form authenticator policies in UAF protocol messages. Refer to [[UAFAuthnrCommands](#)] for more details on the security aspects of TransactionConfirmation Display.

**TRANSACTION\_CONFIRMATION\_DISPLAY\_ANY 0x0001**

This flag **must** be set to indicate that a transaction confirmation display, of any type, is available on this authenticator. Other `TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY` flags **may** also be set if this flag is set. If the authenticator does not support a transaction confirmation display, then the value of `TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY` **must** be set to 0.

**TRANSACTION\_CONFIRMATION\_DISPLAY\_PRIVILEGED\_SOFTWARE 0x0002**

This flag **must** be set to indicate, that a software-based transaction confirmation display operating in a privileged context is available on this authenticator.

A FIDO client that is capable of providing this capability **may** set this bit (in conjunction with `TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY_ANY`) for all authenticators of type `ATTACHMENT_HINT_INTERNAL`, even if the authoritative metadata for the authenticator does not indicate this capability.

## NOTE

Software based transaction confirmation displays might be implemented within



the boundaries of the ASM rather than by the authenticator itself [UAFASM].

This flag is mutually exclusive with `TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY_TEE` and `TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY_HARDWARE`.

**`TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY_TEE 0x0004`**

This flag **should** be set to indicate that the authenticator implements a transaction confirmation display in a Trusted Execution Environment ([`TEE`], [`TEESecureDisplay`]). This flag is mutually exclusive with

`TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY_PRIVILEGED_SOFTWARE` and `TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY_HARDWARE`.

**`TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY_HARDWARE 0x0008`**

This flag **should** be set to indicate that a transaction confirmation display based on hardware assisted capabilities is available on this authenticator. This flag is mutually exclusive with `TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY_PRIVILEGED_SOFTWARE` and `TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY_TEE`.

**`TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY_REMOTE 0x0010`**

This flag **should** be set to indicate that the transaction confirmation display is provided on a distinct device from the FIDO User Device. This flag can be combined with any other flag.

## 3.6 Tags used for crypto algorithms and types

These tags indicate the specific authentication algorithms, public key formats and other crypto relevant data.

### 3.6.1 Authentication Algorithms

The `ALG_SIGN` constants are 16 bit long integers indicating the specific signature algorithm and encoding.

#### NOTE

FIDO UAF supports RAW and DER signature encodings in order to allow small footprint authenticator implementations.

**`ALG_SIGN_SECP256R1_ECDSA_SHA256_RAW 0x0001`**

An ECDSA signature on the NIST secp256r1 curve which **must** have raw R and S buffers, encoded in big-endian order. This is the signature encoding as specified in [`ECDSA-ANSI`].

I.e. [`R (32 bytes), S (32 bytes)`]

This algorithm is suitable for authenticators using the following key representation formats:

- `ALG_KEY_ECC_X962_RAW`
- `ALG_KEY_ECC_X962_DER`

**`ALG_SIGN_SECP256R1_ECDSA_SHA256_DER 0x0002`**

DER [`ITU-X690-2008`] encoded ECDSA signature [`RFC5480`] on the NIST secp256r1 curve.

I.e. a DER encoded `SEQUENCE { r INTEGER, s INTEGER }`

This algorithm is suitable for authenticators using the following key representation formats:

- `ALG_KEY_ECC_X962_RAW`

- ALG\_KEY\_ECC\_X962\_DER

#### ALG\_SIGN\_RSASSA\_PSS\_SHA256\_RAW 0x0003

RSASSA-PSS [RFC3447] signature **must** have raw S buffers, encoded in big-endian order [RFC4055] [RFC4056]. The default parameters as specified in [RFC4055] **must** be assumed, i.e.

- Mask Generation Algorithm MGF1 with SHA256
- Salt Length of 32 bytes, i.e. the length of a SHA256 hash value.
- Trailer Field value of 1, which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value 0xBC.

i.e. [ S (256 bytes) ]

This algorithm is suitable for authenticators using the following key representation formats:

- ALG\_KEY\_RSA\_2048\_RAW
- ALG\_KEY\_RSA\_2048\_DER

#### ALG\_SIGN\_RSASSA\_PSS\_SHA256\_DER 0x0004

DER [ITU-X690-2008] encoded OCTET STRING (not BIT STRING!) containing the RSASSA-PSS [RFC3447] signature [RFC4055] [RFC4056]. The default parameters as specified in [RFC4055] **must** be assumed, i.e.

- Mask Generation Algorithm MGF1 with SHA256
- Salt Length of 32 bytes, i.e. the length of a SHA256 hash value.
- Trailer Field value of 1, which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value 0xBC.

i.e. a DER encoded OCTET STRING (including its tag and length bytes).

