FIDO Authenticator Allowed Restricted Operating Environments List

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Abstract

This document helps support the FIDO Authenticator Security Certification program. The FIDO Security Certification program has chosen only to certify authenticators running in Allowed Restricted Operating Environments (AROE). Authenticators not running in an allowed restricted operating environment are not eligible for FIDO Security Certification.

NOTE
As of February 2017, work on a certification program that does not require an AROE was started by the FIDO Alliance. This work will also result in a renaming or renumber of the security levels. The security level naming and numbering used here is the one in common use during 2015 and 2016 where the lowest security certification is Level 1 and Level 1 requires an AROE.

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1. Notation
The key words "must", "must not", "required", "shall", "shall not", "should", "should not", "recommended", "may", and "optional" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Introduction

FIDO Authenticators can be implemented in various ways.

The FIDO Authenticator is typically implemented based on some hardware and firmware. For example, this might be a secure element as hardware with the basic secure element firmware in which the Authenticator Trusted Application runs. As another example it might also be a multifunctional device containing some CPUs which are securely shared between the firmware of the restricted operating environment and the high-level operating system.

It is important that by definition, all parts which are relevant for the FIDO Authenticator (e.g. underlying hardware, ...) are part of the Authenticator itself. So the FIDO Authenticator is more than just the Authenticator Application.

We use the term Authenticator Application to refer to the entity that combines the underlying hardware and firmware in a way that results in a FIDO Authenticator.

We distinguish these components as the Restricted Operating Environment can be implemented in a way that it supports more than just the Authenticator Application. Additionally the security of the Restricted Operating Environment (ROE) (without the Authenticator Application) can be demonstrated or certified using existing programs (e.g. Common Criteria).

The FIDO Security Certification covers the various components with different depths. At FIDO Security Levels 1 and 2, we are mostly concerned about the protection against scalable attacks (e.g. malware). At FIDO Security Levels 3 and 4 we also require protection against physical attacks.
The following aspects of the AROE are relevant for the FIDO Security Certification:

3. Allowed Restricted Operating Environments

The following table outlines the Allowed Restricted Operating Environments (AROE) for FIDO Security Certification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operating Environment</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Environment</td>
<td>All operating systems (ROE firmware) running on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEE Based on Intel VT HW</td>
<td>Intel VT HW are accepted for Level 1 FIDO Security Certification. See <em>Intel Vanderpool Technology for IA-32 Processors (VT-x) Preliminary Specification</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEE Based on Intel SGX HW</td>
<td>All operating systems (ROE firmware) running on Intel SGX HW are accepted for Level 1 FIDO Security Certification. See <em>Innovative Instructions and Software Model for Isolated Execution and Innovative Technology for CPU based Attestation and Sealing</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEE Based on Intel ME/TXE HW</td>
<td>All operating systems (ROE firmware) running on Intel ME/TXE HW are accepted for Level 1 FIDO Security Certification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEE with GlobalPlatform TEE Protection Profile Certification</td>
<td>GlobalPlatform TEE Protection Profile Certification is NOT required for Level 1 FIDO Security Certification, but it is sufficient for any TEE to be qualified as an Allowed Restricted Operating Environment. See <em>TEE Protection Profile v1.2.1</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure World of AMD PSP (Platform Security coProcessor).</td>
<td>All operating environments running on the secure world side of the TrustZone in the AMD PSP. See <em>AMD Secure Technology</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) Complying to Trusted Computing Group specifications.</td>
<td>For example, TPM Main Specification Version 1.2 [TPM] or TPM Library Specification Version 2.0 [TPMv2].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure Element (SE)</td>
<td>Secure Operating Systems (ROE firmware) running on a secure tamper-resistant microcontroller.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Requirements for Restricted Operating Environment to be Allowed

- The AROE security configuration **must** be controlled by the vendor of the commercial device or its delegates or its suppliers.
- The AROE **must** protect itself from modifications degrading its security. This includes modifications when powered-off. It hence requires a secure boot process of the AROE.
- The AROE **must** provide full isolation from any rich OS or external devices or operating environments it connects with except for conveyance of protocol messages intended for communication with the rich OS and external devices or operating environments. As a consequence, it **must not** be possible for SW or HW on the same device but outside the AROE to modify any state, registers, memory or storage inside the operating environment.
- The AROE **should** be security-oriented with the bulk of the functionality it hosts and provides being focused primarily on security (e.g., not large graphics engines, signal processors, general purpose app hosting, network stacks and such).
- The apps hosted by the AROE **should** be primarily security-oriented (e.g., does not host thousands of downloadable games, complex productivity apps like word processors, or large scale network apps like web browsers).
- A security oriented SW engineering practice **should** be followed
  - Code is reviewed by security experts
  - A security patch system is in place
  - Security incidents are tracked
  - Security coding practice is followed
  - System documentation is produced

A. References

A.1 Normative references


A.2 Informative references

[TPM]  

[TPMv2]  