FIDO UAF Registry of Predefined Values

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Abstract

This document defines all the strings and constants reserved by UAF protocols. The values defined in this document are referenced by various UAF specifications.

Status of This Document

This section describes the status of this document at the time of its publication. Other documents may supersede this document. A list of current FIDO Alliance publications and the latest revision of this technical report can be found in the FIDO Alliance specifications index at https://www.fidoalliance.org/specifications/.

This document was published by the FIDO Alliance as a Implementation Draft. This document is intended to become a FIDO Alliance Proposed Standard. If you wish to make comments regarding this document, please Contact Us. All comments are welcome.

Table of Contents

1. Notation

Type names, attribute names and element names are written as `code`.

String literals are enclosed in “”, e.g. “UAF-TLV”.

In formulas we use “|” to denote byte wise concatenation operations.

UAF specific terminology used in this document is defined in [FIDOGlossary].

All diagrams, examples, notes in this specification are non-normative.

1.1 Key Words

The key words “must”, “must not”, “required”, “shall”, “shall not”, “should”, “should not”, “recommended”, “may”, and “optional” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Overview

This section is non-normative.

This document defines the registry of UAF-specific constants that are used and referenced in various UAF specifications. It is expected that, over time, new constants will be added to this registry. For example new authentication algorithms and new types of authenticator characteristics will require new constants to be defined for use within the specifications.

3. Authenticator Characteristics

This section is normative.

3.1 User Verification Methods

The `USER_VERIFY` constants are flags in a bitfield represented as a 32 bit long integer. They describe the methods and capabilities of an UAF authenticator for *locally* verifying a user. The operational details of these methods are opaque to the server. These constants are used in the authoritative metadata for an authenticator, reported and queried through the UAF Discovery APIs, and used to form authenticator policies in UAF protocol messages.

All user verification methods must be performed locally by the authenticator in order to meet FIDO privacy principles.

`USER_VERIFY_PRESENCE 0x01`
: This flag must be set if the authenticator is able to confirm user presence in any fashion. If this flag and no other is set for user verification, the guarantee is only that the authenticator cannot be operated without some human intervention, not necessarily that the presence verification provides any level of authentication of the human's identity. (e.g. a device that requires a touch to activate)

`USER_VERIFY_FINGERPRINT 0x02`
: This flag must be set if the authenticator uses any type of measurement of a fingerprint for user verification.

`USER_VERIFY_PASSCODE 0x04`
: This flag must be set if the authenticator uses a local-only passcode (i.e. a passcode not known by the server) for user verification.

`USER_VERIFY_VOICEPRINT 0x08`
: This flag must be set if the authenticator uses a voiceprint (also known as speaker recognition) for user verification.

`USER_VERIFY_FACEPRINT 0x10`
: This flag must be set if the authenticator uses any manner of face recognition to verify the user.

`USER_VERIFY_LOCATION 0x20`
: This flag must be set if the authenticator uses any form of location sensor or measurement for user verification.

`USER_VERIFY_EYEPRINT 0x40`
: This flag must be set if the authenticator uses any form of eye biometrics for user verification.

`USER_VERIFY_PATTERN 0x80`
: This flag must be set if the authenticator uses a drawn pattern for user verification.

`USER_VERIFY_HANDPRINT 0x100`
: This flag must be set if the authenticator uses any measurement of a full hand (including palm-print, hand geometry or vein geometry) for user verification.

`USER_VERIFY_NONE 0x200`
: This flag must be set if the authenticator will respond without any user interaction (e.g. Silent Authenticator).

`USER_VERIFY_ALL 0x400`

If an authenticator sets multiple flags for user verification types, it may also set this flag to indicate that all verification methods will be enforced (e.g. faceprint AND voiceprint). If flags for multiple user verification methods are set and this flag is not set, verification with only one is necessary (e.g. fingerprint OR passcode).

3.2 Key Protection Types

The KEY_PROTECTION constants are flags in a bit field represented as a 16 bit long integer. They describe the method an authenticator uses to protect the private key material for FIDO registrations. Refer to [UAFAuthnrCommands] for more details on the relevance of keys and key protection. These constants are used in the authoritative metadata for an authenticator, reported and queried through the UAF Discovery APIs, and used to form authenticator policies in UAF protocol messages.