This algorithm is suitable for authenticators using the following key representation formats:

- ALG\_KEY\_RSA\_2048\_RAW
- ALG\_KEY\_RSA\_2048\_DER

#### ALG\_SIGN\_SECP256K1\_ECDSA\_SHA256\_RAW 0x0005

An ECDSA signature on the secp256k1 curve which **must** have raw R and S buffers, encoded in big-endian order.

i.e. [R (32 bytes), S (32 bytes)]

This algorithm is suitable for authenticators using the following key representation formats:

- ALG\_KEY\_ECC\_X962\_RAW
- ALG\_KEY\_ECC\_X962\_DER

#### ALG\_SIGN\_SECP256K1\_ECDSA\_SHA256\_DER 0x0006

DER [ITU-X690-2008] encoded ECDSA signature [RFC5480] on the secp256k1 curve.

i.e. a DER encoded SEQUENCE { r INTEGER, s INTEGER }

This algorithm is suitable for authenticators using the following key representation formats:

- ALG\_KEY\_ECC\_X962\_RAW



- ALG\_KEY\_ECC\_X962\_DER

#### ALG\_SIGN\_SM2\_SM3\_RAW 0x0007 (optional)

Chinese SM2 elliptic curve based signature algorithm combined with SM3 hash algorithm [OSCCA-SM2][OSCCA-SM3]. We use the 256bit curve [OSCCA-SM2-curve-param].

This algorithm is suitable for authenticators using the following key representation format: ALG\_KEY\_ECC\_X962\_RAW.

#### ALG\_SIGN\_RSA\_EMSA\_PKCS1\_SHA256\_RAW 0x0008

This is the EMSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 signature as defined in [RFC3447]. This means that the encoded message EM will be the input to the cryptographic signing algorithm RSASP1 as defined in [RFC3447]. The result s of RSASP1 is then encoded using function I2OSP to produce the raw signature octets.

- $EM = 0x00 \mid 0x01 \mid PS \mid 0x00 \mid T$
- with the padding string PS with length=emLen - tLen - 3 octets having the value 0xff for each octet, e.g. (0x) ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
- with the DER [ITU-X690-2008] encoded DigestInfo value T: (0x)30 31 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00 04 20 | H, where H denotes the bytes of the SHA256 hash value.

This algorithm is suitable for authenticators using the following key representation formats:

- ALG\_KEY\_RSA\_2048\_RAW
- ALG\_KEY\_RSA\_2048\_DER

#### NOTE

Implementers should verify that their implementation of the PKCS#1 V1.5 signature follows the recommendations in [RFC3218] to protect against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks such as Bleichenbacher.

#### ALG\_SIGN\_RSA\_EMSA\_PKCS1\_SHA256\_DER 0x0009

DER [ITU-X690-2008] encoded OCTET STRING (not BIT STRING!) containing the EMSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 signature as defined in [RFC3447]. This means that the encoded message EM will be the input to the cryptographic signing algorithm RSASP1 as defined in [RFC3447]. The result s of RSASP1 is then encoded using function I2OSP to produce the raw signature. The raw signature is DER [ITU-X690-2008] encoded as an OCTET STRING to produce the final signature octets.

- $EM = 0x00 \mid 0x01 \mid PS \mid 0x00 \mid T$
- with the padding string PS with length=emLen - tLen - 3 octets having the value 0xff for each octet, e.g. (0x) ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
- with the DER encoded DigestInfo value T: (0x)30 31 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00 04 20 | H, where H denotes the bytes of the SHA256 hash value.

This algorithm is suitable for authenticators using the following key representation formats:

- ALG\_KEY\_RSA\_2048\_RAW
- ALG\_KEY\_RSA\_2048\_DER

#### NOTE

Implementers should verify that their implementation of the PKCS#1 V1.5 signature follows the recommendations in [RFC3218] to protect against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks such as Bleichenbacher.

### 3.6.2 Public Key Representation Formats

The `ALG_KEY` constants are 16 bit long integers indicating the specific Public Key algorithm and encoding.

#### NOTE

FIDO UAF supports RAW and DER encodings in order to allow small footprint authenticator implementations. By definition, the authenticator must encode the public key as part of the registration assertion.

#### `ALG_KEY_ECC_X962_RAW 0x0100`

Raw ANSI X9.62 formatted Elliptic Curve public key [SEC1].

I.e. `[0x04, X (32 bytes), Y (32 bytes)]`. Where the byte `0x04` denotes the uncompressed point compression method.

#### `ALG_KEY_ECC_X962_DER 0x0101`

DER [ITU-X690-2008] encoded ANSI X.9.62 formatted `SubjectPublicKeyInfo` [RFC5480] specifying an elliptic curve public key.

I.e. a DER encoded `SubjectPublicKeyInfo` as defined in [RFC5480].

Authenticator implementations **must** generate `namedCurve` in the `ECPParameters` object which is included in the `AlgorithmIdentifier`. A FIDO UAF Server **must** accept `namedCurve` in the `ECPParameters` object which is included in the `AlgorithmIdentifier`.

#### `ALG_KEY_RSA_2048_RAW 0x0102`

Raw encoded 2048-bit RSA public key [RFC3447].

That is, `[n (256 bytes), e (N-256 bytes)]`. Where `N` is the total length of the field.

This total length should be taken from the object containing this key, e.g. the TLV encoded field.

#### `ALG_KEY_RSA_2048_DER 0x0103`

ASN.1 DER [ITU-X690-2008] encoded 2048-bit RSA [RFC3447] public key [RFC4055].

That is a DER encoded `SEQUENCE { n INTEGER, e INTEGER }`.

## A. References

### A.1 Normative references

#### [FIDOGlossary]

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**[RFC5480]**

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**[SEC1]**

Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG), *SEC1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography*, Version 2.0, September 2000.

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