When used in metadata describing an authenticator, several of these flags are *exclusive* of others (i.e. can not be combined) - the certified metadata may have at most one of the mutually exclusive bits set to 1. When used in authenticator policy, any bit may be set to 1, e.g. to indicate that a server is willing to accept authenticators using either KEY_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE or KEY_PROTECTION_HARDWARE.

> NOTE
>
> These flags must be set according to the *effective* security of the keys, in order to follow the assumptions made in [FIDOSecRef]. For example, if a key is stored in a secure element *but* software running on the FIDO User Device could call a function in the secure element to export the key either in the clear or using an arbitrary wrapping key, then the effective security is KEY_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE and not KEY_PROTECTION_SECURE_ELEMENT.

KEY_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE 0x01
: This flag must be set if the authenticator uses software-based key management. Exclusive in authenticator metadata with KEY_PROTECTION_HARDWARE, KEY_PROTECTION_TEE, KEY_PROTECTION_SECURE_ELEMENT

KEY_PROTECTION_HARDWARE 0x02
: This flag should be set if the authenticator uses hardware-based key management. Exclusive in authenticator metadata with KEY_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE

KEY_PROTECTION_TEE 0x04
: This flag should be set if the authenticator uses the Trusted Execution Environment [TEE] for key management. In authenticator metadata, this flag should be set in conjunction with KEY_PROTECTION_HARDWARE. Exclusive in authenticator metadata with KEY_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE, KEY_PROTECTION_SECURE_ELEMENT

KEY_PROTECTION_SECURE_ELEMENT 0x08
: This flag should be set if the authenticator uses a Secure Element [SecureElement] for key management. In authenticator metadata, this flag should be set in conjunction with KEY_PROTECTION_HARDWARE. Exclusive in authenticator metadata with KEY_PROTECTION_TEE, KEY_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE

KEY_PROTECTION_REMOTE_HANDLE 0x10
: This flag must be set if the authenticator does not store (wrapped) UAuth keys at the client, but relies on a server-provided key handle. This flag must be set in conjunction with one of the other KEY_PROTECTION flags to indicate how the local key handle wrapping key and operations are protected. Servers may unset this flag in authenticator policy if they are not prepared to store and return key handles, for example, if they have a requirement to respond indistinguishably to authentication attempts against userIDs that do and do not exist. Refer to [UAFProtocol] for more details.

3.3 Matcher Protection Types

The MATCHER_PROTECTION constants are flags in a bit field represented as a 16 bit long integer. They describe the method an authenticator uses to protect the matcher that performs user verification. These constants are used in the authoritative metadata for an authenticator, reported and queried through the UAF Discovery APIs, and used to form authenticator policies in UAF protocol messages. Refer to [UAFAuthnrCommands] for more details on the matcher component.

> NOTE
>
> These flags must be set according to the *effective* security of the matcher, in order to follow the assumptions made in [FIDOSecRef]. For example, if a passcode based matcher is implemented in a secure element, but the passcode is expected to be provided as unauthenticated parameter, then the effective security is MATCHER_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE and not MATCHER_PROTECTION_ON_CHIP.

MATCHER_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE 0x01
: This flag must be set if the authenticator's matcher is running in software. Exclusive in authenticator metadata with MATCHER_PROTECTION_TEE, MATCHER_PROTECTION_ON_CHIP

MATCHER_PROTECTION_TEE 0x02
: This flag should be set if the authenticator's matcher is running inside the Trusted Execution Environment [TEE]. Exclusive in authenticator metadata with MATCHER_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE, MATCHER_PROTECTION_ON_CHIP

MATCHER_PROTECTION_ON_CHIP 0x04
: This flag should be set if the authenticator's matcher is running on the chip. Exclusive in authenticator metadata with MATCHER_PROTECTION_TEE, MATCHER_PROTECTION_SOFTWARE

3.4 Authenticator Attachment Hints

The ATTACHMENT_HINT constants are flags in a bit field represented as a 32 bit long. They describe the method an authenticator uses to communicate with the FIDO User Device. These constants are reported and queried through the UAF Discovery APIs [UAFAppAPIAndTransport], and used to form Authenticator policies in UAF protocol messages. Because the connection state and topology of an authenticator may be transient, these values are only hints that can be used by server-supplied policy to guide the user experience, e.g. to prefer a device that is connected and ready for authenticating or confirming a low-value transaction, rather than one that is more secure but requires more user effort.

> NOTE
>
> These flags are not a mandatory part of authenticator metadata and, when present, only indicate possible states that may be reported during authenticator discovery.

ATTACHMENT_HINT_INTERNAL 0x01
: This flag may be set to indicate that the authenticator is permanently attached to the FIDO User Device.

  A device such as a smartphone may have authenticator functionality that is able to be used both locally and remotely. In such a case, the FIDO client must filter and exclusively report only the relevant bit during Discovery and when performing policy matching.

  This flag cannot be combined with any other ATTACHMENT_HINT flags.

ATTACHMENT_HINT_EXTERNAL 0x02
This flag may be set to indicate, for a hardware-based authenticator, that it is removable or remote from the FIDO User Device.

A device such as a smartphone may have authenticator functionality that is able to be used both locally and remotely. In such a case, the FIDO UAF Client must filter and exclusively report only the relevant bit during discovery and when performing policy matching.

ATTACHMENT_HINT_WIRED 0x04
This flag may be set to indicate that an external authenticator currently has an exclusive wired connection, e.g. through USB, Firewire or similar, to the FIDO User Device.

ATTACHMENT_HINT_WIRELESS 0x08
This flag may be set to indicate that an external authenticator communicates with the FIDO User Device through a personal area or otherwise non-routed wireless protocol, such as Bluetooth or NFC.

ATTACHMENT_HINT_NFC 0x10
This flag may be set to indicate that an external authenticator is able to communicate by NFC to the FIDO User Device. As part of authenticator metadata, or when reporting characteristics through discovery, if this flag is set, the ATTACHMENT_HINT_WIRELESS flag should also be set as well.

ATTACHMENT_HINT_BLUETOOTH 0x20
This flag may be set to indicate that an external authenticator is able to communicate using Bluetooth with the FIDO User Device. As part of authenticator metadata, or when reporting characteristics through discovery, if this flag is set, the ATTACHMENT_HINT_WIRELESS flag should also be set.

ATTACHMENT_HINT_NETWORK 0x40
This flag may be set to indicate that the authenticator is connected to the FIDO User Device ver a non-exclusive network (e.g. over a TCP/IP LAN or WAN, as opposed to a PAN or point-to-point connection).

ATTACHMENT_HINT_READY 0x80
Thif flag may be set to indicate that an external authenticator is in a "ready" state. This flag is set by the ASM at its discretion.

> NOTE
>
> Generally this should indicate that the device is immediately available to perform user verification without additional actions such as connecting the device or creating a new biometric profile enrollment, but the exact meaning may vary for different types of devices. For example, a USB authenticator may only report itself as ready when it is plugged in, or a Bluetooth authenticator when it is paired and connected, but an NFC-based authenticator may always report itself as ready.

ATTACHMENT_HINT_WIFI_DIRECT 0x100
This flag may be set to indicate that an external authenticator is able to communicate using WiFi Direct with the FIDO User Device. As part of authenticator metadata and when reporting characteristics through discovery, if this flag is set, the ATTACHMENT_HINT_WIRELESS flag should also be set.

3.5 Transaction Confirmation Display Types

The TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY constants are flags in a bit field represented as a 16 bit long integer. They describe the availability and implementation of a transaction confirmation display capability required for the transaction confirmation operation. These constants are used in the authoritative metadata for an authenticator, reported and queried through the UAF Discovery APIs, and used to form authenticator policies in

UAF protocol messages. Refer to [UAFAuthnrCommands] for more details on the security aspects of TransactionConfirmation Display.

TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY_ANY 0x01
: This flag must be set to indicate, that some form of transaction confirmation display is available on this authenticator.

TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY_PRIVILEGED_SOFTWARE 0x02
: This flag must be set to indicate, that a software-based transaction confirmation display operating in a privileged context is available on this authenticator.

  A FIDO client that is capable of providing this capability may set this bit for all authenticators of type `ATTACHMENT_HINT_INTERNAL`, even if the authoritative metadata for the authenticator does not indicate this capability.

> NOTE
>
> Software based transaction confirmation displays might be implemented within the boundaries of the ASM rather than by the authenticator itself [UAFASM].

TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY_TEE 0x04
: This flag should be set to indicate that the authenticator implements a transaction confirmation display in a Trusted Execution Environment ([TEE], [TEESecureDisplay]).

TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY_HARDWARE 0x08
: This flag should be set to indicate that a transaction confirmation display based on hardware assisted capabilities is available on this authenticator.

TRANSACTION_CONFIRMATION_DISPLAY_REMOTE 0x10
: This flag should be set to indicate that the transaction confirmation display is provided on a distinct device from the FIDO User Device.

3.6 Tags used for crypto algorithms and types

These tags indicate the specific authentication algorithms, public key formats and other crypto relevant data.

3.6.1 Authentication Algorithms

The `UAF_ALG_SIGN` constants are 16 bit long integers indicating the specific signature algorithm and encoding.

> NOTE
>
> FIDO UAF supports RAW and DER signature encodings in order to allow small footprint authenticator implementations.

UAF_ALG_SIGN_SECP256R1_ECDSA_SHA256_RAW 0x01
: An ECDSA signature on the NIST secp256r1 curve which must have raw R and S buffers, encoded in big-endian order.

  I.e. `[R (32 bytes), S (32 bytes)]`

UAF_ALG_SIGN_SECP256R1_ECDSA_SHA256_DER 0x02
: DER [ITU-X690-2008] encoded ECDSA signature [RFC5480] on the NIST secp256r1 curve.

I.e. a DER encoded `SEQUENCE { r INTEGER, s INTEGER }`

`UAF_ALG_SIGN_RSASSA_PSS_SHA256_RAW 0x03`
RSASSA-PSS [RFC3447] signature must have raw S buffers, encoded in big-endian order [RFC4055] [RFC4056]. The default parameters as specified in [RFC4055] must be assumed, i.e.

- Mask Generation Algorithm MGF1 with SHA256
- Salt Length of 32 bytes, i.e. the length of a SHA256 hash value.
- Trailer Field value of 1, which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value `0xBC`.

I.e. `[ S (256 bytes) ]`

`UAF_ALG_SIGN_RSASSA_PSS_SHA256_DER 0x04`
DER [ITU-X690-2008] encoded OCTET STRING (not BIT STRING!) containing the RSASSA-PSS [RFC3447] signature [RFC4055] [RFC4056]. The default parameters as specified in [RFC4055] must be assumed, i.e.

- Mask Generation Algorithm MGF1 with SHA256
- Salt Length of 32 bytes, i.e. the length of a SHA256 hash value.
- Trailer Field value of 1, which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value `0xBC`.

I.e. a DER encoded `OCTET STRING` (including its tag and length bytes).

`UAF_ALG_SIGN_SECP256K1_ECDSA_SHA256_RAW 0x05`
An ECDSA signature on the secp256k1 curve which must have raw R and S buffers, encoded in big-endian order.

I.e.`[R (32 bytes), S (32 bytes)]`

`UAF_ALG_SIGN_SECP256K1_ECDSA_SHA256_DER 0x06`
DER [ITU-X690-2008] encoded ECDSA signature [RFC5480] on the secp256k1 curve.

I.e. a DER encoded `SEQUENCE { r INTEGER, s INTEGER }`

3.6.2 Public Key Representation Formats

The `UAF_ALG_KEY` constants are 16 bit long integers indicating the specific Public Key algorithm and encoding.

> NOTE
>
> FIDO UAF supports RAW and DER encodings in order to allow small footprint authenticator implementations. By definition, the authenticator must encode the public key as part of the registration assertion.

`UAF_ALG_KEY_ECC_X962_RAW 0x100`
Raw ANSI X9.62 formatted Elliptic Curve public key [SEC1].

I.e. `[0x04, X (32 bytes), Y (32 bytes)]`. Where the byte `0x04` denotes the uncompressed point compression method.

`UAF_ALG_KEY_ECC_X962_DER 0x101`

DER [ITU-X690-2008] encoded ANSI X.9.62 formatted `SubjectPublicKeyInfo` [RFC5480] specifying an elliptic curve public key.

I.e. a DER encoded `SubjectPublicKeyInfo` as defined in [RFC5480].

Authenticator implementations must generate `namedCurve` in the `ECParameters` object which is included in the `AlgorithmIdentifier`. A FIDO UAF Server must accept `namedCurve` in the `ECParameters` object which is included in the `AlgorithmIdentifier`.

`UAF_ALG_KEY_RSA_2048_PSS_RAW 0x102`

Raw encoded RSASSA-PSS public key [RFC3447].

The default parameters according to [RFC4055] must be assumed, i.e.

- Mask Generation Algorithm MGF1 with SHA256
- Salt Length of 32 bytes, i.e. the length of a SHA256 hash value.
- Trailer Field value of 1, which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value `0xBC`.

That is, `[n (256 bytes), e (N-n bytes)]`. Where `N` is the total length of the field.

This total length should be taken from the object containing this key, e.g. the TLV encoded field.

`UAF_ALG_KEY_RSA_2048_PSS_DER 0x103`

ASN.1 DER [ITU-X690-2008] encoded RSASSA-PSS [RFC3447] public key [RFC4055].

The default parameters according to [RFC4055] must be assumed, i.e.

- Mask Generation Algorithm MGF1 with SHA256
- Salt Length of 32 bytes, i.e. the length of a SHA256 hash value.
- Trailer Field value of 1, which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value `0xBC`.

That is, a DER encoded `SEQUENCE { n INTEGER, e INTEGER }`.

3.7 Assertion Schemes

Names of assertion schemes are strings with a length of 8 characters.

`UAF TLV based assertion scheme "UAFV1TLV"`

This assertion scheme allows the authenticator and the FIDO Server to exchange an asymmetric authentication key generated by the authenticator. The authenticator must generate a key pair (UAuth.pub/UAuth.priv) to be used with algorithm suites listed in section Authentication Algorithms (with prefix `UAF_ALG`). This assertion scheme is using a compact Tag Length Value (TLV) encoding for the KRD and SignData messages generated by the authenticators. This is the default assertion scheme for the UAF protocol.

4. Predefined Tags

This section is normative.

The internal structure of UAF authenticator commands is a "Tag-Length-Value" (TLV) sequence. The tag is a 2-byte unique unsigned value describing the type of field the data represents, the length is a 2-byte unsigned value indicating the size of the value in

bytes, and the value is the variable-sized series of bytes which contain data for this item in the sequence.

Although 2 bytes are allotted for the tag, only the first 14 bits (values up to 0x3FFF) should be used to accommodate the limitations of some hardware platforms.

A tag that has the 14th bit (0x2000) set indicates that it is critical and a receiver must abort processing the entire message if it cannot process that tag.

A tag that has the 13th bit (0x1000) set indicates a composite tag that can be parsed by recursive descent.

4.1 Tags used in the protocol

The following tags have been allocated for data types in UAF protocol messages:

TAG_UAFV1_REG_ASSERTION 0x3E01
: The content of this tag is the authenticator response to a Register command.

TAG_UAFV1_AUTH_ASSERTION 0x3E02
: The content of this tag is the authenticator response to a Sign command.

TAG_UAFV1_KRD 0x3E03
: Indicates Key Registration Data.

TAG_UAFV1_SIGNED_DATA 0x3E04
: Indicates data signed by the authenticator using UAuth.priv key.

TAG_ATTESTATION_CERT 0x2E05
: Indicates DER encoded attestation certificate.

TAG_SIGNATURE 0x2E06
: Indicates a cryptographic signature.

TAG_ATTESTATION_BASIC_FULL 0x3E07
: Indicates full basic attestation as defined in [UAFProtocol].

TAG_ATTESTATION_BASIC_SURROGATE 0x3E08
: Indicates surrogate basic attestation as defined in [UAFProtocol].

TAG_KEYID 0x2E09
: Represents a generated KeyID.

TAG_FINAL_CHALLENGE 0x2E0A
: Represents a generated final challenge as defined in [UAFProtocol].

TAG_AAID 0x2E0B
: Represents an Authenticator Attestation ID as defined in [UAFProtocol].

TAG_PUB_KEY 0x2E0C
: Represents a generated public key.

TAG_COUNTERS 0x2E0D
: Represents the use counters for an authenticator.

TAG_ASSERTION_INFO 0x2E0E
: Represents authenticator information necessary for message processing.

TAG_AUTHENTICATOR_NONCE 0x2E0F
: Represents a nonce value generated by the authenticator.

TAG_TRANSACTION_CONTENT_HASH 0x2E10
: Represents a hash of the transaction content sent to the authenticator.

TAG_EXTENSION 0x3E11, 0x3E12
: This is a composite tag indicating that the content is an extension.

TAG_EXTENSION_ID 0x2E13
: Represents extension ID. Content of this tag is a UINT8[] encoding of a UTF-8 string.

TAG_EXTENSION_DATA 0x2E14
: Represents extension data. Content of this tag is a UINT8[] byte array.

A. References

A.1 Normative references

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